

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Less than 10 years ago, concern about the problem of small arms and light weapons (SALW) was confined to the Press, civil society and the peoples affected. Today, this problem occupies centre stage in the international debate on the proliferation of SALW and the insecurity and socio-economic chaos that result from it. The United Nations (UN), believing that governments bear the primary responsibility for eradicating, combating and preventing the problem of SALW in civilian — mostly belligerent — hands, requests governments to intensify their efforts to resolve the problem.

The unlawful use of small arms is a global problem, which affects every country. At the global level, it is well known that far more people are killed in armed conflict through the use of small arms than by tanks and bombs. It is estimated that there are half-a-billion SALW in circulation globally and that they continue to kill over 300,000 people a year in conflict and 200,000 in criminal activity while millions more are injured, terrorized, or forced from their homes to live as refugees or as internally-displaced persons.

The use of illicit small arms leads to widespread illegal activity and eventually undermines the legitimate authority of the State and hinders the efforts to promote development in the areas affected. Such a situation must not be tolerated. It calls on all stakeholders to take up their moral obligation to alleviate the human suffering caused by small arms proliferation and to work towards greater control of these weapons. Currently, the world's attention is turning towards the linkage between security, conflict prevention, peace building and sustainable human development and Kenya cannot afford to be left out of this emerging paradigm¹. On the other hand, the cultural, socio-economic and political marginalization

¹ Tore Rose, "The Programme for Co-ordination and Assistance for Security and Development in West Africa (PCASED)" In S. Lodgaard and C. F. Ronnfeldt (eds) (1998), *A Moratorium on Light Weapons in West Africa*, Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers.

factors, coupled with the perceived inability of the law enforcement agencies to provide security in some parts of the country, should be understood as dynamics informing the demand for arms in Kenya's North Rift region.

The North Rift is a hardship area within the larger pastoral region of the Horn of Africa. The pastoralist districts of Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya are characterized by conflict such as cattle rustling, banditry and ethnic rivalry. The baseline of the conflict is resource-related in that the area is generally semi-arid and therefore drought is common, necessitating the movement of human and animal populations in search of pasture and water. It is during such movement that contact with other communities turns into conflict as each group guards its territory and seeks supremacy over others. The cross-border conflict is facilitated by the long, porous and inadequately policed borders.

There is therefore an urgent need to address the flow and use of illegal arms in the North Rift of Kenya and lasting solutions to the problems of conflicts ought to be sought. The widespread availability of small arms is contributing to high levels of crime and makes the transition to lasting peace more difficult. The ready availability of these weapons undermines security, erodes prospects for development, contributes to social disintegration, and makes the resort to violence more likely and more deadly.

Problem Statement

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons is assuredly a global phenomenon, whose adverse effects are most visible in Africa in the appalling loss of innocent lives and all-too-easy availability of these weapons. Although they do not in themselves cause the conflicts and criminal activities in which they are used, the easy availability and accumulation of SALW directly contribute to the escalation of conflict, intensified violence, increase in the crime rate, breakdown of peace and impedes economic and social development². The accumulation of small arms in the eastern Africa region is the gratuity for

decades of conflict within this geographical area.³ The destabilizing impact of these weapons within the region cannot be overstated.

For many years now, Kenya's territory has been a conduit for weapons shipments destined to nearby areas of violent conflict, but more recently, the spread of these arms is spilling back into Kenya itself. The arms are smuggled into the country a few at a time in a steady flow and sold by traders in secret markets, with some large-scale illegal arms trafficking also reportedly taking place. The impact of even relatively modest quantities of such weapons is, however, already being felt⁴. These weapons are illegally transported back across borders with ease, wherein they are used to commit crimes such as cattle raids, urban robberies and in conflict among the pastoral communities. A culture of violence has taken root.

The North Rift region of Kenya is one of the areas in the Republic that most acutely experience this problem. The region has had its share of cattle rustling-related violence, tribal conflict, violent robberies, especially against neighbouring farming communities. Illicit arms have fuelled different types of violent conflict in the region with devastating consequences. People have been massacred while hundreds of others have been displaced from their homes. This displacement has had as one of its worst impacts the loss of education for tens of thousands of children, a massive slackening in the development process and ethnic polarization, among other attendant evils.

It is important to note that no systematic study has so far been published on small arms transfers in this area, yet it has a long history of arms proliferation and related consequences. It is hoped that this study will contribute towards filling the gaps of knowledge and provide information that is needed to facilitate the solving of this problem in Kenya's North Rift region.

² See the UN Secretary General's report on SALW, 1997.

³ Tanzania National Plan, The National NGO Conference on the Tanzania National Action Plan to Combat and Eradicate the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons, 2002.

⁴ Human Rights Watch (2002), "Playing with fire: Weapons Proliferation, Political violence and Human Rights in Kenya".

⁵ Uganda attained Independence in 1962, with Sir Edward Mutesa, the Kabaka of Buganda as first President. This was a ceremonial post and the executive power was vested on the Prime Minister, Dr Milton Obote. The Kabaka was

The availability of SALW in the region emanates from liberation wars, conflict, for example in Rwanda, Burundi, and DRC; many violent changes of governments, as in the case of Uganda⁵, and the shifts in alliances during the Cold War era in Ethiopia and Somalia. But the largest supplies of SALW were the abandoned armouries left behind by the Okello forces when they were ejected from Uganda by Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA) in 1986. These are the arms circulating in the North Rift region of Kenya, the Karamoja areas of Uganda and within southern Sudan and southwest Ethiopia. The anarchy in Somalia and other ongoing conflict keep the supplies going. Arms are durable, all-weather, all-terrain materials and flow from one conflict to another.

The North Rift, which, for the purposes of this research, comprises the districts of Turkana, West Pokot, Trans Nzoia, Uasin Gishu, Marakwet, Baringo and Samburu, is a hardship area severely hit by administrative neglect and lack of development. It is an area of harsh natural conditions where the hot sun beats down on man and beast relentlessly by day and then abandons both to generalized uneasiness at night owing to the dangers that loom large after dark. In the darkness, cattle rustling is prevalent and massacres are common during the day as communities fight it out over resources and subsequent counter-raids. In such conflict, the gun is the weapon of choice.

During the field interviews respondents were asked whether they felt safe in their area of residence. Of those interviewed 52.7 per cent felt unsafe, 10.3 per cent felt they were safe, while 31 per cent would not answer the question.


soon forced into exile and Obote served as Prime Minister between 1963 and 1966. In 1967, there was a constitutional change to provide for an executive President and Obote was confirmed to the post. However, he was overthrown by Idi Amin in 1971. Amin was in turn overthrown nine years later (1979) by a force of Ugandan exiles supported by the Tanzanian military and replaced by Professor Lule, who lasted at the helm of power for only 68 days. Between 1979 and 1981, Uganda had four governments: Lule, Binaisa, a military commission headed by Muwanga and then Obote, who was re-elected. In July 1985, Obote was overthrown for the second time, this time by General Tito Okello, who was chased away by Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA) with the backing of its political wing, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) headed by Lule in 1986. The overthrow of Okello, a northerner, ignited the disintegration of the army, which left a number of armouries intact and full of arms and ammunition which the Karamojong soon scrambled for.

⁵ Kurimoto E. and Simonse S. (eds) 1998 *Conflict, Age and Power in North East Africa. Age Systems in Transition*, James Currey, Oxford.

Conceptual Framework

Conceptualizing community conflict as struggles over resources between different ethnic groups places an understanding of the problem within the framework of the neoclassical economic paradigm of scarcity. A conceptualization of the conflict

as resource-oriented puts the emphasis on distribution and therefore allows for essential insights into the political sphere of both the nation and the region.



In the case of the North Rift, one notices the classical retreat of the State and the superficiality of, first, its existence and, second, its lack of penetration. Since in theory the State has the monopoly right of violence, any kind of violence is, by extension, a challenge to the State's authority. Open violence, even when it is not directed against the State itself, is always a challenge against a government's political authority⁶. In this light, violent and sometimes indiscriminate interventions by the security forces, in the form of weapons or livestock recovery, appear very much as primarily directed towards re-establishing the State's unique right to violence and only secondarily towards conflict resolution. The situation in which the residents of the North Rift find themselves puts into question the State's legal and moral obligations. As a legal entity, the State has a moral duty to provide security to its citizens. The security provided must be broad and all-encompassing to include physical, property, social and economic security. Where the State fails or is unable to provide such security to its people, logic demands that the people seek alternative means to meet these challenges. In the North Rift, communities have resorted to self-arming owing to the widespread insecurity and the availability of small arms in the region.

⁷ Republic of Kenya (1999) "Policy and Legal Framework on Pastoral Land Tenure and Resource Management in the Arid Lands of Kenya" — Nairobi

Kenya's North Rift region is occupied by mainly pastoral communities spread along the borderlines with Uganda, Sudan and Ethiopia. There are other communities in the region who are not pastoralists but have critical resource-use disputes with their pastoral neighbours that occasionally assume a political dimension when one community is pitted against another. These are manifested through raids that, on some occasions, result in massacres and massive displacement of populations as livestock is driven away. The causes of conflict include the high premium placed on livestock and livestock products, continuation of traditional practices such as cattle rustling, expansion of agricultural lands, commercialization of pastoralism, episodic drought and insecurity⁷.

When the Government's credibility is this deeply challenged, no community leader can make his or her community hand over illegally acquired arms for destruction. As has happened in the past, people simply reject the idea. The protracted conflict and insecurity in the pastoral areas of the North Rift contribute to widening the gap between pastoral groups and the rest of the country. Economically, it prevents investment and hampers development programmes. Politically, it contributes, through media portrayals, to widespread public images of pastoralists as congenitally backward, irrational and violent⁸. This brings about tension in the society, especially based on increasingly stereotyped images of pastoralists as eternally caught up in a vicious cycle of conflict.

"...the word 'pastoralist' is often used to indicate a broad ethnic origin, independently from the fact of how one actually makes a living. A Pokot wage labourer in Nairobi, a Turkana university student, or a Boran director of an NGO, may all define themselves as 'pastoralists'. It is therefore necessary, when talking of pastoralists and conflict, to remember that some of the actors involved may not be herders at all, yet would still be considered — and consider themselves — pastoralists⁹."

⁸ Hassan Z. M. (1997) "The Role and Effects of Somali Pastoralists in Conflict", paper presented at a workshop on the theme Promoting the Land Rights of Pastoralists in the Horn of Africa.

⁹ Kratli S. and Swift J. (1999). Understanding and Managing Pastoral Conflict in Kenya: A Literature Review, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, UK.



It should be noted, however, that pastoralism is a way of life and that the extension of the above application is only for political expedience. Due to the current levels of insecurity in the region, no viable economic activity or empowerment can thrive. Many pastoralists are going out in search of gainful employment either as herders in

other rural areas or into the urban areas to join the already congested job market. This distortion of lifestyle in the search for diversification of survival strategies is pushing some of the formerly wealthy pastoralists into destitution.



Under such circumstances, only a long-term and well-planned strategy, which includes the participation of the communities concerned can work. Short-cut solutions and quick successes like the mopping up of arms caches will not yield the desired long term peaceful co-existence¹⁰ and elimination of armed conflicts.

Research Objectives

The suffering and the adverse impact brought about by the presence and the proliferation of small arms throughout the region has fueled debate among

researchers, civil society and non-governmental organization (NGO) groups;

government officials and other interested parties. It is generally agreed that

¹¹ Civil Society can be defined as the collective social entity whereby citizens interface with each other and with the State. Civil society therefore is normally thought to be composed of a range of organizations, including social movements, professional and voluntary associations, non-governmental organizations, trade unions, co-operatives,

there can be no development where conflict, especially violent conflict, exist. The situation is made worse by the presence of small arms. The broad aim of the study was to investigate and detail the problem of SALW in the North Rift with a view to making recommendations to address the problem. Thus, the objectives of this study are to;

- 1 Establish the root causes of gun culture¹² in the North Rift.
- 1 Identify the channels and mechanisms of arms trafficking, including gun markets, trends, supply and demand for small arms.
- 1 Assess the impact of the illegal gun trade in the region.
- 1 Establish the control measures relating to transfer of arms and their effectiveness.
- 1 Make recommendations for combating, eradicating and preventing the problem of SALW in the North Rift of Kenya.

The hostile weather and rough terrain in this region and the vast borders have greatly limited the abilities of the neighbouring governments to adequately police the area. The outcome has been serious massacres during raids for livestock and poor or too late government response to distress calls. This has left the residents with no other options except to arm themselves in readiness for such events. This is a contributory factor to the emergence of gun culture in the region. In the past, the Government of Kenya (GoK) has responded to such raids with operations that sometimes recover livestock, return the animals to their owners and confiscate all seized illegal guns. This seems to expose the Kenyans to more dangers because their neighbours are still armed. The hands-off attitude towards the arms problem in this area has by extension encouraged more and more people and communities to arm themselves. The results are

academic and philanthropic institutions, community groups, youth and women's organizations and religious-related organizations. In many cases, the independent media and the informal sector are also included as part of civil society. Among other roles, civil society can influence public performance, can help hold governments accountable, and can complement national and local administrations in the establishment of effective governance.

¹² Gun culture, in this context, is the replacement of traditional weapons such as spears, bows and arrows with the gun to pursue the goals initially sought through the traditional weapons.

¹³ In our field research, it was quite clear that there is lack of operational procedures between law enforcement agencies and the KPR. Sometimes the KPRs take a lead role following up the raiders.

¹⁴ According to Thomas Hobbes the state of nature is exemplified by continuous fear and danger of violent death; the

deadly as they occasionally result in massacres when communities attack each other during cattle raids.

One of the GOK responses to this challenge has been the recruitment of Kenyan Police Reserves (KPRs). This may be a noble idea but in our opinion not well-thought-out or managed¹³. Recruiting fully armed reservists and neither supervising nor paying them is a recipe for disaster. Many KPRs will tell you that since they do not receive any remuneration for their services, they must go on raids with the same weapons in order to provide for their families. It is also said that those with licit arms also have their own illicit weapons, which are perhaps better and more modern than the service-issued ones. A further danger is that such large numbers of unpaid, undisciplined reservists can easily be lured and converted into private militia by unscrupulous and power hungry politicians.

Our general findings are that among the pastoralists of West Pokot, Turkana, Samburu and East Baringo, most, if not all mature adults possess personal guns. The Marakwets are now arming themselves in earnest with the communities organizing themselves to purchase communal guns. Trans-Nzoia residents, though not in any new way, are arming themselves more than before. Of the five districts, Trans-Nzoia has a unique experience where raids (though interested in livestock) concentrate more on burglary, in which money and household goods are taken.

The gun culture has impacted very negatively on this region. Education standards, where they existed, have generally gone down as more and more schools are abandoned due to insecurity. More and more professionals are deserting this region, drawing back any progress previously achieved in agriculture, education and administration. The fertile Kerio Valley has been abandoned and no grazing or farming is taking place, especially between the Marakwet and Pokot. The same case applies with regard to the areas neighbouring the Turkana and Pokot. Most shopping centres in these areas are deserted or operating at the minimal levels because of fear of attack and loss of goods. More community resources

life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short. Life is a competition and only the fittest survive. (Hobbes, T. [1991]: *Leviathan*, R. Tuck (ed), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press)

than ever before are channelled to security- related matters such as purchase of guns and ammunition at the expense of food and health.

On 13 September, 2002, Ethiopian Merille raiders armed with sophisticated weapons attacked a village in Turkana killing ten people only two days after the two communities had entered a peace agreement. During this incident, a Kenya Police Reserve (KPR) reservist had his gun stolen. Four days later, armed raiders from the same neighbouring country invaded Turkana District killing six people. This brought to 16 the number of people killed in four days since the first attack. The perpetuation of the gun culture in this region has not spared leaders either. On October 14 the same year, former Turkana North MP Japheth Ekidor was shot dead when his car was sprayed with bullets on his way to Nairobi ahead of Kenya African National Union (KANU) Presidential nominations. Ekidor had played a key role in trying to bring peace between warring communities in Turkana only a few days before and had witnessed the Merille from Ethiopia and the Turkana of Kenya sign a peace agreement on September 11, 2002. A month later, he died by the gun.

The Government response has been greatly inadequate. This is the one region in this country where security matters are overwhelmingly in civilian hands. The citizens are alienated from the government and solutions to their problems are not sought from courts or the provincial administration but from the people themselves. If nothing is done about it, we are likely to see an increase in incidents of violence as warriors and bandits treat law and order and its agents with ever more contempt and ridicule.

Morale will further decline among state security personnel and lawlessness will radically increase. This should not be allowed to happen. To avert this “Hobbesian law of nature”¹⁴, the governments of the region must come together and provide a workable disarmament arrangement that will be accepted by the people.

Methodology

The methodology applied in this work involved field survey and interviews with government officials and law enforcement agencies, civil society and ordinary citizens.

To address the main concerns of the study, the researchers adopted various methods. Both field survey techniques as well as the historical method of data collection were utilized. The researchers undertook an in-depth analysis of relevant secondary data sources such as policy papers, official documents, reports, journals, magazines, newspapers, periodicals and published books. The aim was to collect relevant information necessary to find answers to the central concerns of the study.

Fieldwork was undertaken in the seven districts of Turkana, West Pokot, Marakwet, Samburu, Uasin Gishu and East Baringo. These districts were chosen purposively, because it is here that cattle rustling and ethnic violence have been most pronounced, with sophisticated, illegally-held weapons featuring prominently. Actual data was collected using both structured and unstructured questionnaires and discussions with people deemed to have useful information related to the study. The researchers also used participant observation techniques such as attending inter-community peace meetings, government barazas, market days and community-based seminars. For example, the researchers attended a community peace seminar organized by the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK) in Chesongoch, Marakwet District, a market day at Kolowa Market, East Baringo, a peace meeting between the Pokot and Karamojong communities organized by the Pokot, Karamojong, Turkana and Sabiny (POKATUSA) in Nakaipiripirit District of Eastern Uganda, refugee clearance at the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) clearance centre at Lokichogio and toured the Kakuma refugee camp.

Respondents were drawn from a number of key categories including government officials in Kenya, church and civil society officials, business persons, senior security officials in both the police force and provincial administration, professionals working within and outside the target research area such as teachers, health personnel, community development workers and NGO personnel as well as ordinary wananchi. Care was taken to ensure age and gender balance.

In all, a total of 203 respondents were interviewed for this study, and were drawn from a sampling frame carefully derived from the categories listed above. Purposive, systematic and multi-stage sampling techniques were utilized with the aim of achieving adequate representation of all the categories targeted for the study. The data collected was carefully analyzed using mainly qualitative analysis techniques such as descriptive statistics.


Chapter 2

STUDY AREA

Study Area

Definition of North Rift Region

The term North Rift Region of Kenya, in this study is understood to mean the area comprising primarily three administrative districts that lie generally to the North of the Great Rift Valley, that is; Turkana, West Pokot and Samburu. It also comprises parts of Baringo and Marakwet districts. A common denominator of the region is pastoralism, which explains the prevalent and widespread conflict over scarce resources especially pasture and



water. These conflicts are exacerbated by the presence and proliferation of small arms. The spill-over effects of the conflicts and insecurity extends into the neighbouring administrative districts of Trans-Nzoia and Uasin Gishu.

Thus, in this study the latter two districts are included so as to understand the dynamics of the conflicts and arms though they are exclusive to our definition of the North Rift region. This is because they are essentially occupied by farming communities resettled there after independence and their security situation is different from that of the pastoralist districts.

It should be noted that Eldoret town, the 'Capital City' of Uasin Gishu district is the economic and administrative power base that links the North rift with the rest of the country. It hosts most major government departments. It is also a host to a number of key parastatal bodies. Besides, as the largest and most infrastructurally developed town in the region, it is a centre of all kinds of socio-political and economic activities. Eldoret town is located on the Trans-African Highway, which also cuts through the districts of Trans-Nzoia, West Pokot and Turkana. This road is an important transit route for goods destined to and from the entire region and beyond such as to Southern Sudan and Ethiopia.


In order to understand conflict and arms flows in North Rift, a detailed account of the physical, infrastructural and demographic disposition of the six districts mentioned here-in is important.

TURKANA

Turkana District is part of Kenya's Arid and Semi Arid Lands. It is situated in the northwestern Kenya to the west of Lake Turkana. It borders the states of Ethiopia to the northeast, Sudan to the northwest and Uganda to the west and the Kenyan districts of West Pokot and Baringo to the southeast and Marsabit to the east. It lies between longitudes 34° 0' and 36° 40' East and between Latitudes 0° 54' and 5° 30' North. It is the largest district in Kenya and covers an area of 77,000 square kilometres¹⁵. Turkana district comprises of 17 divisions, 56 locations and 156 sub-locations. The physiographic features in the district include low lying open plains, mountain ranges, Lake Turkana and river drainage patterns.

¹⁵ Republic of Kenya Turkana District Development Plan 2002-2008, Government Printer, Nairobi, 2002, Page 8.

There are several mountain ranges in the district such as Loima, Lorengipi, Lokwamoru, Mogilla, Lorianotoma among others. The altitude of the mountains ranges between 1500m and 1800m above sea level in the east reaching the peak at Loima, which forms undulating hills for an area of some 65 square kilometres. The ranges support important economic activities like honey production, grazing during the dry season, water catchment sources, gum arabica harvesting, small rain fed shambas and wood production.



The open plain consists of the Central, Kalapata and Lotikipi plains. The plains form part of the arid area in the district and receive the lowest amount of rainfall, around 180mm per annum. These plains are dominated by dwarf shrubs and grassland, which provide forage for livestock during and shortly after the rainy season. However, this forage dries rapidly at the onset of the dry season.

The major rivers in the district are Kerio, Turkwel, Tarach and Suguta. As these rivers get to the low-lying areas in Turkana district, they disappear under the sandy conditions of the riverbeds. The district is characterized by warm and hot climate. The temperature ranges between 24°C and 38°C with a mean of 30°C. Rainfall comes in two seasons, the long rains in April-July and the short rains in October-November. The rainfall pattern and distribution is erratic and unreliable both with time and space. It ranges between 120 mm to 500 mm. Only about 30% of the district's soil can be rated as moderately suitable for

agricultural production due to the high rate of evaporation.

The population of the district was estimated to be 450,860 in 1999. The population density varies from 29 persons per km² in Kakuma Division to 1 person per km² in Kibish division. Of the total estimated population in 1999, 224,548 were male while 226,312 were female.

People have settled permanently and semi-permanently in areas along the Turkwel and Kerio rivers, where irrigated farming is practiced. Rainfall, being unreliable and highly erratic, runs rapidly off the barren soils and causes flash floods in the rivers and valleys.

Livestock production is the main economic activity in the district. The main types of livestock reared include goats, sheep, cattle, camels and donkeys, which provide such products as hides, skins, milk, meat and ghee. The highest numbers of livestock in Turkana are to be found in Lokitaung and Lokori divisions with the heaviest average concentrations being evident around the catchment areas of Kakuma, Kalokol, Lokori and Lorugum, but low around Lodwar and Katilu.

With regard to minerals, Turkana District has rich building sand and quarry materials. Small-scale gold mining is found in the southern part of the district at Nakwamoru and central parts at Makutano near Kakuma. The gold mining is not of a commercial nature, though an alluvial type of it is being exploited. Oil prospecting is also ongoing.

Lake Turkana is a source of a variety of fish, which is mostly used for supplementary food but not as a sole means of livelihood except for a small population around Kalokol market. There used to be a flourishing fish industry at Kalokol, which collapsed in the 1980s due to mismanagement.

With regard to agricultural activities, only a small farm sector exists in the district. Average farm holdings are 0.1 to 0.5 hectares. Crops like maize are grown as staple food whereas cotton is grown as a cash crop in some parts of the district and Ezoon divisions. The main agricultural activities are confined to small irrigation schemes found in several areas in the district. The food crops

sale. Sorghum is the major income source, followed by maize and cow-peas respectively. Cotton production generally ceased with the collapse of the sector in Kenya.

Regarding the communications network, there is only one Class A all-weather road from Kainuk to Lokichogio, covering a distance of 438km and another class B road running from Lodwar to Kalokol and covering a distance of 60km. There are two Class C roads, one of which runs from Lokichar to Lokori (a distance of 68km) while the other runs from Lokori to Kapendo (134km). Both are earth roads and are impassable during the rainy seasons. There are five post offices and six sub-post offices. The head office in Lodwar has an STD exchange system.

Water is a scarce resource, particularly during the dry season. People often travel more than 10 kilometres in search of water for domestic use and for livestock. Thus, conflict over water sources and pasture between the Turkana and their neighbours is common.


The district has 175 pre-primary schools, 136 primary schools, eight secondary schools, two youth polytechnics and one medical training college. Turkana district is host to the Kakuma Refugee Camp, located in Kakuma Division, 120 km northwest of Lodwar town. The large refugee population has had various impacts on the lives of the Turkana community. The camp also houses a large number of humanitarian non-governmental organizations who provide various forms of assistance to the refugees. The UNHCR is in charge of the camp and works in close collaboration with GoK.

Overall, pastoralism remains the main economic activity of Turkana people. Land ownership is mainly communal except within the urban centres such as Lodwar town.

WEST POKOT West Pokot is bordered by Trans Nzoia and Marakwet districts to the south, Baringo and Turkana districts to the east and north respectively. It is located between West Pokot District is situated along Kenya's western boundary with Uganda

34° 47' and 35° 49' East longitude and 1° 15' and 2° 45' North latitude. The district has an area of about 9,100 square kilometres and its headquarters is at Kapenguria. It comprises six administrative divisions namely: Kapenguria, Chepareria, Kacheliba, Sigor, Alale and Lelan. There are 36 locations and 112 sub locations. It is mainly inhabited by the Pokot community.

In 1999, the district had a population of 308,086. Chepararia has a relatively higher population concentration followed by Kapenguria and Sigor¹⁶. The average population density was 34 people per square kilometre in 1997¹⁷. In 1996, the district had 226 pre-primary schools having 9,512 pupils, 51.9% of whom were boys. There were 227 primary schools with 40,542 pupils. Boys represented 53.8% while girls represented 46.2% of the school population. There were 13 secondary schools with 2,752 students. Tertiary institutions in the district included six youth polytechnics with 176 students and one family life training centre.



The district is predominantly pastoralist. The livestock reared consists of cattle (zebu), camels, donkeys, sheep and goats. The main pastoralist divisions are Alale, Kacheliba, Sigor and parts of Chepareria. Dairy cattle are reared in

¹⁶ Republic of Kenya, West Pokot District Development Plan 1997-2001, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1997, pp.4 – 6.

¹⁷ Ibid. Pg. 13

Lelan, the upper part of Chepareria and in Kapenguria. Thus, livestock keeping accounts for a significant percentage of household incomes in the district. Land is mainly communally owned except small portions, which are individually registered particularly within the agriculturally rich divisions of Kapenguria and Lelan. Maize, sorghum, beans, finger millet, irish potatoes, cassava, horticultural crops and green grams are among the food crops grown in the district. Cash crops include coffee, cotton, pyrethrum and sunflower. The first three are grown on a relatively small scale while sunflower is the third most important crop after maize and sorghum. All farm holdings are essentially small scale in nature.

Other natural resources in the district include minerals such as gold, copper and chromium, which are, however, not found in commercially viable quantities. There is potential for fishing exploitation in the Turkwel Dam.

The district has poorly developed infrastructural facilities except the Kitale-Lodwar road, which cuts through Kapenguria and Chepareria divisions. Other roads such as the Makutano-Konyao-Alale road are in pathetic state despite being a major link between the northern part and the rest of the district.

Telephone services distribution is not well developed and there are at least three divisions without telephone connections. Electricity is the main form of power supply but again very few people outside Makutano, Kapenguria and Chepareria market centres have electricity in their homes.


West Pokot has a great variety of topographical features. The Cherangany Hills are found in the southeastern section of the district, with an altitude of over 3,000 metres above sea level. On the northern and northeastern parts of the district are the dry plains of Turkana, with altitudes of less than 900 metres above sea level. There are spectacular escarpments of more than 700 metres high. Kacheliba, Alale, Sigor and parts of Chepareria are sparsely populated and characterized by rough terrain and harsh climatic conditions.

TRANS NZOIA

Trans Nzoia is one of the 18 districts in the Rift Valley Province. It is bordered by the Republic of Uganda to the West, Western Province of Kenya districts of Bungoma and Lugari to the southwest, and Rift Valley districts of West Pokot to the North, Marakwet to the East and Uasin Gishu to the southeast. The district lies between latitudes 0° 52' and 1° 18' North and longitudes 34° 18' and 35° 23' East. It covers an area of 2,487 square kilometres, which represents 1.4 per cent of the Rift Valley Province¹⁸.

The district comprises seven administrative divisions that are further sub divided into twenty seven locations and fifty four sub-locations.

The main topographical features in the district are Mt. Elgon, (4,313m) to the northwest, Cherangany Hills (3,371m) and the Nzoia river, which flows into



Lake Victoria, and the Suam River, flowing into Lake Turkana. The district has a highland equatorial climate with fairly distributed rain throughout the year. The annual average rainfall is 1,242 mm¹⁹.

Generally, the district is flat with gentle undulation rising steadily to Mt. Elgon and the Cherangany Hills. On average, the district has a height of 1,800m above sea level. The Kitale-Endebbes plain is the best zone for maize and sunflower farming in the district. The area covers 50% of the district. As one moves to the northern part bordering West Pokot District, the area becomes drier. The district is cosmopolitan and is settled by people from most ethnic

¹⁸ Republic of Kenya Ministry of Finance and Planning, Trans Nzoia District Development Plan, 2002 - 2008, Government Printer, Nairobi Pg. 4.

¹⁹ Ibid. Pg. 6.

communities in the country. These include the Luhya, Kikuyu, Kisii, Kalenjin and Pokot. Land is demarcated and a large number of the population possesses land-ownership documents.

Fifty-four per cent of the population in Trans Nzoia live in absolute poverty. Pockets of poverty are found at Top Suwerwa in Cherangani division due to uneconomical land sizes, at Kinyoro in Saboti division due to squatter problems, Kapkoi and Central Kwanza in Endebbes and Kwanza divisions respectively due to cattle rustling and Kipsongo slums, in central division due to unemployment, landlessness and high rent rates.²⁰

Other challenges in the district relate to cattle rustling and tribal clashes, especially in areas bordering Uganda and in Kenya's Marakwet and West Pokot districts. This has retarded development in these areas due to frequent destruction of property and displacement of people.

According to the 1999 national Census, the population in Trans Nzoia was 575,662 (286,836 male and 288,826 female). In 2002 the population in the district was estimated to be 645,170. Of these 321,470 are male while 323,700 are female. The average population density in the district is 231 persons per square kilometre. Population density is highest in Central Division, which comprises Kitale town. The lowest population density (90 persons) is in Endebbes Division.

The district is fairly covered by telephone services, with 2,147 households connected in the district. There are 4 cyber cafes with Internet connection and several post offices.

Agriculture is the main economic activity in the district. Maize, beans and Irish potatoes are the main food crops produced while wheat, coffee, maize and sunflower are the main cash crops. Dairy farming is also widely practiced

²⁰ Ibid. Pg. 7

²¹ Republic of Kenya Ministry of Finance and Planning, Uasin Gishu District Development Plan, 2002 – 2008, Government Printer, Nairobi, Pg. 10.

²² Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Finance and Planning, Marakwet District Development Plan 2002-2008,


and is one of the main sources of conflict between Trans-Nzoia residents on the one hand and the Pokot on the other. The Pokot culturally believe that all cattle belong to them and that other communities have no right to keep or own cattle. This explains why they routinely raid for cattle from other communities.

UASIN GISHU

Uasin Gishu District extends between longitudes 34° 50' and 35° 37' East and 0° 03' and 0° 55' North. The district shares common borders with Trans Nzoia to the North, Marakwet to the Southeast, Kericho to the south, Nandi to the West and Lugari district to the Northwest. It has a total area of 3,328 square kilometres. The district is divided into six administrative divisions namely Moiben, Kesses, Soy, Ainabkoi, Kapsaret and Turbo. These are further divided into 51 locations and 96 sub locations.

Uasin Gishu district is a highland plateau. Altitudes fall gently from 2,700mm above sea level at Timboroa in the east to about 1,500m at Kipkarren to the west. The district can roughly be divided into two broad physiographic regions, the highland and the plateau with Eldoret, situated at an altitude of 2,085m, forming the boundary between the two regions.

Agriculture is the main economic activity in the district. The main food crops grown are maize, beans and Irish potatoes. Cash crops grown include wheat, cut flowers, maize and pyrethrum. Livestock



activity entails dairy and beef cattle, which are reared on a large scale, sheep and goats, poultry and pigs.

There are 467 primary schools, 86 secondary schools, 1 polytechnic, 1 institute of technology and 1 university with two campuses. Infrastructure is fairly well developed, with 310 km of tarmac road, 549 km murrum, 377 km earth and 179 km of railway line.²¹ There is also a newly constructed international airport, railway line, a bullet factory and two military barracks. Besides, there is a National Teaching Referral Hospital and a branch of the Central Bank of Kenya.

Uasin Gishu is a fairly cosmopolitan district and many of Kenya's ethnic communities live there. The Kalenjin ethnic cluster, however, forms the highest percentage of the population.

Eldoret town forms the outlet of all the other five districts in the North Rift region and beyond. It is the largest commercial centre and the headquarters of many state and non-state departments. The town is the centre of all the region's commercial activities.

Among the six districts covered in this study, Uasin Gishu is the least affected by the problem of small arms proliferation. This is mainly due to the fact that it does not directly neighbour a pastoralist district. Pastoralism and cattle rustling does not seriously affect the district. Secondly, it does not share an international common border, thus there is no big threat of cross-border illegal arms movement as is the case with Trans-Nzoia, West Pokot and Turkana districts.

The main link between Uasin Gishu district and small arms is that it serves as a major transit centre to other parts of the country. This is best explained by its relatively superior infrastructure and the fact that the district also has its fair share of armed criminals.


Government Printer, Nairobi.

²¹ Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Finance and Planning, Marakwet District Development Plan, 2002-2008,

MARAKWET

Marakwet District was created through an executive order on 4th August 1994²². It is bordered by West Pokot to the North, Trans-Nzoia to the West, Uasin Gishu to the southwest, Keiyo to the South and Baringo to the East. It extends from latitude 0° 51' to 1° 19' North and from longitude 35° 29' to 35° 43' East.

The district covers a total area of 1,588 square kilometers and is divided into seven administrative divisions, 29 locations and 88 sub-locations. The district is divided into three topographic zones, namely Highland Plateau, the Marakwet Escarpment and Kerio Valley. The escarpment forms the main watershed to many rivers in Marakwet district. The Tot and Tunyo administrative divisions are located within Kerio Valley and have a population density of 82 and 78 persons per square kilometres respectively. The two divisions are semi-arid and prone to insecurity in the form of cattle rustling, inter-ethnic conflicts and drought induced poverty. According to the national population Census of 1999, Marakwet District has a total population of 140,629, of whom 71,562 are male and 69,068 female.



The district has steep escarpments and flat plateaus that comprise the narrow

Elgeyo Escarpment, which varies between altitude 1,200m and 2,000m above sea level. Kerio Valley is 6.4 km wide and 61.6 km long and stretches from the North of the district. The escarpment forms the main watershed to many rivers.

Natural forest cover in the district occupies about 43 % of the land. Altitude and vegetation cover largely influence rain distribution. Rain is highest in the highland zone, and occurs around mid-March. The highland plateau has the lowest temperature, while the highest temperatures are recorded in the Kerio Valley. The average temperature in the district is 24°C during the wet season with a maximum of 30°C in the hot season.

In the highland plateau, maize, beans, wheat, pyrethrum, sorghum and vegetables are grown while in the Kerio Valley there is a high potential for the growth of bananas, beans, maize, mangoes, Irish potatoes, cabbages, citrus fruit and pawpaws. Despite the fact that the area is very fertile for agriculture, people have fled from the valley in the face of insecurity and settled on the escarpment. This has impacted negatively on the district's economic performance.

Agriculture is the backbone of the district's income, contributing 52.6% of average household income. The average farm size is two acres among small-scale land-owners, and 20 acres on average among large-scale owners.

The main livestock types are dairy and beef cattle, red Maasai sheep and goats. These are mainly found in the highland plateau areas. In Kerio Valley, due to cattle rustling, related conflicts and insecurity only a few people have the drive to rear livestock.

Regarding infrastructure, the district has no tarmac road. It has a total of 675km of roads; 333km earth and 342km gravel. Only 28 households have telephone connections in the entire district while 70 private and public organizations have telephone connections. There are four post offices, five sub-post offices and seven telephone booths. There are a total of 154 pre-primary schools, 146 primary schools and 20,557 pupils and one village polytechnic. The number of male students enrolled in primary school at the start of 2002 was 20,241 while


BARINGO

Baringo is one of the 17 districts in the Rift Valley Province. It borders Turkana District to the North, Samburu and Laikipia districts to the East; Koibatek to the South, and Keiyo, Marakwet and West Pokot districts to the West.

The district covers an area of 8,655 square kilometer of which about 140.5 square kilometer is covered by water surface. Lake Baringo covers an area of 130 sq. km, Lake Bogoria 9.5 sq. km and Lake Kamnarok 1 square kilometre. The district is about 210 km in length (North-South) and 100 km in breadth (East-West).

Nginyang and Kolowa divisions, which are central to this study, have an area of 1,689 sq. km and 1,231 sq. km respectively.

According to the 1999 Census, The population of Baringo was 264,978, of which 130,054 were male and 134,924 female. The projected population of 2001 was 422,404 at a growth rate of 5.4%. The foremost socio-economic implication of the increasing population is the increasing demand for basic services. This calls for expansion of educational, health and other facilities in order to cope with the large numbers.²⁴



The major topographical features in the district are river valleys and plains, the Tugen Hills, the floor of the Rift Valley and the Northern Plateau. One of the

²⁴ Ibid

more prominent river valleys is the Kerio Valley. It is situated in the western part of the district and is a fairly flat plain. In the eastern part of the district near Lakes Bogoria and Baringo is the Lobo Plain, covered mainly by the lacustrine salt impregnated silt deposits. The Tugen Hills in the southwestern part of the district form a conspicuous topographical feature in the district.

The altitude varies from 1,000m to 26,00m above sea level. The hills occur in the North-South direction and mainly consist of volcanic rock. The rivers flowing down these hills pass through very deep gorges.

The floor of the Rift Valley owes its origin to the tectonic disturbances that have led to the formation of separate ridges. The troughs of the Rift, which have a North-South alignment, are occupied by lakes Baringo and Bogoria.

There are several extinct volcanoes especially in the North Tiati, Paka Kamugo and Korosoi areas. 46.3 per cent of the district is either very steep (the Tugen Hills) or too plain (eastern parts around Lake Baringo and the northeastern parts, Nginyang and Kolowa). The lowlands or plains are very dry. This means that 46.3% of the land in Baringo cannot support any meaningful crop production. However, in the valleys with alluvial soils, the use of ground water and run-off catchment for irrigation can be profligately practiced.

Baringo District is one of the arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL), with much of the district receiving low-to-average annual rainfall. However, within the district there are some high potential areas neighbouring the hills and the highlands that receive high rainfall. It has different agro-ecological zones, necessitating different agricultural activities.

The district receives two seasons of rainfall, the long rains start from the end of March to the beginning of May, and the short rains from the end of September to November. Rainfall varies from 1,000 to 1,500mm in the highlands to 600mm in the lowlands in the north-eastern part of the district.

²⁷ Ibid Pg. 29

The major cropping activities are concentrated in the highland areas of Kabartonjo, Tenges, Sacho and Kabarnet divisions, which have adequate rainfall. The main farming activities include dairy farming, maize, groundnuts, cotton and coffee. The rest of the district is mainly rangelands with the rearing of goats, sheep, cattle and camels and bee-keeping forming the major livestock activities.

The mean annual maximum temperature in the district lies between 25⁰ C and 30⁰ C in the southern part. In the northern part, the mean annual maximum temperatures is about 30⁰C and occasionally rises to over 35⁰C. The hottest months are from January to March.²⁵

The mean annual minimum temperature varies from 16⁰C to 18⁰C but can drop to as low as 10⁰C in the Tugen Hills. In the highlands of the Tugen Hills, with an altitude of 2,600m, the temperatures are much lower than in the lowlands of Marigat, Kerio Valley and Nginyang. The altitude ranges between 762 and 1,000m above sea level.

The district is divided into 11 administrative divisions, which are further divided into 58 locations and 168 sub-locations. Nginyang, Kolowa and Tangelbei divisions make up East Baringo sub-district, which was recently formed with its headquarters at Chemolingot ²⁶ and is the area of interest in this study.

The district is divided into three parliamentary constituencies namely Baringo Central, Baringo North, and Baringo East.

The surface water potential in the district exists in the form of rivers, dams and lakes. The main rivers in the district are Perkerra, Molo, Kerio, Lobo, Suguta, Ol Arabel and Wasenges. Lake Baringo is the largest of the three lakes, but the water from the lake is of limited domestic uses due to its high turbidity. Despite this, the water is used for livestock and human consumption, as there are no alternative sources in the vicinity of the lake.

²⁸ Republic of Kenya; Samburu District Development Plan, 1997-2001, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1997

Lake Bogoria has a fluoride content of over 100mg/l and therefore has no potential for water development. The lake is only used as a tourist attraction due to its number of flamingoes and geysers (hot springs). On the other hand, Lake Kamnarok has a fluoride content of 0.6mg/l and therefore has a large water supply potential for domestic, livestock and irrigation of crops in its semi-arid neighbourhood of the Kerio Valley.

The district has a forest cover of 24,346.9 hectares. Most of the gazetted forests are in the highlands, where they are threatened by encroachment owing to the high demand for agricultural land.

The district has very little known mineral wealth, though there are deposits of fluoride in the basement and volcanic rocks of the Tiati Hills and lime deposits are also found at Kaborian in Ngorura location of Kipsaraman Division. However, the quantities and potential of these minerals have yet to be established.

Baringo is endowed with a number of tourist attractions, which contribute substantially to the district's income and employment opportunities. The Lake Bogoria National Reserve has hot springs (geysers) lesser flamingoes, and other wildlife as its main attraction to tourists. The Lake Bogoria Hotel and Papyrus Inn cater for the visitors who come to this reserve. Lake Baringo and its surrounding cliffs and Islands are also a major tourist attraction. Wildlife attractions such as hippopotamus, crocodiles and 450 different bird species are found here too. In East Baringo, there is potential for the establishment of a game reserve because of the picturesque scenery and the large populations of wildlife, but this has yet to be exploited.

The major food crops grown in the district are maize, beans, and finger millet, while the major cash crops are coffee, pyrethrum, cotton and onions. The other food and cash crops include sorghum, cassava, sweet potatoes, irish potatoes, cow-peas, green-grams, groundnuts and horticultural crops.

²⁹ Republic of Kenya, 1999 Population and Housing Census, Vol. 1, pp. 1-192

The main types of livestock reared here are cattle, goats, sheep and bees while the main livestock products are beef, milk, shoat meat, hides and skins as well as honey. Donkeys and camels are also reared in East Baringo.²⁷

The district produces a lot of handicrafts, particularly in East Baringo. These products are marketed locally and others exported. These products include beads, necklaces, antiques and souvenir items.

The district has 198km of tarmacked road, 497km of gravel road and 861.7km of earth roads. Most parts of the district are hilly and hence most of the roads have queer alignments, even though they are graveled, some sections are impassable during rainy seasons.

Telecommunications services are available at Kabarnet, Kabartonjo, Tenges, Sacho and Marigat but they need to be developed further in order to reach outlying rural areas for economic development. Fast-growing urban centres such as Chemolingot, Tangelbei, Barwessa, Kipsaraman, Muchongoi, Kolowa, Makutano and Salawa do not have Standard Trunk Dialing (STD) facilities.

The district has a total of 356 pre-schools, 318 primary schools, 29 secondary schools, 6 youth polytechnics, and one teacher-training college.

SAMBURU

Samburu District is located in the northern half of the Rift Valley Province. It is bordered by 5 districts in the Rift Valley and eastern Provinces. To the North West is Turkana District while to the South West is Baringo District. Marsabit District is to the North East, Isiolo to the East and Laikipia district to the South.

The district lies between latitudes 0° 40" North and 2° 50" North of the Equator and longitudes 36° 20" East and 38° 10" East of the Prime Meridian. It lies within the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL) areas of the country and covers a total area of approximately 20,826 square kilometers of these, 3,250 square

²⁷ Ibid. pp. 1-193, 1-194

kilometers are gazetted forests.²⁸


The district has six administrative divisions, namely Wamba, Waso, Nyiro, Baragoi, Kirisia and Lorroki. Wamba is the biggest administrative division followed in size by Waso. Lorroki is the smallest covering only 8 percent of the total area of the district. These divisions are subdivided into thirty locations and ninety-two sub-locations. The district has two local authorities, the Samburu County Council and the Maralal Town Council. The district has two parliamentary constituencies — Samburu East and Samburu West. Maralal, the district headquarters, is in Kirisia Division.

Key topographical features include the Suguta Valley located to the extreme West of the district. Its sides are bounded by fault escarpments and the floor is covered by red-

clay boulders and gravel fans. The East of the Valley is dominated by high level plateaus built by repeated floods of lava from the Rift Valley. The highest point of this plateau is the Kirisia Hill, which rises to 2,000m above sea level.

To the North of Baragoi is Mt. Nyiro, which tappers northwards and falls steeply southwards. There are peneplanes to the East and South of Mt. Nyiro, which forms the Elbarta, Sware, Bonyeki and the middle Waso Nyiro planes, ranging between 1,000m and 1,350m above sea level.

The Mathews Ranges and Ndoto Mountains are located East of the central plains.



³¹ Republic of Kenya, Samburu District Development Plan, Government Printer, Nairobi, Pg. 34

They are discontinuous and form a North-South alignment on the eastern side of the district. The rest of the district forms a continuous basin, which slopes northwards to Lake Turkana and East of the Mathews Range.

The rainfall pattern in the district is erratic and varies significantly both in time and space. The district experiences both short and long rains. January and February are the driest months. Long rains fall in the months of March, April and May. The short rains occur in July and August, except in Wamba and South Horr, where they occur in October and November, sometimes extending up to December.

The Nyiro and Ndoto mountains and the Mathews Range receive the highest amount of rainfall of between 750mm and 1,250mm per annum. The southwest plains and the Lorroki plateau receive between 500mm and 700mm of rainfall annually. The central basin and the plains East of the Mathews Range are the driest parts of the district, with annual rainfall of between 250mm and 500mm.

Temperatures vary with altitude and are generally between 24°C mean minimum and 33°C mean maximum. The central plains and the region east of the Mathews Range have the highest temperatures while the highland belts in the north and eastern side of Lorroki Plateau are cooler.

The district has a total population of 143,547, of whom 69,378 are male and 74,169 female. The district's population density is seven persons per square kilometre²⁹. Kirisia has the highest population, totaling 48,072 due to its good climate, fertile soils and many trading centers. The district headquarters, Maralal, is located in this division. Waso Division has the least population — 10,314 — because of its relatively harsh climatic conditions.³⁰

In terms of resources, the district has fertile soils, water, forestry, wildlife, commercial minerals and materials. Thick, clay well-drained soils suitable for farming and livestock production are found in Lorroki and Kirisia divisions, especially in the plateau. In the highland areas, where rainfall is higher, there is high potential for agriculture and animal husbandry. The main crops include wheat, barley, maize, beans, potatoes and vegetables. In the low-potential areas,

where rainfall is lower, grazing is practiced and the livestock include beef cattle, camels, shoats and indigenous poultry. Pastoralism is the most prominent land use in the district, occupying more than 90 per cent of the residents.

Tourism is a major economic activity in the district. There are several tourist attractions, with the area between Maralal town and Nomotio being designated as a game sanctuary. The Samburu Game Reserve in Waso Division is a key tourist attraction.

With regard to commercial minerals and materials, Samburu District has various mineral deposits, though their economic potential has not been ascertained. In the Suguta Valley, soda and salt exist near Lake Logipi, barley talc, chromites, columbium and tantinum are found around Baragoi, graphite is found North of South Horr, while stillinimite is found near Kiengok Hill. There are also scattered deposits of various precious stones, including aquamarine, ruby-blue sapphire, garnet and methsy, particularly around Baragoi, Nyiro and Barsaloi. The quantities of most of the minerals has not been ascertained to determine their economic potential. Quarry stones are found at Soita Ikkukuyu on the way to Baragoi and at Mbukoi, before Marti. There is clay around Maralal, Kisima and the Ndoto mountains which can be used to make jikos, tiles, and bricks.

Forests and forest products are significant in terms of providing fencing poles, timber, fuel, wood, traditional medicines, protection of water catchment, making clubs, grass, tooth brushes, charcoal, mats, honey and limited grazing during the dry season.

Samburu District has very limited industrial activities. Lack of raw materials, low incomes, poor infrastructure, lack of institutional support and cultural practices have ensured that only a few exist.

Commerce, trade and services are the other leading source of employment and income particularly in the urban and market centers. Small businesses are

scattered in urban centers, even in the ‘manyattas’.³¹ The potential for both the trade and service sectors has not been fully exploited.

In terms of communication network, Samburu has a total of 1,434km of roads. There is no tarmacked road in the district, though many of the roads have been murramed by the Government. The area’s most commonly used roads are the Rumuruti–Maralal road and the international trunk road from Isiolo to Marsabit. Generally, the district is under-served by the road network.

Telephones services cover only a small part of the district. Only four of the six divisions are served by telephone facilities, namely Kirisia, Wamba, Lorroki and Baragoi. The Wamba and Baragoi facilities are very poor though and communication in most cases is through police signals. There are five airstrips, occasionally used by tourists using small-chartered planes. The airstrips are in very poor condition.

Samburu District has 193 pre-primary schools, 111 primary schools and eight secondary schools. Kirisia has the highest concentration of all categories of schools.

With regard to health facilities the district has two hospitals, one of which is a government hospital and the other a Catholic mission hospital. These are the Maralal and Wamba district hospitals. There are six other health centres, among them three GoK- and three mission/NGO-sponsored. The area has 28 dispensaries.

The distribution of income in Samburu District is highly skewed. A small proportion of the population engaged in large-scale farming earns very high incomes while many pastoralists live in poverty. There is a rising number of destitute families in the district due to cattle rustling and frequent drought. Residents of Kirisia and Lorroki are generally well off, due to the favourable climate and comparatively well-developed infrastructure. Other divisions

have large numbers of poverty-stricken residents owing to harsh climate, poor infrastructure and the effects of conflict.


Chapter 3

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The gun culture in the North Rift is directly linked to the resource-based conflict among pastoralists and their neighbours in the region and across the national borders over the years. Some of the ethnic communities in the region are not pastoralists but have critical boundary and resource disputes with pastoralists. Consequently, raids and counter-raids among the communities in the region are a common phenomenon. Raiding neighbouring communities for cattle is an entrenched cultural practice among the communities in the region. The reasons for raids include restocking, acquisition of livestock for dowry payments, heroism and revenge in counter raids. Each community therefore considers the security of their livestock a priority and the common culture among them makes conflict inevitable.

Communities in the neighbouring countries share similarities with the Kenyan pastoralists in that they are also pastoralist and as such often find their way into the North Rift of Kenya for raids or in search of pasture and water. The uncontrolled human traffic flow across the borders makes it easy for arms to move from one community to the other and, by extension, from one country to another.

Residents felt that there was an increase in use of arms. The pie chart shows that 53 per cent of the respondents agreed on the increase, 7 per cent said there was no increase while 40 per cent opted not to answer



the question.

It is evident, therefore, that the gun culture and its historical background in the North Rift goes beyond Kenyan borders into the neighbouring countries of Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. In the recent past, the fall of governments in Uganda (1979 and 1986), Ethiopia (1991) and Somalia (1991) as well as the continued conflict in the Southern Sudan have all in a great way contributed to the availability of illegal small arms in this region.

For purposes of clarity, it is necessary to look at a brief background of each community in the North Rift region with regard to the acquisition, possession and use of small arms.

Before 1920, the Turkana mainly used traditional weapons for purposes of defending themselves against their enemies as well as for raiding their neighbours. The traditional weapons widely used then were spears, bows and arrows, shields, knives, machetes, sticks and clubs. During World War I (1914–18), the colonialists introduced guns in several parts of the African continent. In Turkana, the first guns entered the district through the River Omo, from Ethiopia, around 1920. At this time on the African continent, guns were very few and far between indeed. The Turkana exchanged ivory for guns with European traders. They used the guns thus acquired to kill elephants for more supplies of ivory. With time, guns fell into the hands of other communities neighbouring the Turkana, such as the Toposa and Dodos of Sudan, the Merille of Ethiopia, the Karamojong of Uganda and the Pokot of both Kenya and Uganda. At this time, the most readily available guns were Mk-3s and possibly Mk-4s. However, acquisition of large amounts of guns in Turkana began to be noticeable only decades later, in the period 1978-79. This was a tumultuous period in Uganda, characterized by acrimony and war against the regime of then President Idi Amin Dada. After the fall of Amin, the Karamojong looted the abandoned arms and ammunition at the Moroto Barracks. The acquisition of surplus guns by the Karamojong soon found a ready market among the Turkana. The continuing conflict in the Sudan has provided a steady supply of arms to the Turkana community to date.

Of all the districts in the North Rift, West Pokot is considered the most adversely affected by the gun culture because of its rough terrain and proximity to the Ugandan border. Traditionally, the Pokot used sticks, spears, shields, bows and arrows during cattle raids and community confrontation with enemies.

According to respondents³², the first guns entered West Pokot around 1975-1976. These were manual homemade guns that came from Turkana. They were called Tupai, Michir or Pogela in the local language. But Pokot soon developed their own homemade gun between 1976-78 called amatidai. The automatic guns entered West Pokot at around this time. The guns came from the Karamojong and the Turkana, who had acquired guns much earlier. Another source that was developing around this time was Somalia, through Baringo. Somali cattle traders came with guns, which they sold to a number of Pokot. The cost of a gun then was 40 cows. Thus only the wealthy³³ could afford guns then.

In 1980 there was a major war between the Karamojong and the Pokot in Churchor along the River Kanyang'areng. The Karamojong lost to the Pokot and out of the confrontation, many Pokot acquired G3 and Mk-4 guns in large numbers. The Karamojong had acquired these guns from the Moroto Barracks after the Tanzanian Army ousted Idi Amin from power. They took advantage of the confusion and change of leadership to raid the armouries after the army had fallen. It is this large number of guns in civilians hands in Uganda that increased the number of guns among the Kenyan Pokot because they were now cheaper and the threat of gun-propelled raids was more serious.³⁴ Away from West Pokot District, there is a group of Pokot who live in East Baringo. They share a similar culture and lifestyle with their brothers in West Pokot.

As we conducted this research, the Ugandan Government was issuing identity cards to its citizens. We saw many Kenyan Pokot who openly

³² Interview with the Reverend John Lodinyo of Kiwawa Baptist Church and a group of Pokot village leaders on 23rd August 2001

³³ The majority of respondents indicated that one paid 40 cows to acquire a gun at that time.

³⁴ R.C. Soper (ed), Social Cultural Profile of Turkana District, Uzima Press Ltd., Nairobi, 1985

admitted that they were going for registration in Uganda. According to them it is safer to have documents from both countries. As far as they are concerned, the national boundary between Kenya and Uganda is of no consequence to their community. We were further informed that during electoral campaigns politicians in this area campaign in both countries because people in the area vote for both Kenyan and Ugandan civic, parliamentary and presidential candidates. This is a case of dual-nationality for an ethnic community.

Illegal arms entered East Baringo in 1978 in response to Turkana attacks. The first armed Turkana attack against the Pokot was in 1963, in a raid in which they stole livestock and hundreds of Pokot were displaced. Consequently, the Pokot acquired guns from Somali in Isiolo, around 1978. They began to fight with the Turkana. The Isiolo weapons source was later blocked by the Government through strict policing. After the overthrow of Amin, the Western Pokot began to acquire guns from the Karamojong of eastern Uganda. The price of an AK-47 rifle then was 50-80 cows³⁵. It was found that, as in Turkana and West Pokot, ownership of guns by the East Baringo Pokot pastoralists is mainly for the defence of their property and security for their livestock. Those interviewed held a common view that one cannot live in East Baringo without a gun. It would be suicidal, particularly due to the threat posed by the Turkana.

Traditionally, the Marakwet are agriculturists, although they keep cattle as well. Unlike the Pokot and the Turkana, they are not nomadic. The gun culture among the Marakwet is therefore a new phenomenon and can be traced directly to the insecurity created by Pokot raiders. The Pokot routinely raid their Marakwet neighbours, driving away livestock. In recent attacks, a trend has emerged whereby Pokot raiders do not just raid, but kill, maim and destroy Marakwet property. The Marakwet too at times stage retaliatory attacks, killing the Pokot. These raids and retaliatory attacks have intensified insecurity. In 1982 for example, the Pokot and the Marakwet fought a very fierce war after a Pokot

³⁵ It should be noted that the residents of West Pokot acquired the guns for 40 cows each from the Karamojong and sold them to their brothers in East Baringo for 50 cows per weapon during times of peace and 80 cows during times of conflict.

attack in which a Marakwet was killed. In an attack as recently as March 2001, 58 Marakwet villagers were killed, and more than 200 houses burnt, other property destroyed and hundreds of people displaced. It is this insecurity that has prompted the Marakwet to arm themselves in earnest³⁶. They accuse the Government of favouring the Pokot and the security forces of indiscriminately seizing animals from their villages³⁷.

Before the early 1990s, the Marakwet primarily relied on their traditional weapons. These included bows and poisoned arrows as well as swords and pangas. Things changed in 1992 when the Pokot staged a deadly attack in which many people were killed. In 1995 and 1997, other attacks followed, driving large sections of the Marakwet population to the escarpment³⁸. Due to this increasing state of insecurity, the Marakwet then began to buy guns, initially at a slow pace. Another reason that explains this scenario is the fact that the Government has not responded effectively to Pokot belligerence. The result inevitably is that the people sought an alternative to realize sustained security for themselves and their property, hence the decision by clan elders to begin to arm their people. Thus, the guns now in the hands of the Marakwet are a response to those guns held by the Pokot which have, over the years, made life unbearable for them.³⁹

With the agitation for the restoration of political pluralism, the Pokot had been told that supporters of multipartyism were enemies of the Government. This heightened the feeling of animosity among the Pokot against the Marakwet, who were perceived as Opposition supporters, and explains the subsequent attacks of 1992, 1995, 1997 and 2001. Politics, therefore, is a major factor in the acquisition and use of illegal firearms by the Pokot of East Baringo on the one hand and the Marakwet on the other hand. The gun culture in East Baringo

³⁶ See the Daily Nation and East African Standard newspapers of March 18th 2001.

³⁷ Kenya Human Rights Commission (2001) *Raiding Democracy: The Slaughter of the Marakwet in Kerio Valley*, Nairobi.

³⁸ Between 1992 and 2000 a total of forty (40) adult Marakwet had been killed by Pokot raiders. In February, 2001 alone, five pupils were killed. KHRC: (2001) *Raiding Democracy: The Slaughter of the Marakwet in Kerio Valley*, Pg. 14.

³⁹ A large number of respondents told us that Marakwets feel marginalized by the State in terms of both

is promoted by the fact that the pastoralist and nomadic character of the Pokot ensures that young, energetic men are idle most of the time. Other than looking after cattle, there is not much work to do. This creates room for politicians to misuse the youth for their political gain.

Trans Nzoia District is different in that it is a cosmopolitan settlement area and unlike West Pokot, Turkana and Baringo, the district is occupied by farming communities due to the reliable rainfall and fertile soils. The mixture of ethnic groups can be explained by the re-settlement history of this area. The colonial government had given most of the land in the area to White settlers. It was only after their departure soon after Independence that various ethnic groups who were in need of settlement land migrated to this place. They formed land-buying groups, which acquired land from the settlers or benefited from the government settlement schemes after Independence.

Its closeness to the Ugandan border has exposed the district to availability of guns, especially from Uganda. The years of instability in Uganda left many citizens with illegal guns that later found their way into Kenya through the lengthy, mostly unpoliced borders. The fact that many residents of this district are farmers and can easily recover from aggression reduces their desire for guns. On the other hand the insecurity posed by armed neighbours and availability of guns across the borders has created a gun culture in the district.

The Samburu are a pastoralist community. Traditionally, the Samburus used short spears (similar to the assegai used by the Zulu of South Africa), swords and shields as confrontational and protection weapons. They keep cattle, camels, sheep and goats as livestock while donkeys are used for transportation and thus are prevalent in the community. Owing to the nature of their livelihood — herding in the wilderness — self-arming has been a cultural aspect of the community from time immemorial.

Like other pastoralists in the North Rift region, the Samburu have had their share of conflict with their pastoralist neighbours for a long time, resulting in raids and cattle rustling. The major conflict is between the Samburu and the

Turkana community, who occupy part of the Samburu administrative district where it shares a boundary with the Turkana administrative district, particularly in Bargo Division. There has also been minor conflict between the Samburu and both Rendile and Somali from Marsabit and Isiolo administrative districts. The three communities, however, occasionally gang up against the Turkana, who are reputed to be fierce and brutal. The legendary fierceness of the Turkana may also be explained by the harsh and unfavourable climatic conditions in their traditional territory, where pasture and water are limited and thus expose the community to frequent drought in which animals are wiped out, necessitating raids for restocking when pasture improves.

We were told that the first gun-related attacks in Samburu occurred in 1968. In that year, several attacks were staged by the Turkana against the Samburus in which guns were used. According to respondents, the colonial government had effectively kept the communities away from each other and it is only after Independence that interaction between them intensified. Of course, the colonialists did this for control purposes, while the Kenyan Government allowed communities to interact as part of Independence's freedom and liberation. It is therefore evident that major inter-communal conflict has occurred during the post-colonial period.

The influx of small arms into Samburu is said to have began around 1977-78. According to respondents, during the Kenyatta succession crisis, some troops of ngoroko (bandits) were training in the Kisima area and used guns to raid the community for livestock to feed themselves. But it also should be noted that this was the period of war between Tanzania and Uganda and that, after the fall of President Amin of Uganda, there was a major flow of arms into Kenya and the region as a whole. This may explain the increase in raids between 1978 and 1984.

Between 1984 and 1996, there was a spell of peace. The 1996 drought saw the movement of large herds of cattle from Marsabit to Baragoi Division of Samburu District. The Samburu are said to have welcomed and accommodated

the newcomers, while the Turkana felt the influx was threatening their reserve pasture. The Rendile and Somali who comprised the newcomers were well armed with automatic weapons. The Turkana asked for reinforcements from their brothers in Turkana District in a raid against the Rendile and Somali. Within a month, all the livestock was raided and, since then, raids have become common phenomena, whereby arms are used and as a result every individual in the raid-prone areas seeks to have a personal gun for self-defence and also to join the occasional raiding party.

As we have seen, the availability of arms among the communities of the North Rift region dates back to around the year 1920, but the current trend where everyone is seeking to be armed is a recent phenomenon. It has brought along with it the commercialization of cattle rustling, which was previously a cultural activity and changed it to an open war among ethnic groups in the region. The long history of neglect of the region by the Government has left security matters in civilian hands and in that case only the better-armed prevail, or, in extreme cases, survive. The integration of the gun into the cultural aspects of these communities, where some see the gun as a symbol and means of power, is a worrying development.

The history of the North Rift's gun culture therefore revolves around livestock, insecurity and resources. Owing to the abundance of SALW that are cheap and require little training to use, small arms have become the weapons of choice for all manner of present-day conflict in this region⁴⁰. The availability of arms among communities across borders and the lack of a joint intergovernmental approach to this problem complicate a delicate situation. The continued supply and use of arms in this area has turned what used to be a cultural exchange system into full-blown wars where the weak, such as the aged and children, bear the major consequences of conflict. The cultural ethics of raids have been distorted by the gun owing to its superior damage level and the indiscriminate murder of victims, regardless of whether they are women or children. Traditionally, all raids should first be approved by the elders but early ethnographers stress that

development and security.

⁴⁰ Jayantha Dhanapalan "The Challenge of Controlling International Small Arms Transfers" in S. Lodgaard and

often young men decided in secret and took action without informing the elders of their intentions⁴¹. Unrestrained conflict escalation is therefore a sign of the elders' inability to exercise their institutional role of conflict management and a creeping feeling of neglect by the Government so much so that they also feel victimized. Such a situation needs urgent government attention.

⁴¹ Gulliver P. H. (1951) "A Preliminary Survey of Turkana. A Report Compiled for the Government of Kenya", School of African Studies, New Series No. 26, University of Cape Town, Cape Town.

Chapter 4

ROOT CAUSES OF SMALL ARMS PROLIFERATION IN THE NORTH RIFT

The proliferation of small arms in the North Rift region does not occur in a vacuum. There is evident pressure on the communities to arm themselves. While security and competition for resources stand out as the main forces, other factors that are interrelated and intertwined account for the proliferation of SALW in the region.

The shrinking natural resources especially pasture and water, triggered by environmental degradation and erratic precipitation patterns in the region, have increased competition over these resources causing conflict and wars which in turn have led to proliferation of arms. The use of automatic weapons in these conflicts results in large numbers of casualties, especially among women and children, triggering vengeance and counter-vengeance and escalation of conflict, hence increased demand for more firearms. The war in southern Sudan, the rebel groups in northern Uganda and the collapse of the state in Somalia are steady suppliers of arms to the region. These arms are the main catalyst of conflict as communities seek supremacy and control of resources. For example, Samburu District enjoys better climatic conditions than the neighbouring pastoral districts of Turkana, West Pokot and Isiolo, which makes it a war-zone as communities from Marsabit, Isiolo and Turkana compete for pasture in Samburu during the dry spells in the other districts. The situation also demands that the Samburu be well armed to protect their reserves of pasture, otherwise they will be driven out. Also, it should be noted that some Samburu residents of Baragoi Division have migrated to Laikipia, where they have displaced the Tugen who have in turn pushed the Kikuyu from their farms⁴².

Geographical location and physical characteristics of the region should be taken into consideration. We observed in Ndurungo Location, Baringo Division, Laikipia District, that most of the farms vacated by members of the Kikuyu community due to insecurity are occupied by the Tugen. Interviews with the Tugen revealed that they have been pushed there by the Samburu.

⁴³ There are 11 official police checkpoints between Kitale Town and Lokichogio Town, manned 24 hours a day by

into account. The North Rift region of Kenya neighbours the countries of Uganda to the West, Sudan to the northwest and Ethiopia to the North. All the three countries have had a history of serious internal conflict whose effects have reverberated across the region. Refugees, arms and contraband goods move with ease across the common borders. This movement is facilitated by the porous nature of the international borders. Most parts of the region are characterized by harsh climatic conditions. The terrain is rough and hostile while the hot, dry and windy conditions make border patrols an extremely difficult task. In addition, there are not enough police officers available to police a border region of well over one 1,000 kilometres. Thus, the geographical conditions and characteristics of the region render it prone to insecurity.

Closely related to geographical and climatic conditions is the culture of the people. Pastoralism is the main economic activity of the majority of the population living in the North Rift region. Traditionally, cattle raiding is a part and parcel of the culture of the Pokot, Samburu and Turkana communities and their neighbours such as the Karamojong, Toposa and Merille hence, raids for cattle are routine. Also, culture puts pressure on the youth to marry, for which they have to pay dowry. Raiding neighbours' cattle provides the means. Small arms make the art of raiding more effective, hence, arms acquisition among the younger members of pastoral communities is much higher as compared to non-pastoral communities. The need to acquire arms to meet these cultural demands is therefore a major factor that explains the proliferation of SALW in the region.

Poverty is high amongst the people of the North Rift region, just as it is amongst other Kenyan communities. According to the Human Development Report, 2001, about 64 percent of Kenyans live below the poverty line. Interviews with residents in various parts of the region revealed that the majority of the people feel that the government has neglected the region economically. One sees many malnourished children across the region, from West Pokot to Turkana. Infrastructure, social facilities such as schools and health centres are poorly developed. Only a few students from the area are able to excel academically. A combination of factors, ranging from lack of school fees to inadequate facilities,

militates against academic success. Many youths drop out of school at an early age and remain idle. The high rate of unemployment has compounded the problem. It is therefore easy for the unemployed to be lured into anti-social activities, including the procurement and use of small arms. This marginalization and neglect of the communities by the State is a recipe for conflict and arms proliferation.

The main reason for acquisition of guns by the communities in this region is first and foremost for security reasons; that is, the protection of themselves and their property — particularly livestock — against hostile neighbours. Security deterioration along the common borders exemplified by repeated raids for cattle by their neighbours the Toposa and the Dodos of Sudan, the Merille of Ethiopia and the Karamojong of Uganda, has encouraged these communities to arm themselves. This has been worsened by government intransigence in dealing with cases of insecurity and cattle raids. Intra-community raids in the region are also prevalent hence the demand for small arms. The failure to provide adequate security services by the state has enabled the arms traffickers to operate with impunity.

Corruption in the public service, and especially among the security forces, is identifiable as a factor in the proliferation and trafficking of small arms. The common practice by customs officials and police officers of turning a blind eye towards crime, and taking bribes has enhanced the proliferation of small arms in this region. In Samburu District especially in Maralal town, we were told, business people and well-to-do individuals are bribing both the police and members of the provincial administration with upto Ksh15,000 (around \$200) so as to be supplied with government guns for personal protection. On the Kenyan roads, police officers who man various check points rarely bother to inspect vehicles or even inquire what is in transit, especially with regard to private and government vehicles. Commercial vehicles are also rarely thoroughly checked as long as one is able to offer a bribe.⁴³

The proliferation of illegal arms in some of the communities in the region is directly linked to the acquisition and use of the same by other communities. In other words, one community's arming is a direct result of the other's possession

and use of illegal small arms. For example, currently, the Marakwet are arming themselves as a community in order to defend themselves effectively against armed Pokot raiders. The Pokot also claim that their decision to acquire arms was a result of threats to their wellbeing by the Turkana community. Pokot children grow up aware that there are enemies in the name of Turkana, Karamojong and Marakwet from whom they must protect themselves⁴⁴. Members of the Samburu community are arming themselves in response to Turkana aggression manifested in cattle raiding. This is particularly true in Baragoi Division. The means of protection is gun acquisition and use. It is therefore one's communal responsibility to acquire and learn how to use a gun, hence the problem of gun acquisition in the region has been enhanced by socio-environmental circumstances. This is also true for the Turkana community.

Government arms control mechanisms have been, at best, gravely wanting. In fact, the Kenyan Government is blamed for the escalation of arms proliferation due to its policy of providing guns to home-guards of particular communities while denying other communities such protection. This has often sent the wrong message to the affected communities, with the consequent increase in arms acquisition by those who feel left out or threatened. For instance the government has provided guns to KPRs belonging to the Pokot, Turkana, Tugen and Keiyo communities while denying the Marakwet the same.

The prevalence of natural calamities such as drought, floods and environmental degradation contributes to conflict in the region, consequently heightening the demand for small arms. During drought or floods, livestock is decimated and the affected communities resort to the use of arms in raiding their neighbours for restocking. Environmental degradation has contributed to competition for resources such as pasture and water where arms are used to enhance dominance.

Competition for power among political leaders, which takes the form of ethnicity

⁴⁴ Interviews with several respondents indicated that, among the pastoralist Pokot, every mature man owns a personal gun. It is not easy to tell the number of available guns in the community because the people would not want to disclose such information.

and clannism, is evident, especially during electioneering periods, when the fight for prominence in local political control reaches a peak. The possession of arms is a sign of might which groups use to dominate others.

Lack of sufficient security personnel in these areas makes vulnerability inevitable. The logical response has been self-arming by the affected communities. The people purchase arms to secure their lives and property.

Regional conflicts in southern Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia and Somalia provide the key sources of small arms in the North Rift. During conflicts in these countries the supply of arms to fighting parties is uncontrolled. During peacetime, the combatants sell arms to meet other necessities.

The colonial legacy of borders that divide ethnic groups between states encourages proliferation of arms in conflict areas. For instance, it is easy for the Pokot to trade in arms across the Kenya-Uganda border because the community inhabits both states.

The harsh social, political, economic and environmental conditions that the North Rift region residents find themselves in explain the acquisition and use of arms. The natural obligation to seek self-security and to protect self-territory are informing aspects in relation to the proliferation of small arms in the region. The impact of raids by armed communities leaves the victim with a desire to be equally armed to wade off attacks or recapture raided livestock. A situation is emerging among the residents where more and more individuals are seeking the best available arms to outdo their aggressive adversaries. It will be futile and a waste of resources for the Government to collect arms from these areas while the factors that create demand remain un-addressed. The problem of small arms proliferation in the North Rift region, like any other problem, must be approached from the roots, if a lasting solution is to be found. With commitment

and political will from the Government, the problem can be halted.


Chapter 5

SMALL ARMS FLOW IN THE REGION

Africa is confronted by challenges of dealing with economic reconstruction and containing various internal conflicts. The uncontrolled availability of small arms mostly supplied to various parties during the Cold War is still fueling conflict and also exacerbates violence and criminality. The State's ability to govern effectively is seriously undermined, threatening the stability and security necessary for socio-economic development. Lack of resources, uncontrolled porous borders and the absence of detailed comprehensive data stand in the way of effective management of the problem of arms proliferation.

Arms flows in this region are an old phenomenon that has been in existence since the two World Wars and the liberation wars that followed. During the Cold War, Africa was supplied with arms by both East and West, depending on ideological choice. The shifts in alliances, especially in Ethiopia and Somalia, meant changes in armament by selling off the previous arms stocks and acquiring new stocks from the new suitors. There were no decommissioning programmes and many weapons found their way into the wrong hands. This was a major factor that helped create the illicit trade in arms in the region.


The main sources of small arms held by the communities in North Rift are from Uganda, Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia. During the last five years, Sudan and Somalia have been the main sources, mainly due to the conflict situation pitting the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Sudanese Government and the clan wars in Somalia while Uganda used to be the main supplier of arms prior to the current sources. Porous, uncontrolled borders allow for easy cross-over from Sudan by the Toposa, who bring with them arms for sale to the Turkana as well as to other interested parties. On the other hand, the uncontrolled borders allow the Turkana themselves to get into Sudan and Uganda to buy arms. The same applies to the Pokot, who easily get into Uganda and purchase arms. The Karamojong of Uganda frequently cross over into Kenya and sell arms to Pokots




and other communities along the border.

The main road that connects Kenya and Sudan and the Lokichogio airport serve as the leading route for the arms flows from Sudan into Kenya. The war deserters and arms traffickers cross the border and sell their arms to the local communities in Turkana. The surplus arms are transported along the highway through Lodwar, Kitale, Eldoret to Nairobi.

The porous border between Kenya and Uganda serves as an entry point of arms from Uganda. The main entry points are Kanyalus, Suam, Amudat and Kiwawa (see West Pokot flows map). The majority of arms coming from Uganda are normally acquired for retention and use by the communities. The surplus is taken to markets further a field like Nairobi through Endebess, Kapenguria, Kitale and Eldoret.



Mutual exchange of goods between border communities also makes it easy for people to acquire guns through barter trade, where members would exchange livestock (camels, donkeys, cows and goats) for arms. Another method of arms acquisition involves the killing of the arm owner during raids and the acquiring of the victim's gun by the enemy. The main types of weapons available in the market are the Russian-made AK-47 semi automatic rifle, the Mk-4,



G3, FN, hand grenades and even Anti-aircraft guns usually pulled by donkey carts.⁴⁵ Of these, the AK-47 remains the most popular. This is because it is relatively, small in size, it is not very heavy, it is efficient and available. It can be easily dismantled and concealed. The AK-47 used to cost an average of Ksh 60,000 or 20 cows

during the late 1970s. On average, the price has now gone down to between Ksh. 20,000 and 30,000 or about 6 cows.

Sudanese refugees fleeing the war in Southern Sudan are another source of arms. They come with guns, which they sell to locals and use the money to settle in the refugee camps in the country, especially Kakuma. This happens before they present themselves to the camp authorities for inspection and status determination and is made possible by police laxity, and the ineffective government gun-control mechanisms. UNHCR officials interviewed for this study denied the possession of arms by refugees inside the Kakuma Refugee Camp. However, our investigation revealed that refugees are an important source of small arms especially in Turkana District.⁴⁶

Guns are also easily transported by road from border points since the police hardly do thorough checking of vehicles at the numerous checkpoints along the roads. For example during the three weeks we were in the field, along the border of Kenya and Uganda, and elsewhere, no police man bothered to check what

⁴⁵ Though not seen, this was mentioned by various respondents in Samburu, Turkana, West Pokot Districts.

⁴⁶ Both the camp officials, refugees and the local people indicated that whenever there are conflicts in the camps, gunshots are heard.

⁴⁷ Interview with a number of respondents who requested not to be named.

we were carrying in our car. It would have been very easy for us to transport any number of guns into as far inside Kenya as Eldoret.

Corruption plays a major role in the trafficking of illegal arms. Bribery is the order of the day and the bigger the bribe the higher the possibility that the officer taking the bribe will have little interest in thoroughly inspecting a vehicle which may be ferrying contraband goods including arms. Evidence from the field indicates that arms smugglers hide guns inside inflated vehicle spare tyres, which are then filled with pressure, in the engine compartment of vehicles, and inside fuel jerricans. Guns are also tied under the vehicle's chassis, sometimes even without the knowledge of the vehicle's driver. Gun runners also hide guns in tarpaulins of lorries, and inside charcoal bags. Bullets are acquired and transported the same way. It was also found that, trucks, which transport relief food to Kakuma and Lokichogio are usually used to ferry guns. We were told that when policemen insist on inspecting these vehicles, they get bribed with as little Ksh. 50⁴⁷.

Another important finding was that some of the bullets used in cattle raids in Turkana and Pokot districts are from Government sources. The introduction of government bullets in to the community through KRP's has opened room for security officers to trade in bullets in these areas. It was pointed to us during the field research on several occasions, that serving security personnel especially prison warders and Administration Police look for ways and means to accumulate bullets, which they give to their brothers at home. The low salaries given to officers in these departments of disciplined forces may further explain the desire to trade in bullets or using them to participate in cattle raids while on leave. The fact that the government has the machinery to contain the insecurity problem yet it has not leaves lingering questions as to whether this is a result of lack of capacity or commitment on the part of the government.

In Lokichogio town, some businessmen and women have found their way into the ranks of KPRs. They have fraudulently been issued with

⁴⁸ The Marakwets are a cluster of six groups namely, the Endo, Markweta, Borot, Almo, Sengwer and the Kiptani.

guns that they use to secure their business premises. They do not discharge any security duties to the local community.

In Marakwet district, gun ownership is a recent phenomenon. People began to acquire illegal arms after 1992 primarily to defend themselves and their property against hostile neighbours. There are a number of mechanisms of acquiring guns in Marakwet.

First and foremost, gun ownership in Marakwet is communal. A system has been devised where villagers from each of the 46 Marakwet clans contribute an agreed amount of money or the equivalent in cattle, then approach Pokot gun sellers in East Baringo and buy arms. Through this system, each of the 46 clans has in its possession, at least one AK-47 rifle. It is the clan elders who are responsible for the safe custody of the clan's arm(s)⁴⁸.

Another method of acquiring guns is during raids by the Pokot. Often, villagers kill Pokot raiders then they acquire the guns of the fallen victims.

Direct buying by individuals. Some young men and those who can afford approach the gun sellers as individuals and buy guns for themselves. These are kept away from the elders' custody, although those owning them may use them for communal protection. Thus, other than those guns held communally, relatively wealthy individuals have bought guns for their own personal protection.

The main gun sellers are Pokots. Other gun merchants are Somalis who come through Baringo district. The arms from Somalia follow the Isiolo, Samburu and Baringo routes to end up in Marakwet. But this is a complicated route and is mostly used by cattle dealers who use their lorries to transport the arms. A few other arms come from Ethiopia through the extensive borders and border crossing points at Sabarel and Moyale through Marsabit to the markets in


In all, there are 46 clans spread along the Kerio Valley as well as the Kerio Escarpment. Basically the Marakwet are an agricultural community. They grow millet, cassava, sorghum, beans and maize. They also keep dairy cattle and goats.

Marakwet.

We found that, at the moment, most guns in the possession of the Marakwet are sold by Pokot, especially those from East Baringo, and Somali. The Somali come through Isiolo and Samburu districts. They deal in legitimate cattle trading, buying cattle and transporting them to Nairobi and elsewhere. Their illegal gun trade is camouflaged in their usual cattle business.

At the moment, the Russian made AK-47 rifle is the most popular and widely available gun in this area. Currently, its cost ranges between Ksh. 30,000 and Ksh.45,000 or 50 goats. We were told that in Aror Location for example, there are

6 guns acquired recently for which villagers paid 450 goats. Each household contributed one goat.⁴⁹



Other types of guns include Mk-4, G3, Uzi and Pachet (Sten gun). The latter two are, however very rare. One common gun route is from Uganda through Trans-Nzoia to Cherangany and down to Kerio Valley. The other is through Samburu, Baringo and into Kerio Valley. The gun merchants have their own contact people within the community, who provide them with clients. Chiefs know this, but they have no desire to stop it, or inform the government because first, they would lose

⁴⁹ Interview with Marakwet village elders and two chiefs who requested anonymity. It was also confirmed by a group of Marakwet professionals in Eldoret town.

their lives and second, they are themselves victims of insecurity. They know that the government has left their people at the mercy of the hostile Pokot and that the onus is on the people to provide their own security.


The main entry points of illegal arms in Trans-Nzoia district are Suam, Antrokoit and Kanyalus (the latter two are in West Pokot District). Most guns come into the district through panya routes (unofficial routes) because most gun runners

walk with them to their customers. After the entry, some of the arms are retained in the entry point areas while the rest are transited to other parts of the country such as Endebess, Kitale, Eldoret, Nakuru and Nairobi towns and their environs. The most common guns are AK 47's in their various models. Pistols and revolvers are available but not common. G3s

are the most rare but still found with few people. According to one senior police officer, pistols and revolvers are transported in the spare wheel tyres of vehicles. This means of transport enables guns to be moved along the highway from such border centres to the big towns.

The communities with guns in the district are Pokots, Sebei and Sabaots. While the Pokots use theirs for cattle rustling, the Sebeis and Sabaots use theirs for self-protection and the protection of their property and also for robbery and theft.

Because of the insecurity in this area, we were told that the government has appointed about 400 Kenya Police Reservists (KPRs) in the District⁵⁰. Majority are armed and are regularly supplied with bullets by the government while others are not armed.



According to another senior police officer, who requested anonymity, recruitment to KPR is based on the following requirements; land ownership, Certificate of Good Conduct issued by the police and ownership of cattle and other property. The aim is to ensure that guns are in the hands of responsible people. The main problem with this arrangement is that the said KPRs are not salaried, and are poorly trained to handle security matters. The fact that they are unsalaried explains why some could be using the government weapons for criminal activities such as banditry. It is important to note, however, that the government faces an enormous dilemma with respect to insecurity in this area.

The cost of guns in the district varies depending on the type of gun one is interested in. A wide variety of guns are available in Trans Nzoia. An AK-47 rifle costs between Ksh7,000 and 10,000, G3 between Ksh20,000 and 30,000 while the cost of pistols and revolvers ranges between Ksh3,000 and 5,000. These prices may fluctuate from time to time depending on the security situation. Guns are relatively cheaper during the time of peace while they become more expensive when tension rises among communities.

The presence of Somali traders some of whom are non-Kenyans in the gun prone areas is suspicious. A number of respondents expressed the opinion that some of the Somali traders, could be trading in small arms and engaging in small businesses as cover-up. In a number of cases we were told that some guns come from Somalia. The only contact point between this area and Somalia is the traders.

As mentioned elsewhere in this chapter, gun running in West Pokot District is done on foot from across the Ugandan border to the region. Initially, the gun business was essentially barter trade in nature because guns were acquired in exchange for livestock such as cattle, camels or donkeys. The mode of exchange has now changed to cash.


It was found that guns are getting cheaper by the day. The current price of an

⁵⁰ Interview with security personnel in Kitale Town.

AK 47 in West Pokot ranges between 6 to 7 cows (or Ksh. 30,000 – 35,000) depending on the magazine capacity and type of AK 47 gun. G3s are not popular because their bullets are not easily available. The sale of guns is open and one freely inspects and chooses the best. This happens particularly during the peace period. During such times gun sellers walk freely with them looking for buyers.⁵¹

The Karamojong are the main suppliers of guns in West Pokot. Sebeis were

also mentioned as selling guns to Pokots albeit on a lesser scale. The selling points are mainly along the Kenya-Uganda boarder. The border is very expansive and crossing over is very easy since it is hardly patrolled by security forces⁵². Pokots do not necessarily keep all the guns they acquire, they sell others to communities near them such as the Marakwets, who are now paying for them in cash, or to other Pokots in East Baringo and to communities in Trans-Nzoia.



It is evident that there are no open markets for arms in the region. In other words, arms trafficking in the North Rift region is secretive and operates

on trust that none of the involved parties will betray the other to government

⁵¹ For example, on 23rd August 2001 near Kiwawa shopping Centre in West Pokot district, as we conducted this research, there was a group of four (4) Karamojong men with eight (8) guns looking for buyers.

authorities.


The Pokot gun traders walk in groups to find prospective buyers. They avoid towns or where they are likely to meet with the police. They can travel far and wide looking for buyers. We were told that they have contact people among the buying communities.

The main reason for acquisition of guns is community defense; that is, ensuring the security of people, livestock and other property. Without a gun no Pokot near the border would keep cattle; so gun ownership is properly a security issue. Those who kill fellow tribesmen are traditionally thoroughly punished and this would explain the low level of arms misuse among the Pokot. The punishment would in most cases entail the taking away most of the property of the killer.



The main source of arms coming to East Baringo is West Pokot through the shared border. The fact that East Baringo is mainly occupied by the Pokot community makes it easier for them to trade in arms with their brothers in West Pokot district. There are also arms that come to Baringo from both Marsabit and Isiolo district. While most of the arms are retained by the community for self-protection some are sold out to residents of Marakwet, Samburu and Laikipia districts.

⁵² As we conducted this research, we unknowingly crossed into Uganda and only realised our whereabouts when we reached Moroto, which is over 60 kms into Uganda.



In East Baringo, it is estimated that over a half of the male adult population have guns. These include young men as young as 13 years. We found out that, at the moment, the price of an AK-47 rifle, which again is the most popular gun in the area ranges between Kshs.40,000 and Kshs.50,000. Other common types of guns include; Mk-4 rifles, G3 (which is very rare) and a few pistols.

Bullets used in this region are mainly sourced from Uganda and they cost

an average of Ksh. 50/= each. None of the respondents from East Baringo agreed that there are government bullets held by ordinary people except those issued to KPRs. However, most Marakwets held the view that Pokots are routinely supplied with arms and ammunitions by state agents. It was difficult to independently confirm this.

We found that Pokots routinely acquire new and sell the older guns. Their main clients are the Marakwet. They also sell guns to Tugens, Njemps near Lake Baringo, Keiyos, Samburus and some people in Trans Nzoia district. Selling is facilitated by friends especially due to the increasing tension with neighbours.


The flow of arms from these pastoral communities to towns such as Kitale, Eldoret and Bungoma is translating into frequent armed robberies and car-

jacking in these areas. The tensions brought about by political competition is another contributing factor to the flow of arms in the North Rift region. There is need for the Kenyan government to ensure that peace prevails in both Sudan and Somalia because they will continue to be the main sources of arms into the region and the country.

Like in Turkana and West Pokot districts, the Kenya government has provided a section of the Samburu population with guns under the KPR Programme. This action was necessitated by increased threats and attacks against the Samburu by their neighbours, particularly the Turkana. Under the KPR programme, the chief appoints individuals from amongst the community supposedly based on their integrity and good conduct. These individuals are then issued with guns by the local OCS depending on the agreed number of guns to be issued at a particular time. Currently, there are about 1,000 guns (mainly rifles) issued by the GOK in Samburu district, mainly in the areas experiencing high incidents of insecurity. These are Baragoi, Nyiro, Wamba and Waso divisions.

KPRs are expected to guard the communities' livestock and generally to beef up security in their areas of operation. In recent days however, a trend has emerged where people in areas considered relatively safe have used unscrupulous means to be recruited as KPR s. Such people then use the guns issued to them for personal purposes and settling scores with their enemies. This process is fuelled by corruption and nepotism and has watered down the original objective of issuing guns to the community, that is, communal protection. Thus, most influential businessmen in urban areas particularly in Maralal town have been issued with guns by the government. The businessmen use such guns for personal security and prestige. This, of course, goes with a fee.

This study established that there are large numbers of illegally held guns in Samburu district. These guns are in the hands of mainly the Samburu and the Turkana communities. The latter live in parts of Baragoi division of the district. The areas with the highest concentration of illegal arms in the district are Baragoi, Wamba, Nyiro, and Waso divisions. The most commonly available guns are the 303 Rifle, the G3, AK47 and to a lesser extent the M16 rifle.



The Samburu get guns from the following main sources: Baringo, Isiolo, Marsabit and Turkana. Usually, individuals buy guns from well-known gun dealers. Guns are widely available and it is easy to acquire a gun as long as one has money. The Pokot of East Baringo, the Somali and Borana from Isiolo and the Rendille of Marsabit are known to supply illicit arms to the Samburu.

It must be noted that gun acquisition in Samburu is a fairly recent phenomenon and is attributable to the increasing insecurity in the form of cattle raids by neighbouring communities, particularly the Turkana and the Pokot.

There is no systematic manner in which the gun acquisition is transacted. Samburu, particularly those living in the border areas with the Somali, Borana, Pokot, Turkana and Rendille, approach gun sellers, negotiate the price and take home whatever gun one wishes to buy.

During our fieldwork in Samburu District, we established that, on average, the price of a G3 rifle range between Ksh30,000 to Ksh40,000, while that of an AK47 rifle ranges between Ksh20,000 and Ksh30,000, depending on the season and location. Buyers pay cash in Kenya shillings or exchange the guns for bulls. The G3 may be exchanged with three to four bulls, while the AK47 usually goes for two bulls.

A key finding was that illicit guns are not moving out of Samburu: The district is largely a recipient of illegal arms. The Samburu do not sell guns themselves.

They are victims of conflict and are only trying to secure themselves. Thus small arms are only flowing into Samburu District but hardly out of Samburu. Key entry points are the border areas of Wamba Division, Baragoi Division and Nyiro and Waso divisions.

It was established that most of the adult male population in the lowland pastoral areas of Samburu District hold guns. It was also found that Central Division (Kirisia) is not very much affected by the problem of illegal arms. The explanation for this is that the division is located mainly in the highland plateau, where both agriculture and pastoralism are practiced. Also, the division comprises Maralal town, which is the district headquarters and the commercial centre of the district. Insecurity therefore is not as severe as in the lowlands pastoral areas of the district.

Uasin Gishu is a transit district for arms from the North Rift and the western Kenya border points around Malaba and Busia. The main route is the highway to Nairobi through Eldoret and Nakuru. The few arms in the district are to be found mostly in the urban centres and along the busy Malaba/Eldoret/Nairobi highway. The entry points into Uasin Gishu are Kipkaren Centre from the Western region and Moi's Bridge from the North Rift region.



Estimated number of illegal arms in the North Rift

District	Total Population	Male Population	Males aged 15 years and above	50% of adult male population above 15 years presumed armed
Turkana	450,860	224,548	132,478	66,239
Samburu	143,547	69,378	32,956	16,478
West Pokot	308,086	151,506	73,874	36,937
East Baringo	63,659	31,728	15,547	7,773
Marakwet	140,629	69,068	35,075	92
Totals	1,106,781	546,228	289,930	127,519

It is noteworthy that counting illegal Small Arms is an extremely difficult task. This is because few people will volunteer information relating to whether or not they possess arms and if so, how many. In the course of our research in the North Rift, we were told that most, if not all, of the male population aged 15 years and above are armed. This applies mainly to Turkana, West Pokot and Samburu districts as well as East Baringo Sub-district.

In order to generate a plausible estimate of the number of illegal arms in the North Rift, we have adopted population statistics from the 1999 Kenya Population and Housing Census, for each of the districts in the North Rift. Field interviews revealed that all males aged 15 years and above are armed each with at least one firearm. However, we lowered the figure to 50% of all males aged 15 years and above to accommodate the fact that most urban residents are not armed, and that some parts of the districts are inhabited by agriculturalists who are not armed. Note that the population figures for Marakwet District are not included in our calculation due to the different arming situation in the area. The Marakwet Community comprises 46 clans and each clan is said to possess an average of 2 guns. Prominent individuals in the district have also acquired personal guns, thus the number of guns in Marakwet may be much more than 92.


To us, therefore, the figures presented here are very conservative and may actually be much higher in the actual sense.

Chapter 6

IMPACT ANALYSIS

The proliferation of small arms has had a telling impact on the socio-political and economic lives of the people of the North Rift region in particular, and the country in general. Those holding guns have a false sense of security. They feel that they can protect themselves in the event of an attack from their enemies. In reality, however, this is not always the case. Thus there is a significant psychological feeling of security and the relative ability to ward-off attacks. Consequently, there is increased pressure on those without guns to acquire them by whatever means.

Increased insecurity in the North Rift region, poverty and poor governance, have increasingly driven people to using guns for other purposes — such as robberies and vehicle hold-ups — other than protecting themselves and their property. Cattle raiding has been transformed into practically a commercial affair, with use of sophisticated guns featuring prominently. What best exemplifies this insecurity is the fact that one cannot travel the entire stretch of road from Marich Pass in West Pokot District to Lokichogio in Turkana



District without armed police escort. This state of affairs has enhanced a culture of fear amongst the people of the region.

A lot of wealth or property has gone into purchasing arms. This could have been better used to improve the people's lives. Unlike the case in the past, when cattle raids left only a few injured or dead, the current attacks are very destructive both to human life and property. Women, children and the elderly have not been spared during raids. Thus all the people are now vulnerable.

Education has been badly hit by insecurity. Near the common border with the Pokot, Karamojong and the Toposa, large areas have been left uninhabited due to displacement of the population. Schools have been abandoned. For example in Lokori Division of Turkana District, Sarmach, Akiriamet, Lochrelimu, Kotaluk, Napeiton and Lomelo primary schools have been deserted. In Todonyang, along the border with Ethiopia, people have been massively displaced. In Nakwamoru, Juluk and Kapelibok areas along the border with West Pokot, people cannot send their children to school. They cannot exploit the fertile land in this area due to insecurity. Business activities have come to a stand-still and people have been denied access to pasture, with the overall impact being increased poverty levels, hunger and disease. In the entire Marakwet side of the Kerio Valley, all the 13 primary schools have been closed down as people fled the valley to the relative safety of the Kerio escarpment. We saw only four secondary schools that remained open, but each guarded throughout by Administration Police officers. Most young men and women stay idle while others watch out for Pokot attacks. As a result, ignorance has increased as have disease and general poverty.

Increased violence against women and children and rape incidents have become numerous. Government offices have been closed down in areas such as Lomero division in Turkana District and Alale in West Pokot.

The penetration of the gun culture in the society, where everyone owns or seeks to own a gun, has made many people come to see it as their right to own one. Among other things, this means that the police in these areas have almost resigned themselves to the reality of illegal gun ownership. Thus during raids or other incidents of insecurity, the police are usually reluctant to take any serious

action for fear of losing their own lives. Hence, the police are known to send the KPRs to go first after the raiders! The security rapid-reaction strategy of hot pursuit, which appeared to work wonders years ago, has become a thing of the past. The result is that many raiders take their time perpetrating murder and mayhem and then making an almost leisurely getaway.

Due to increased ethnic tension and conflict, the gun culture and its attendant insecurity has contributed to suspicions and unbridled conflict between the Turkana and the Pokot communities on the one hand and between the Turkana and the Toposa and the Merille and the Karamajong on the other. These conflicts have led to numerous cattle raids, death and destruction of property. Arms proliferation make peaceful resolution of conflicts difficult.

Another serious consequence has been the growth of the gun culture among the Marakwet. People see that the best way forward is for them to arm themselves. Each of the 46 clans that make up the Marakwet community has acquired at least one AK-47 rifle for its protection. As insecurity has increased, most professionals have moved away from Kerio Valley. These include teachers, doctors, social workers and businessmen who relocate in the face of the prevailing insecurity.

Health facilities, schools, businesses and even churches have been closed down. Only the Catholic and Anglican churches remain operational in the area. There are also a few international NGOs working in the area such as World Vision, Care International, Christian Children's Fund (CCF) and SNV-Netherlands among others.

The proliferation of small arms has exposed the government's lopsided policy with regard to the control of illegal gun ownership. The government has done little to effectively control ownership of illegal small arms. Indeed, its policy of arming civilians selectively has fuelled insecurity. Evidence on the ground points to the fact that some Kenya Police Reservists (KPRs) appear to condone insecurity through participating in cattle raids and hiring out their guns to criminals. (See footnote 63).

The culture of raiding has made it impossible for people in some parts of the North Rift to take advantage of other resources available in the region. Only a few people have taken advantage of mining gold, semi-precious stones and gypsum all of which are available in profitable quantities in areas such as Turkwel, Lokirima, Lorengipi, Julut, and Nakwamoru.⁵³

Marakwet District provides a unique case of the impact of arms induced insecurity. Loss of life and massive destruction of property and looting stand out as the most

glaring. Houses have been burnt, and the fertile lands of the Marakwet side of Kerio valley have been deserted⁵⁴. The Marakwets now live on the rocky and bare escarpment. Land in the valley is un-demarcated and people hold no title deeds to land they claim to own.⁵⁵ Many of the respondents expressed fear that the Marakwets were being displaced from the Kerio Valley for reasons that have nothing to do with cattle-rustling. The feeling among the Marakwet is that they have been displaced, because someone in authority wants to exploit the natural wealth of the valley. There is evidence that there are large deposits of cement




⁵³ According to the Government of Kenya, West Pokot District Development Plan 1997-2001, most of the exploitable deposits of gold are found in the Muruny Valley, between Sebit and Marich Pass, and the rest in the Turkwel River Valley. Chromite is found around Telot and Kameghen. Numerous talc deposits are also available at Wakor and Kapchok Hill, near Konyao.

⁵⁴ For example, more than 50 people were killed and over 200 houses razed in Chesongoch Location during the last Pokot attack on March 12th 2001.

⁵⁵ While the Keiyo who occupy the south-eastern parts of Kerio valley have been issued with title deeds for their

bearing rocks, semi-precious stones and even oil.⁵⁶

The valley itself is also very fertile and mangoes, horticultural crops, maize, beans, cassava, bananas and other agricultural crops do very well. The permanent Kerio River cuts through the valley. Villagers say that in recent years, the Biritwo-Endo road has been very well murramed, raising suspicions that there must be a good reason for such action. Indeed, people have deserted the whole valley. So why improve the road?⁵⁷ The road that runs from Iten to Kapsowar is in a pathetic state, yet, it serves a large number of the population in the upper parts of Marakwet district. This sense of suspicion and bitterness is heightened by the selective recruitment of KPRs.



Agriculture, the backbone of the people of Marakwet, has come to a standstill. The fertile areas of the Kerio Valley have been left fallow because it is too dangerous to venture into farming for fear of deadly attack. The perception of the people is that the aim is to keep the Marakwet out of the Kerio Valley. Poverty levels have shot up among the Marakwet, who have nowhere to turn

already demarcated plots, the Marakwet have no title deeds or any other land ownership documents yet they occupy most of the Kerio valley. Their land has also not been demarcated. This renders them squatters.

⁵⁶ Many respondents in Endo reported that there have been scores of people who, in the recent past, have come to the surrounding area to make enquiries and have carried samples of rocks and soil.

⁵⁷ On 17th August, 2001 at 4 pm as we drove on the Endo-Biretwo road, 40km from the Biretwo junction, our car developed mechanical problems. We pushed the car and managed to arrive at a heavily guarded construction camp along the road. After much persuasion we got help from some technicians and then continued with our journey to Eldoret. We later learned that the camp houses equipment, machinery and staff of a company contracted to repair the Endo-Biretwo road.

⁵⁸ During our field research, we had to hire armed escorts from Kapenguria to Lokichogio.

to. This has increased other related social problems such as divorce, bitterness and ethnic animosity.

Culturally, the possession of guns by young people encourages them to engage in cattle rustling. There is also the urge to get back the cows one used to acquire the gun. This in effect increases the number of attacks and the reasons to organize for the same. A new trend has also emerged whereby good fighters, or killers, are praised in the community. Indeed, as a badge of recognition and courage, warriors get a physical mark in the form of tattoos or bracelets for each killing. This encourages the young people or warriors to engage in such fights so that they can acquire higher status.

Commercialization of cattle rustling, is emerging whereby raided cattle are sold, thereby replacing the original cultural goal of restocking as a reason for raids. The removal of such large numbers of livestock is impacting negatively on the people in terms of food supply and wealth distribution. There were indications during the field research that, after raids, cattle traders come in large numbers, complete with lorries, to purchase the raided animals. We were told that some prominent people may be financing cattle raiding in the region.

Gun possession has impacted negatively on development in the area. Most of the land along the fertile Kerio Valley is deserted and no farming is going on. The pasture also goes to waste because none of the people can graze there. A number of water boreholes provided by NGOs (such as the one near Nauyapong in West Pokot provided by World Vision) have been deserted or vandalized during confrontation or owing to insecurity. People's attention in this area is all focused on security and other aspects of development such as education have no room. The over-all impact is a circle of false security that breeds poverty and stagnation of any development in the area. Domestic quarrels have in some occasions resulted in death when people use guns to settle their differences.

The proliferation of small arms in East Baringo has kept away business people, professionals, NGOs, churches and even the Government, owing to insecurity. These groups would have opened up the area and inculcated among the Pokot

a sense of brotherhood with their neighbours. They would have educated the community and taken away the ignorance that is preyed upon by the politicians.

The level of insecurity has increased in the region. The Government seems to have left security matters on the hands of civilians. Consequently, bandits have taken charge. For example, along the Kainuk-Chepareria road, many motorists and commuters have been ambushed and robbed, even killed in the last few years⁵⁸. The net impact therefore is widespread ignorance, poverty, disease, suspicion and under-development. It is our submission that the Government can rectify the situation if it had the moral and political will to do so. Evidently, there appears to be a political conspiracy to maintain the status quo.

In Samburu District, small arms proliferation has negatively affected the lives of the community. The most devastating impact relates to killings, particularly during cattle raids. Many people have been killed during raids by the Turkana and the Pokot.⁵⁹ Highway robberies have increased and commuters have been killed along the Maralal-Baragoi, Rumuruti and Nyahururu roads. The gun has been turned into a weapon of choice in solving grudges.

Another key impact is the displacement of sections of the Samburu community owing to cattle raids. In Baragoi Division, the majority of the people have been displaced and camped at the Baragoi shopping centre. Others have moved to Maralal town.

Poverty has generally increased, occasioned by cattle raids, where one is suddenly reduced to a pauper after one's livestock has been stolen by raiders. It takes a long time for such people to recover (or not at all) and to restock their cattle.

⁵⁹ One of the most memorable killings in Samburu occurred in 2001 along the Maralal-Baragoi Road when bandits ambushed a vehicle travelling to Baragoi and cold-bloodedly killed four of its five occupants. Among those killed were two brothers, one a lawyer by profession, the other a clinical officer. The fifth person escaped.

⁶⁰ Local people in Maralal town and near Suguta Valley narrated to us about this incident.

Business has also been negatively affected, since the area is considered insecure by prospective business people. This discourages cattle buyers from venturing to buy cattle in the district. Cattle dealers fear the attacks and therefore tend to stay away and residents are forced to drive their livestock all the way to Rumuruti, about 100km away, where buyers gather. This is both risky and tiring. Other small-scale investors have also kept away from the urban areas in the district for the same reasons. This has contributed to underdevelopment in the district. In the countryside, the manyatta shops have closed down in the face of frequent raids and theft.

Another notable impact of arms proliferation relates to the environment. Wildlife is in danger. The district has several wildlife reserves, which are a key attraction to tourists. These reserves hold various wildlife species. With the easy accessibility to the gun, people are killing wildlife indiscriminately. It has become very difficult for the Kenya Wildlife Service to protect wildlife in Samburu District. Game wardens interviewed for this study explained that the most endangered wildlife are leopard, elephant and rhino.

Security on the roads is badly affected, necessitating a police escort whenever people travel, especially on the Maralal-Baragoi road. The local Member of Parliament (Samburu West) was recently harassed by bandits near the Merti trading centre, on the same road. His proficiency in the Turkana language saved him when the bandits (who were Turkana tribesmen) realized that the MP “is one of our own”. (The MP is actually a Samburu by tribe).⁶⁰

On the positive side, those with guns feel secure and that they are able to ward off attack. They have a sense of security and can venture into the countryside to graze their cattle since they feel they can protect themselves in case of attack. There is therefore evidence that the possession of guns by the Samburu has reduced the incidence of raids against them by their neighbours.

The flow of arms in the North Rift assumes a regional perspective because most of the arms in the area emanate from outside Kenyan territory. If the sources

in Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia could be checked, the flow would fall in the North Rift districts. The current flows are the background to continued use of arms in raids and ethnic conflict. There is a need for decisive action to be taken to stop this trend because the arms in the North Rift are likely to find their way beyond the pastoral communities. In the event that a political crisis occurs in the affected areas, the use of arms by civilian dramatically changes scenarios.

The roads from the neighbouring countries act as conduits through which arms move from the region to urban areas in the country. There is a need to double the surveillance on the roads to ensure that arms do not move from pastoralists to criminals in urban areas.

Chapter 7

RESPONSES

The problem of small arms has elicited several responses at all levels namely; international, regional, national, local community and civil society. The Kenyan government has since the year 2000 publicly and prominently recognised the need to stem the proliferation of small arms. Drawing on growing international attention to the spread of small arms and light weapons, particularly in the lead-up to the first-ever United Nations “Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects” held in New York on 9 – 20 July 2001, Kenya has taken a lead role to promote initiatives to stem small arms proliferation at national, sub regional and regional levels. At the national level, the Kenyan government has responded to the crisis of small arms and light weapons by initiating the 12 – 15 March 2000 Ministerial Conference that resulted in the famous Nairobi Declaration.

The government also hosted in November 2000 an experts meeting that drew up the Co-ordinated Agenda for Action and the Implementation Plan of the Nairobi Declaration. Kenya also actively participated in a meeting held in Addis Ababa in May 2000 of the first African governmental experts on small arms, which drew up the continental position for the ministerial meeting in Bamako, Mali in December 2000. To enrich this position, a meeting of Intergovernmental Organizations (IGAD and EAC), Civil society and other stakeholders was held in Addis Ababa in June 2000.

The Nairobi Declaration expresses grave concern, by state parties, on the problem of the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa and the devastating consequences they have in sustaining armed conflicts, abetting terrorism, cattle rustling and other serious crimes in the region. The formation and operationalization of the Nairobi Secretariat was one of the major initiatives undertaken by the Kenyan government to combat the proliferation of small arms.

The initiative by the Kenya government will help drive the implementation plan. The outcome of “the first Ministerial Review Conference of the Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa” held in Nairobi on 7–8 August, 2002 is a revised and comprehensive implementation plan and its operational guidelines for the following year. This is an ambitious plan that could result in comprehensive government programs and plans for the prevention, combating and eradication of SALW and land mines.

At the international level, the United Nations Programme of Action (UNPoA) recognizes that the problem of small arms and light weapons in all its aspects sustains conflicts, exacerbates violence, contributes to the displacement of civilians, undermines respect for international humanitarian law, impedes the provision of humanitarian assistance to victims of armed conflicts and fuels crime and terrorism⁶¹. The UNPoA is quite comprehensive and gives guidelines for action by individual states at the national, regional and global levels. In addition, the UNPoA recognizes that the primary responsibility for solving the problem of SALW falls on all states but the implementation requires international cooperation and assistance. In this respect the UNPoA encourages all initiatives to mobilize resources and expertise to promote its implementation and to provide assistance to states in their implementation of the Programme of Action.

Further, the UNPoA encourages non-governmental organizations and civil society to engage, as appropriate, in all aspects of international, regional, sub regional and national efforts in its implementation.

Government Responses

Although prominently present and active in the international and regional

⁶¹ Preamble to UN A/CONF. 192/15 item 5.

⁶² According Samburu respondents, the Nashora GSU camp supports the Turkana KPRs and services their arms.

initiatives, the GOK should extend the same zeal to local initiatives to curb the problem of illegal arms especially in the North Rift region. The government has not fared very well in terms of controlling small arms proliferation, but there are a number of measures it has undertaken in an attempt to control, prevent and combat the illicit proliferation of small arms.

The GoK has deployed security personnel in some areas along the international borders. In Lokichogio, the government has deployed regular police officers as well as a military unit 10km from the common border with Sudan. There are a number of roadblocks along the main road from Lokichogio through Lodwar to Kitale. The government has deployed a huge security machinery in Kerio Valley. There are both regular, General Service Unit and Anti- Stock theft police officers stationed at six different parts of Kerio Valley. These include Regular and Administration police at Tot, Arror and Liter, Anti-Stock theft units at Chesongoch and Mogil, GSU units at Mogil and Tot. Their responsibility is to provide security for the people and their property. The problem with this measure is that there seems to lack instructions to the officers on what to do when raids occur. The question is whether they should shoot raiders or not. The matter gets even more complicated because you cannot disarm these people when their neighbours in Uganda, Ethiopia and Sudan are still armed.

The international common border is not sufficiently policed and people can and do easily cross the border on either side. Thus, the porous nature of the border makes it easy for the trafficking of illegal weapons and other contraband goods. Besides, the number of officers deployed by the government is hardly enough to man such an extensive common border. The rough terrain and hostile weather are also major hindrances to effective policing. Evidence from the field suggests that little has been achieved by the government in providing security for the people. Majority of the respondents held the view that whenever there are raids the government security personnel do little to stop them. Their feeling is that the police have no inclination to prevent or contain attacks whenever they occur. According to them, the government is not interested in providing security for the communities in this region. The Marakwet, especially, felt very vulnerable to the situation.

In Samburu, the government has increased the number of security personnel in the district, especially the establishment of a GSU camp at Nashora in Baragoi division. However, local residents pointed out that security personnel though present, are generally lax in their response to attacks and in most cases, ill equipped for the challenge of pursuing stolen livestock. They lack enough vehicles and other facilities. To many observers there seems to lack political goodwill from the government to rid the affected areas of this problem.⁶²

Another control mechanism the government has used is the issuance of guns to Kenya Police Reservists (KPRs). The KPRs are recruited and co-ordinated through the Kenya Police Force. They are issued with arms and charged with the responsibility of protecting and maintaining security within the community. They are also expected to report any incidences of breach of security. The problem is that these KPRs are not remunerated in any way for the services they provide. They are under no proper command and are ill-trained. Given the harsh economic realities in many parts of the country, this opens the way for possible misuse by the KPRs of the guns in their possession. For example a number of them have been found guilty of hiring out their guns to criminals or using them to commit robberies against the very people they are supposed to protect⁶³. Another downside to this is that those without guns feel threatened, and hence resort to buying illegal weapons to protect themselves. The presence of government arms among the population, since the KPRs are not uniformed, offers a cover for those with illegal arms to be confused for government issued firearms.

For instance, in Samburu district, the government has responded to the challenge of illegal arms by recruiting about one thousand (1,000) KPRs. There are mixed reactions about this response with many residents feeling that the introduction of such a high number of arms is encouraging other individuals left out in the

This sort of favouritism on one side of a conflict is sending a wrong message about the Government's commitment to solving the problem of small arms.

⁶³ While in the field in Turkana District, we were told of a case in which two people were arrested by the police after a vehicle holdup near Lokichogio Town. The two confessed to have hired the AK-47 rifle found in their possession from a KPR resident of the area.

⁶⁴ After the Presidential directive, only one gun had been surrendered three months later. We were told that even

recruitment to acquire their own guns. Others argue that the presence of the KPRs has helped to minimize attacks. Indeed, majority of the respondents confirmed guns held by the KPRs have been used in attacks on vehicles along the roads in the district.

There are occasional security operations aimed at confiscating illegal arms from citizens. This is a strategy the government has employed with limited success because it is usually carried out unprofessionally. Very few weapons get recovered during such operations, as citizens ensure that they are safely hidden from the security personnel. In fact, such operations only help to alienate the population from the government. Many respondents in West Pokot and East Baringo reported that whenever such operations are carried out, the police act with ruthlessness, steal peoples' property and generally intimidate residents.


The government has used the tactic of declaring amnesty to those willing to return their weapons to government authorities within a specified period of time. Related to this measure is the tendency to give threats and ultimatums to illegal gun holders. A good example is the order given by the Kenyan Head of State in April 2001 to all illegal gun holders to turn in their guns to government security officials⁶⁴. This order has gone largely unheeded. The few returned guns are usually outdated and unserviceable ones, which the owners do not need. This is a futile measure particularly because the government fails to recognize that people have acquired guns specifically as a response to the government's failure to guarantee them security. No one, for example, has been arraigned in a court of law charged with the raid in March 2001 that left 47 Marakwets dead.⁶⁵

This pie chart shows the views of respondents when asked whether they considered the government responses to the proliferation of small arms effective. While 48 percent cent thought that government responses were ineffective, only 12 percent considered the government responses as effective and 39 percent opted not to

the gun that was surrendered was defective. Respondents among both the Pokots and the Marakwets told us that it is futile for the state to issue ultimatums and orders for people to return guns. People have bought the guns that they hold and therefore if the government wants them surrendered, then it must first be willing to provide adequate security and then compensate the people adequately for the guns surrendered.

⁶⁵ Daily Nation 13th March, 2001

answer the question because they considered the issue sensitive.



Public Barazas held by government officials, and police patrols are other measures employed by the government to curb insecurity. These however, need to be enhanced if lasting peace is to be achieved.

Another key measure the GoK has undertaken is the amendment of the Fire arms Act to increase penalties for illegal possession, handling, dealing, selling et cetera of firearms to further discourage

the illicit proliferation. This has been presented in parliament but is yet to be debated and enacted

Community Responses

The widespread insecurity has occasioned several community responses. People indicate loss of faith in the government ability to provide adequate protection thereby holding it in ridicule. Consequently, the communities in the North Rift continue to arm themselves. They feel neglected and find it difficult to consider themselves part and parcel of the larger Kenyan society as evidenced by the various questions residents ask visitors to the area, such as ‘How is Kenya’!⁶⁶ The value of education has been eroded. According to a large number of respondents, young people should commit themselves to community protection rather than going to school. It’s in record that when asked to take children to school, the parents responded that “there is absolutely no need to take a child to school” or “Taking a child to school is itself a loss to the community”. Why pay for education? Of what use is it?”⁶⁷

⁶⁶ These are direct responses from members of the Pokot community in West Pokot and East Baringo

⁶⁷ These are responses from Pokot elders during interviews carried out in Kolowa Division, East Baringo Subdistrict in August 2001

There is a growing adoration of gun culture among the community. The people consider those who support community arming as heroes. The Marakwets are arming themselves as a direct response to Pokot attacks who, apart from state-issued guns through KPRs, have many more guns of their own. Community solidarity has been enhanced among the residents in the region in readiness to ward off imminent attacks. For instance sub-chiefs and chiefs know that people have illegal guns but they cannot reveal this to higher authorities. In other words, they are more committed and loyal to their communities than to the government.

The proliferation of small arms has caused internal displacement. Most of the communities have moved out of the affected areas. In Maralal town, for example, many immigrants from Baragoi, Waso and Nyiro divisions have moved in and settled during the last three years. This settlement is itself potentially explosive particularly when one considers that most land in the district is un-demarcated. When land demarcation starts, problems are bound to occur, because the squatters are likely to demand recognition as the rightful owners of the land on which they have settled. Those who have remained in Baragoi, have gathered in large manyattas, where they can put their strength of numbers and arms together to improve their security. One shanties village in Baragoi has about 18,000 people. This has adversely affected the environment because the population is high and the growing number of livestock is also hurriedly destroying the ecosystem since there is no room for pasture to grow.

The local politicians would prefer to retain the status-quo (ignorance and lack of exposure) so as to maintain control of the people.

The government has not taken any steps against politicians who routinely incite communities against each other. Those politicians are well known and their pronouncements are well documented by the press, yet the government never prosecutes them. Pokot politicians have repeatedly threatened their neighbours, and deadly attacks have

⁶⁸ Daily Nation, 1 and 14 January 2001; KHRC, 2001, *Raiding Democracy: The Slaughter of the Marakwets in Kerio Valley*, Pg. 52.

been carried out after such threats, yet the government has never prosecuted any of them. These politicians some of them cabinet members are known to encourage sections of their people to arm themselves. It shows a glaring lack of commitment on the part of the government to eradicate gun culture and ethnic animosity in the region. For example, the late Hon. Lotodo and his successor MP for Kapenguria the Honourable Moroto are on record for having incited their Pokot community to attack other communities living in West Pokot District as well as the Marakwet in Kerio Valley.⁶⁸

Public awareness is then critical in any government measures to deal with the issue of guns in this region. Force and government operations cannot solve the problem. May be a new approach of educating the people and negotiating with them may reduce the problem. On the other hand all countries in this region should combine efforts to confront this challenge.

Most respondents held the view that if the governments were to be more positively engaged in the region, cattle raiding and the proliferation of illegal guns would drastically reduce. They further held the view that the government had neglected the residents in many aspects of development activities. A large percentage of those interviewed lamented the fact that educational standards in the region remained very low. School enrolment for example in East Baringo is almost less than 10 percent of those eligible to attend school. In one primary school in Kolowa division it was found that out of a class of 32 students, only one was female. Generally, it was the feeling of most of those interviewed that the government should launch awareness campaigns in the area, build and equip schools and then provide free education as well as meals to the students. If this was done, it would have a significant impact on the peoples lifestyle and would, consequently, reduce cattle rustling and thuggery among the people of the North Rift Region.

⁶⁸ Pacifying the Valley: An Analysis of the Kerio Valley Conflicts, A Joint Project Report by the NCKK, SNV, Netherlands and SARDEP.

Civil Society Initiatives

The high human and physical cost of small arms presence in North Rift has prompted various levels of action regimes aimed at reducing or eradicating the destabilising effects of arms proliferation and use. Among those spearheading the crusade against illegal arms proliferation are civil society groups and community based organizations. These organizations are mainly involved in humanitarian action and policy advocacy at various levels. A key component of civil society are the religious organizations. In the context of the North Rift region, the NCKK and the CJPC have contributed tremendously towards peace and reconciliation amongst the communities of the area.

On its part, the NCKK started an initiative named “Community Peace Building and Development Project” during the 1992-3 ethnic clashes with several objectives including the prevention of ethnic conflicts, improvement of inter-ethnic relationship and the reduction of suffering caused by ethnic violence through the use of posters, videos, teaching aids, documentation, role plays, drama, roving peace choirs and peace tournaments. The project has managed to thaw relations between the Marakwet and the Pokot in Kerio Valley on the one hand and the Luhyia, Kisii, Kikuyu and the Pokot in Trans Nzoia on the other. NCKK’s work also involves civic education and policy advocacy at the national level⁶⁹. The aim is to improve relations amongst the various communities



and thereby forestall conflict.

NCKK and UJCC have initiated a joint project to work on peace and reconciliation, to include development and security along the Kenya/Uganda common border. The project will utilize existing church structure for implementation. It is funded by USAID through Mwengo and Church Aid.

The CPJC's work in Trans Nzoia, West Pokot and Turkana districts is similar in many respects to that of the NCKK. Through its peace programme, the Catholic Church actively advocates for peace and reconciliation amongst the diverse communities living in the region. The church repeatedly preaches against arms use, cattle rustling and other ills in society. Secondly, the CPJC actively engages with other civil society organizations in efforts to find lasting solutions to peoples' problems particularly those plagued by conflicts. International and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are other key players in efforts to minimize the impacts of proliferation of small arms. Most notable are the World Vision, the SNV Netherlands, Oxfam, UNHCR, Christian Children's' Fund (CCF) and the World Food Programme (WFP).

World Vision is implementing a programme on peace and reconciliation amongst the Pokot, Turkana, Karamojong and the Sabiny (POKATUSA) communities living along the Kenya-Uganda common border. The project is a multi-pronged approach to peace building and integrates community-based peace making approaches with development action. Joint community activities such as sports, drama and peace rallies as well as shared resources such as boreholes and schools are among the key pillars of the project whose aim is to reduce opportunities for tension and violent conflict. POKATUSA also sponsors children from the various communities through paying school fees and buying books, equipment and uniforms. The project has constructed a number of schools, health centres and community social centers to promote interaction between the various communities. The project calls upon members of the communities to respect each other and to sanctify life and property. To this end, people are encouraged

⁷⁰ UNHCR Briefing on Kakuma, September 2002.

to surrender illegal weapons in their possession.

SNV Netherlands runs a research and advocacy programme in Kerio. Oxfam has a comprehensive program in Turkana and Samburu districts dealing with issues relating to effects of conflict, poverty, arms proliferation and drought response mechanisms. These strategies and programmes have been implemented in isolation but also in collaboration with government agencies and other civil society organizations. GTZ, SWOM (Samburu Wings of Mercy) and ITDG have tried to bring communities together to set up peace initiatives. Their approach is the establishment of peace committees starting from the village or clan level to the district level.

The UNHCR handles screening and settling of refugees in the country. One of its key tasks is to ensure that no refugee gets admitted into the country carrying illegal arms or other contraband goods. This task is accomplished in close collaboration with the government. There is a screening camp in Lokichogio.⁷⁰

The above responses have somewhat helped minimise the impact of small arms use in the North Rift. However, a lot more needs to be done by both the Government and civil society, particularly with regard to community awareness, early-warning and development initiatives. Politicians must take the initiative in promoting peace amongst their communities instead of being war-mongers. The Government of Kenya needs to do a lot more in beefing up security in the North Rift and elsewhere in the country.

Chapter 8

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary

In summary, this study has established that small arms are prevalent in uncontrolled numbers in the North Rift region of Kenya. The most heavily armed communities are the Turkana, Pokot and Samburu. A significant percentage of the male population in these communities possesses illegal arms. The Marakwet have, however, only recently begun to acquire guns. The community is systematically and deliberately arming itself as a direct response to the frequent raids meted out on them by the Pokot. While in West Pokot, East Baringo, Samburu and Turkana guns are privately owned, in Marakwet they are owned by the community. Insecurity remains the main reason why communities have armed themselves. The pastoralist communities in the North Rift routinely raid each other's livestock as well as that of their neighbours. Gun ownership is supposed to ensure protection of one's property and cattle against theft.

Politicians have played a leading role in inciting communities to violence. By so doing, they have sent the message to the people that it is right for them to acquire illegal arms and to stage cattle raids against their neighbours. This was found to be particularly true of senior politicians in West Pokot.

The Kenya Government has recruited police reservists (KPRs) to safeguard security within certain communities. It has also occasionally issued amnesties and ultimatums to those holding illegal guns to surrender them to the security forces. The Government has deployed regular, Administration and General Service Unit police officers and the Anti-stock Theft Unit in the conflict-prone areas.

Arms-induced conflict has resulted in devastating consequences. Many schools have closed down due to insecurity. Agriculture in Marakwet is at a stand-still. Poverty and ignorance are widespread in Turkana, West Pokot, East Baringo and Samburu. In general, small arms and the gun culture have very negatively affected development activities in the North Rift.

People in these areas are fed-up with insecurity and they would like to see increased efforts from the Government to curb it. If security were guaranteed, people would see no point in acquiring guns and would be willing to negotiate with the Government to surrender such guns to the State if they were compensated.

The Kenyan Government appears to be a leader in this region in recognizing the problem of small arms proliferation as well as in working to coordinate a sub-regional response and implementing a national strategy to curb the problem. However, the Government has not pursued any comprehensive approach to eradicate or control the proliferation of arms in the worst-hit areas within its territory. In particular, its emphasis on a legal and law enforcement-oriented strategy, with very limited attention to the factors driving demand for weapons, such as the insecurity from ethnic tensions, the existence of armed militia groups and cross-border attacks, poverty and other socio-economic factors, holds little promise in addressing the problem in the systematic way required.

Civil society has played a leading role in trying to ameliorate the problems of insecurity and development in the North Rift. There is a need for the organizations working in the region to harmonize their activities and work with the local communities and government agencies to achieve an integrated and mutual approach to ensure efficient utilization of resources.

The phenomenon of arms proliferation and conflict in the North Rift cannot be said to be beyond control. If the Government were to become more committed, evince the necessary political goodwill and facilitate adequate civic education, the situation can be brought under control. Government commitment would entail willingness to allocate more resources to this region. This should come

punished for their deeds. No livestock should be declared lost, because the government has the resources to track down stolen livestock.

As a sign of political will, the leaders in these areas must be sincere and honest with their people. They must let them know that arms can only offer false and limited security. Leaders should offer better strategies for coping with drought, natural calamities and cultural pressures than cattle rustling.

The Government policy of issuing guns to civilians under the KPR Programme has not brought tangible positive impact. There is need for the Government to reassess the policy.

The role of education as a liberating factor from unrewarding cultural undertakings must be emphasized. In this regard, the Government should use the available resources to provide free education in these areas because the people are too poor to afford education. The free education package should include food, shelter, medical care and uniforms. Educational tours should be organized for the communities to expose opinion leaders to other economic livelihoods apart from cattle keeping.

The solution to insecurity problems in the region has to start from the people, since any external effort to change their lifestyle may not achieve much. This is due to the fact that it is not very easy to change the culture of a people. Any change initiatives should maximize their focus on the positive values and practices that people have and where they are, such as improving cattle-keeping methods, better markets and encouraging the positive effects of education.

Effective early-warning systems set up and operated by the Government, civil society, and the people themselves to forestall conflict, should be emphasized. This should include sensitizing elders to the benefits of controlling the activities of the youth, enhancing government Intelligence networks and political will. All occasions for mutual cultural exchange in the form of dances, markets and games should be enhanced to help dispel the negative attitudes inculcated during the periods of animosity.

Conclusion

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons is a real challenge in the North Rift region of Kenya. There is a fast growing gun culture whereby firearms now attain the cultural status of items of inheritance, as is increasingly becoming the case among the Turkana. The commercialization of cattle rustling, where raided livestock is driven straight to market, is turning the gun to a wealth-creating tool among the North Rift pastoralists. The use of excessive force in raids is leaving behind a trail of death, rape, displacement and property destruction, among other evils and human rights abuses. The cloud of fear, trauma and desperation hanging over the residents of the region is gathering fast. The communities' response is ever more armament and more conflict in search of supremacy.

The sources of arms in the North Rift region are mainly Uganda, southern Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. The long history of conflict in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa regions has left a legacy of illegal arms flowing freely in the area. The long and porous borders around the North Rift region offer easy movement of arms from one country to the other. For a long time, Uganda has been the main source of arms to the North Rift region, but Somalia seems to be taking the lead now. The continued demand for small arms in southern Sudan has left the country a moderate but steady source of illegal arms in the North Rift region. This can be explained by the fact that war deserters in the Sudan conflict are some of the suppliers of arms as they seek settlement in the refugee camps or on their way out of the region. This does not rule out the role of traffickers across the border.

Resources such as pasture, water and farmland remain grossly under-utilized, especially in areas where conflict is intense. This scenario may be explained by the fact that none of the parties would dare settle on the wide buffer zones, which, in most cases, are the most agriculturally productive areas (a good case in point is the Marakwet-Pokot border along the Kerio Valley). A major consequence of this is a serious destruction of food security for the affected communities. Most have to rely on relief food throughout the year, further enhancing a culture of donor dependency. With the changing trends in humanitarian interventions and philanthropy throughout the world, donor support has been significantly

reduced, hence the need for communities to be empowered to take charge of their own needs. As a matter of urgency, it is important for the Government to help the communities to improve livestock farming so that they can reap maximum benefits from their labour. The marketing of livestock and their products needs to develop to a level where the communities will not be exploited and the market is sure and reliable. In addition, the communities need to be helped to improve the breed of their livestock so that they can reap maximum benefits.

The proliferation of arms in the North Rift region has impacted negatively on development. The common phenomenon of wealthy families being reduced to beggars after their livestock is raided is increasing the levels of poverty in the region. Many institutions, such as schools and facilities such as health centres, have been abandoned as people flee from conflict-prone areas. The end result has been poor health and the prevalence of ignorance as children of school-going age are recruited into community security arrangements, thereby sealing their fate with regard to continuing education.

The Government's response to the issue of illegal arms in the region can, in all fairness, be rated as unserious. The recruitment of KPRs has emerged as a double-edged sword because the government-issued arms have been used both for providing security as well as for committing illegal acts. The government has a prime responsibility to provide security to its citizens. In this regard, compensating and motivating the KPR's requires urgent attention, if they are to effectively perform their duties. Eventually, the Government must take up the responsibility of security to all its citizens, regardless of their location, economic circumstances, political inclination and ethnic background.

It is important to note that the curbing of illegal arms proliferation can only succeed if there is adequate co-operation from the regional governments. Uncoordinated and individual government efforts cannot work in a multifaceted, regional problem.

The role of the international community in the supply of illegal arms should not be ignored. There are very few arms that are locally manufactured, meaning that most arms are sourced from outside the region. Dealers in arms should be internationally pressurized to sell arms only to governments and not to competing

factions and rebel groups. International illegal arms dealers must be dealt with according to both national and international laws.

The human cost of small arms-induced conflict and their negative impact on development is enormous and should no longer be tolerated. No effort should be spared in confronting the problem in its various forms. It is our conviction that the war against illegal arms proliferation and use can be won.

Recommendations

This study proposes the following recommendations:-

- 1 There is need for commitment and political will on the part of the Government to integrate the North Rift region in the national development agenda and to help the communities to identify with mainstream Kenya.
- 1 The Government should recognize the traditional structures of governance and link them with government structures to enhance law and order, especially in resource sharing and allocation and peace building. The government presence must be felt, hence the need to beef up security in the region. More police officers should be deployed in the affected areas and motivated through higher salaries and better living conditions.
- 1 Education should be enhanced, particularly among the pastoralist communities like the Pokot and Turkana. This would minimize over-reliance on livestock and reduce cattle rustling. Related to this, the Government should increase civic awareness efforts to eradicate ignorance.
- 1 Government and other stakeholders should also capitalize on times of relative calm to bring warring communities together. This can be done through barazas, joint cultural events such as sports peace meetings and exchange visits. Elders can play a leading role in these activities.
- 1 The Government should be firm in taming politicians who are known to incite the people. Those found guilty of arming or inciting their communities to

violence should be dealt with according to the law. In the past several leading politicians in the region have been known to openly support cattle-rustling and to sponsor anarchy.

- 1 The Government should come up with tight border control mechanisms to ensure that gun dealers do not bring in weapons from neighbouring communities. This can be done through utilizing vigilante groups and secret service security personnel among communities living in border areas. Increased police border patrols and suitable equipment, such as four-wheel drive vehicles and fuel can help in this respect.
- 1 There is a need to review the policy on the requirements for KPRs. Their presence in the region has, in many respects, been counter-productive. The KPRs tend to encourage those without arms to acquire them. They have also been misused, largely because they lack remuneration, training and proper co-ordination.
- 1 The Government, civil society and the communities should develop early-warning systems to ward off possible attacks and check against arms proliferation.
- 1 The Government should enhance vigilance in arms registration. All guns should be licensed. The current practice by government security officials to look the other way as communities actively arm themselves should be discouraged.
- 1 Immediate action is required for proper marketing of livestock, especially just before drought.
- 1 The problem of small arms is an international problem. To effectively solve the problem, there is a critical need for inter-state cooperation. Unless Uganda, Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia are involved, arms will conveniently continue to cross the borders. The Government of Kenya must initiate contacts with the neighbouring governments in seeking solutions/resolutions of the problem of small arms and light weapons.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Pacic Amir, “Culture, Identity and Security: An Overview”, Unpublished Report,

Pacic Amir, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, 1998.

Maclean Andrew, “Tackling Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of

Africa: Strengthening the Capacity of Sub-regional Organisations”, Meeting Report, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2000.

Muchai Augusta & Jefferson Claire, Kenya Crime Survey 2000, SRIC, 2002.

Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC), Brief 11, Reasonable Measures: Addressing the Excessive Accumulation and Unlawful use of Small Arms, 1998.

_____ Brief 14, Disarmament and Conflict Prevention in Development Corporation proceedings of an international conference 30th-31st August, BICC 2000.

_____ Brief 23, Small Arms in the Horn of Africa: Challenges, Issues and Perspectives, March 2002.

Crawford Young, Ethnic Diversity and Public Policy: An Overview, Occasional Paper No. 8, World Summit for Social Development, UNRISD, Geneva.

Demetriou S, Muggah R, and Biddle I, Small Arms Availability, Trade and Impacts in the Republic of Congo, Small Arms Survey, Geneva, 2002.

Proliferation
Reyncke Eunice, Small Arms and Light Weapons in Africa: Illicit

Circulation, and Trafficking, Institute for Security Studies, 2000.

Gebre-Wold Kifremariam, “Understanding the Demand for Small Arms in the Horn of Africa”, In BICC Brief No. 23, March 2000.

Gulliner P.H., A Preliminary Survey of Turkana: A Report Compiled for the Government of Kenya, School of African Studies, New Series No. 26, University of Cape Town, 1951.

Hassan Z.M., “The Role and Effects of Somali Pastoralists in Conflict”, Paper presented at a workshop on the theme “Promoting Land Rights of Pastoralists” in the Horn of Africa, Nairobi, 1997.

Kenya Human Rights Commission, Raiding Democracy: The Slaughter of the Marakwet in Kerio Valley, KHRC, Nairobi, 2001.

Lake D. and Morgan P. (Eds), Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997.

Larjour Consultancy, “Arms Trafficking in the Border Regions of Sudan”, A Research Report presented at the International Conference on Small Arms Trafficking in the Border Regions of Sudan, Uganda and Kenya, Jinja, November 9th-13th, 2001.

Lumpe Lora (Ed), Running Guns: The Global Black Market in Small Arms, Zed Books, London, 2000.

Chambers Malcolm & Mephram David, British Security Policy: Broadening the Agenda, Saferworld, 1997.

Leonhardt Manuela, “Conflict Impact Assessment of EU Development Co-operation with ACP Countries: A Review of Literature and Practice”, Unpublished Report, International Alert, July 1999.

Mkutu Kennedy, “Pastoralism and Conflict in the Horn of Africa”, unpublished

report, Africa Peace Forum, Saferworld, University of Bradford, December 2001.

Muggah R & Berman E, *Humanitarianism Under Threat: The Humanitarian Impacts of Small Arms and Light Weapons*, Small Arms Survey, Geneva, 2001.

Republic of Kenya, “Report of the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa Conference on the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons”, Nairobi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, 2000.

_____ “Co-ordinated Agenda for Action on the Problem of the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa”, Nairobi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation 2000

_____ “Study on Land Tenure and Resource Management in Kenya: Policy and Legal Framework on Pastoral Land Tenure and Resource Management in the Arid Lands of Kenya”, Office of the President, Department of Relief and Rehabilitation, February 1999.

_____ “The Report of the First Ministerial Review Conference of the Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa”, Nairobi, August 7-8, 2002.

Kizito Sabala, “The Proliferation, Circulation and Misuse of Firearms in Urban Centres: The Case of Nairobi, Kenya” In BICC Brief 23, Bonn, 2001.

Cratili Saverio & Swift Jeremy, “Understanding and Managing Pastoral Conflict in Kenya: A Literature Review”, Unpublished Report, DfID, 1998.

Demetrio Spyros, Muggah Robert & Biddle Ian, *Small Arms Availability, Trade and Impacts in the Republic of Congo*, Small Arms Survey, Geneva, 2002.

Lodgaard Sverre & Ronnfelt Carsten, *A Moratorium on Light Weapons in West*

Africa, Norwegian Institute on Small Arms Transfers/Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1998.

APPENDIX

MINISTERIAL DECLARATION

THE FIRST MINISTERIAL REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE NAIROBI DECLARATION ON THE PROBLEM OF THE PROLIFERATION OF ILLICIT SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION AND THE HORN OF AFRICA

Nairobi, August 7–8, 2002

Ministerial Declaration for Continued Concerted Action in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa

We, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the countries of the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa namely, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda and United Republic of Tanzania, meeting at Nairobi on 7-8 August, 2002 on the occasion of The First Ministerial Review Conference of the Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapon in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa;

Reaffirming the inherent right of states to individual or collective self-defence as recognised in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter;

Gravely concerned with the problem of the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa and the devastating consequences they have had in sustaining armed conflict, abetting terrorism, cattle-rustling and other serious crimes in the region;

Concerned about the supply of small arms and light weapons into the region,

and conscious of the need for effective controls of arms transfers by suppliers outside the region (including measures against transfer of surplus arms) to prevent the problem of illicit small arms and light weapons;

Aware of the urgent need to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of, excessive and destabilising accumulation of, trafficking in, illicit possession and use of small arms and light weapons, ammunition and other related materials, owing to the harmful effects of those activities on the security of each state and the sub-region, their social and economic development and their right to live in peace;

Acknowledging that the problem of proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons in the region has been exacerbated by internal political strife and extreme poverty, and that a comprehensive strategy to arrest and deal with the problem must include putting in place structures and processes to promote democracy, the observance of human rights, the rule of law and good governance, as well as economic recovery and growth, and practical measures to ensure peace and security in Africa as expressed during the launch of the Africa Union in Durban in July 9, 2002;

Noting that in Africa preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons is a key element to promoting long-term security and creating conditions for sustainable development which is a cornerstone of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) endorsed by the African Heads of State and Government on 11 July 2001 during the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Summit in Lusaka, Zambia;

Further Noting the recommendations of the NEPAD Sub-Committee on Peace and Security on practical steps to ensure efficient and consolidated action for the prevention, combating and eradication of small arms, and land mines proliferation in Africa of June 2002;

Reaffirming the commitment undertaken by our governments in support of:

1 The United Nations' Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects of July 1998

2001.

- 1 The Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime of June 2001; and taking into account the compatible elements thereof in the African Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism;
- 1 The OAU Bamako Declaration on the Common African Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons, of December 2000; and,
- 1 The Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa of March 2000; its Coordinated Agenda for Action on the Problem of the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa [SAEM/GLR.HOA/1 of November 2000] and its implementation Plan [SAEM/GLR.HOA/2 of November 2000];

Supporting similar African initiatives such as, the Central African States initiative taken at N'djamena in October 1999 in the framework of the UN Standing Committee of Security in Central Africa; the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) extension of its Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa of 2001 and the signature of a Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and other Related Materials in the Southern African Development Community (SADC);

Acknowledging the results of other initiatives in support of similar objectives such as the African Conference on the Implementation of the United Nations' Programme of Action on Small Arms: Needs and Partnerships between African countries and OECD countries of March 2002;

Commending the work undertaken by the Nairobi Secretariat in charge of the regional coordination for the implementation of the above-mentioned

commitments and the preparation of this First Ministerial Review Conference;

Further Commending the work undertaken by the Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Committee (EAPCCO) in preparing the Draft Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa undertaken in 2001;

Welcoming the contribution of civil society organisations in supporting the implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and sensitising society as to the dangers of the proliferation and illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons and, in particular, the results of the Djibouti Seminar of 10-11 December 2001 on the “Establishment of National Focal Points” organised by the Nairobi Secretariat, the Regional Interpol offices, the IGAD Secretariat and civil society; and

Thanking the international community for its continued support for the implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and welcoming the establishment of the Friends of the Nairobi Declaration initiative.

We do hereby declare our firm determination to take all necessary steps to prevent, combat and eradicate the trafficking in, and the illicit proliferation of small arms, light weapons, ammunition and other related materials in the region.

To this end, our governments will, inter alia, undertake to:

1. Improve the coordinating mechanisms that will guide and facilitate the Implementation Plan of the Coordinated Agenda for Action on the Problem of the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa [SAEM/GL,HOA/1 of November 2000 through:
 - a. Reaffirming the designation of the Kenyan Government to coordinate the follow-up to the Nairobi Declaration in consultation with states' arms and light weapons as stated in the Operational Guidelines [Nairobi respective national mechanisms dealing with the problem of small

Declaration (iv)].

- b. Endorsing the institutional framework of the Coordinated Agenda for Action on the Problem of the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa mandating the Nairobi Secretariat as regional coordinator for action. [SAEM/GLR.HOA. (1.3)].
 - c. Reinforcing the institutional framework of the Implementation Plan of the Coordinated Agenda for Action of November 2000 [SAEM/GLR/HOA/2 - (1.3) by:
 - (i) Providing technical and logistical support to the Nairobi Coordination Unit established as the Nairobi Secretariat and responsibilities therein mandated;
 - (ii) Endorsing the revised and updated Secretariat Work Plan for implementation, and the new Operational Guidelines that have been developed by the Nairobi Secretariat during August 2002 which will guide the procedures for interactions on all aspects related to the implementation of the Coordinated Agenda for Action;
 - (iii) Agreeing that the Nairobi Secretariat should develop a regional character, representation and location in line with the Operational Guidelines; and
 - (iv) Supporting the immediate provision of start-up assistance for National Focal Points in line with submitted proposals.
2. Improve the national and regional co-ordinated capacity to prevent, control and reduce the small arms and light weapons problem in the region by:
- a. Calling on the Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Committee (EAPCCO) to adopt the Draft Regional Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa (as developed during 2001 by the EAPCCO legal sub-committee) at the forthcoming EAPCCO Annual General Meeting for presentation to governments [the relevant authority of States Parties for ratification] for signature during 2002.

- b. Undertaking to enhance the capacity of law enforcement agencies to prevent, combat and reduce the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons through, inter alia, the following measures:
 - i). Developing training curricula for law enforcement officials that should cover different levels of officials including senior management, detectives and firearm desk officers.
 - ii). Developing proposals for potential joint operations for weapons control and reduction.
 - iii). Urging the EAPCCO and Regional Interpol secretariats to ensure compatibility of training and facilitate the development of joint operations proposals between regional member states.
- c. Reviewing national legislation as agreed in the Co-ordinated Agenda for Action in order to facilitate the urgent adoption of the following measures:
 - i. Prohibit the unrestricted civilian possession of small arms¹ and the total prohibition of the civilian possession and use of light weapons² and automatic and semi-automatic rifles and machine guns;
 - ii. Regulate and centralise the registration of all firearms owned by civilians;
 - iii. Regulate and control the manufacture, import, export, transfer, brokering, possession and use of small arms, light weapons, ammunition and other related materials;
 - iv. Standardise the marking and identification of small arms and light weapons at the time of manufacture, import and export;
 - v. Improve the operational capacity of the police, customs officials, border guards, the military and the judiciary in order to combat the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, ammunition and other related materials;
 - vi. Promote national and regional public education and awareness programmes concerning the curbing of the proliferation of small

¹ As defined in the OAU Bamako Declaration and the Draft EAPCCO Protocol.

² As defined in the OAU Bamako Declaration and the Draft EAPCCO Protocol.

- arms and light weapons;
- vii. Improve the control over small arms and light weapons owned by the State, including the development and adoption of programmes for the collection, safe storage, destruction and responsible disposal of small arms and light weapons rendered surplus, redundant or obsolete through, inter alia, peace agreements, demobilisation or integration of ex-combatants or re-equipping or restructuring of national armed forces or armed State bodies;
- viii. Provide for mutual legal assistance and information exchange between focal points and the Nairobi Secretariat in a concerted effort to suppress the illicit manufacturing of, trafficking in, possession and use of firearms and ammunition and other related materials;
- ix. Institute appropriate and effective measures for cooperation between law enforcement agencies in order to curb corruption associated with the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in, possession and use of small arms, light weapons, ammunition and other related materials; and
- x. Adopt applicable national legislation and take administrative measures that will:
 - 1 Adequately provide for the seizure, confiscation, and forfeiture to the State of all small arms and light weapons manufactured or conveyed in transit without or in contravention of licences, permits or written authority;
 - 1 Provide for effective control of small arms and light weapons including the storage and usage thereof, competency testing of prospective small arms owners and restriction on owners' rights to relinquish control, use and possession of small arms;
 - 1 Monitor and audit licenses held in a persons' possession, and the restriction on the number of small arms that may be owned;
 - 1 Prohibit the pawning and pledging of small arms and light weapons;

- 1 Prohibit the misrepresentation or withholding of any information given with a view to obtain any license or permit; and
 - 1 Promote legal uniformity in the sphere of sentencing.
3. Ensuring a sustainable solution to the problem through the pursuit of national long-term coordinated and concerted efforts through:
 - a. Establishment and effective operationalisation of National Focal Points to deal with the problem of small arms and light weapons in all its aspects and to oversee the implementation of the Co-ordinated Agenda for Action at the national level, and to interact effectively with the regional coordinating unit of the Nairobi Secretariat; and
 - b. Establishment of sustainable and comprehensive national plans for implementation of action on arms management and disarmament.

We firmly believe that these measures will contribute towards preventing, combating and eradicating the stockpiling and illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, ammunition and related material in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa.

Furthermore,

We encourage the participation by civil society and international like-minded agencies and organisations in preventing and reducing the problem of illicit small arms and light weapons,

We appeal for financial, technical and political support from other sub-regions and organisations in the continent, and from the international community for the effective implementation of this Ministerial Declaration for Continued Coordinated Action in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa and the Interim

Ministerial Meeting of 2003 leading to the UN Review Conference of 2006; and to hold a further Ministerial Review Conference to oversee implementation and development of this Declaration in the year 2004.

In witness whereof, we the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the countries of the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa have signed this Declaration.

Done at Nairobi on this 8th day of August 2002, in two (2) original texts, in the English and French languages, both texts being equally authentic.


FOR THE REPUBLIC OF BURUNDI


FOR THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF DJIBOUTI




FOR THE STATE OF ERITREA






FOR THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA




FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA



FOR THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA




FOR THE REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN



FOR THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA



MSH Sarkis

Katzgays