

# The Status of Peace and Economic Impact of Conflicts in Kenya:

## A Case of Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu Counties



Security Research &  
Information Centre



**NATIONAL STEERING COMMITTEE  
ON PEACE BUILDING & CONFLICT MANAGEMENT**  
Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government



REPUBLIC OF KENYA



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*Deepening the Foundations of Peace and Community  
Security in Kenya 2014 - 2018*

**The Status of Peace and Economic Impact  
of Conflicts in Kenya:  
A case of Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu Counties.**

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## ABBREVIATIONS

ACIs	-	Annual Cohesion Indexes
ACLED	-	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project
ACLED	-	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project
API	-	Annual Peace Index
BBI	-	Building Bridges Initiative
CEDS	-	Computational Event Data System
CEDS	-	Computational Event Data System
CEWARN	-	Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Mechanism
CIDPs	-	County Integrated Development Plans
CIPEV	-	Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence
CRECO	-	Constitution and Reform Education Consortium
CSOs	-	Civil society organizations
DACS	-	Data on Armed Conflict and Security
DACS	-	Data on Armed Conflict and Security
FGDs	-	Focused group discussion
GDP	-	Gross Domestic Product
GPI	-	Global Peace Index
GTI	-	Global Terrorism Index
IDP	-	Internally Displaced Persons
IDPs	-	Internally displaced person
IEBC	-	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
IEP	-	Institute for Economics and Peace
IGAD	-	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ISSN	-	International Journal of Humanities and Social Studies
KECOSCE	-	Kenya Community Support Centre



<b>KI</b>	-	Key Informant
<b>KII</b>	-	Key Informant Interview
<b>KIPPRA</b>	-	Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis
<b>KNFP</b>	-	Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons
<b>LICODEP</b>	-	Likoni Community Development Program
<b>NASA</b>	-	National Super Alliance
<b>NCEWERS</b>	-	National Conflict Early Waning and Early Response System
<b>NCIC</b>	-	National Cohesion and Integration Commission
<b>NCRC</b>	-	National Crime Research Centre
<b>NDMA</b>	-	National Drought Management Authority
<b>NPS</b>	-	National Police Services
<b>NSC/PBCM</b>	-	National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict Management
<b>ODM</b>	-	Orange Democratic Movement
<b>PC</b>	-	Peace Committees
<b>PEV</b>	-	Post-Election Violence
<b>PfPS</b>	-	Partnership for Peace and Security
<b>RCK</b>	-	Refugee Consortium of Kenya
<b>SALW</b>	-	Small Arms and Light Weapons
<b>SIPRI</b>	-	Stockholm Peace Research Institute
<b>SRIC</b>	-	Security Research and Information Centre
<b>UCDP</b>	-	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
<b>USAID</b>	-	US Agency for International Developm

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Regular determination of the levels of peace in Kenya cannot be gainsaid. Moreover, there have been several attempts to measure the level of peace in the country. The Annual Crime Statistics, Crime Observatories, the Conflict Mapping Analysis, Small Arms Surveys and Peace Reports published by state and non-state agencies are some of the recent attempts to assess peace and or lack of it in the country.

Further, foreign embassies have also tried to determine risk levels in the country in order to advise their citizens and companies on the security situation in the country. Unfortunately, all these efforts have come short of determining or predicting the level of peace, or peacefulness or lack of it in the country. This has left the Annual Peace Index (API), and to an extent the Global Terrorism Indexes (GTIs), both published by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), as the only available indices of measuring the level of peace in the country.

This obtaining state of affairs prompted SRIC to fill the void by piloting this study in a bid to publish the inaugural “Kenyan” status of peace report. The report, partly informed by the protracted 2017 presidential elections, also sought to determine the economic impacts of conflicts on the national economy. This report marks the first steps towards the journey to the publication of comprehensive Annual State of Peace Reports in the country.

Due to resource and time constraints, the study was conducted in three Counties i.e. Nairobi, Kisumu and Mombasa. A total of 685 household interviews, 30 KI interviews and 6 Focused Group Discussions (FGDs) were held for the primary data. The three Counties largely represent the face of the country in terms of ethnicities and population. Even in these Counties, the sampling may have not been comprehensive enough to cover all strata’s of the society. Nevertheless and notwithstanding these methodological challenges, the findings reflect a fair status of peace not only in the sampled counties but

also the country at a large. Widening the area of study to include all of Kenya’s 47 Counties would have improved the generalizability of the study. Literature review conducted triangulated the primary data which was collected, analyzed qualitatively and quantitatively using SPSS.

Literature review identified the following 7 peace indicators that this study used to determine level and or perceptions of peace in the country: i) level of criminality (theft, burglary, pick pocketing, carjacking, robbery, cattle rustling and or banditry), ii) presence of criminal groups and or gangs, iii) access to small arms and light weapons, iv) likelihood of violent demonstrations and or protests, v) number of refugees/Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), vi) level of political intolerance and vii) perceptions of equity in resource distribution.

Notwithstanding methodological constraint, 78.3% of respondents sampled across Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu Counties opined that the country is generally peaceful. Indeed, almost half of the respondents (48.9%) believe that the country is moderately peaceful while 24.5% felt the level of peace in the country was “high”. Additionally, 4.9% of respondents were satisfied that the country was “very peaceful”. It is important to note that, in spite of the protracted 2017 presidential elections that was characterized by protests and violence, both by the state actors and community members, many Kenyans believe that the country is peaceful.

On the other hand, and as the peace or lack of it was unpacked, 59.4% of respondents felt that the level of criminality in the country was very high. In addition, 39% of the respondents thought that the presence of organized criminal gangs and or groups was high and therefore a threat to peace and security. Only 5.3% of the respondents believed that the presence of these criminal groups was not a major peace and security concern.

Moreover, 50.8% of the respondents were alarmed at the perceived proliferation of illicit arms. Out of this, 29.5% of the respondents

thought that the proliferation was high with another 21.3% opining that the problem was moderate. Only 13.2% of the respondents in the three sampled Counties thought the problem was not a major concern.

The study found out that Kenyans were divided on issues of political intolerance. In fact, 51.2% of respondents were of the opinion that political intolerance was either still very high, 21.5%, or high, 29.7%. On the other hand, 23.8% of the respondents felt the political intolerance was “moderate”.

The study observed that majority of Kenyans are not happy with the way opportunities, including employment, are distributed in the country. Indeed, 59.3% of the respondents were concerned that the level of equality of opportunities were either “low” or “very low”. Out of this percentage, 34.1% of the respondents opined that equality in terms of opportunities was low with 25.2% returning a verdict of “very low”.

In terms of conflicts and economy, 74.6% of the respondents opined that political conflicts were the greatest threats to livelihoods. Perhaps this observation is informed by the 2017 elections which were lengthy, characterized with demonstrations, protests and bouts of violence that disrupted people’s lives and livelihoods as some business premises had to be closed. Although political events and processes are periodic, it seems that many Kenyans are concerned with political conflicts that seem to have long term effect on the citizens’ livelihoods.

Based on these findings, the study was convinced that the March 9, 2018 “handshake” between President Uhuru Kenyatta and National Super Alliance (NASA) leader Raila Odinga that birthed the Building Bridges Initiative was and continues to be a major stabilizing factor. Although the handshake may not have been received well especially in areas supportive of Deputy President William Ruto’s 2022 presidential ambition and those of the other NASA principals who were not part of the handshake, it still remains a major peace building, cohesion and

integration opportunity that the country should seize and uphold.

The study makes the following key priority policy recommendations

SRIC and her partners NSC, National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), KNFP, National Crime Research Centre (NCRC) and UNDP-Kenya among others should continually improve the peace indicators and come up with a comprehensive methodology for undertaking Annual National Surveys to establish and publish APIs.

The National Government agencies such as NSC, NCRC and or NCIC should purpose to publish annual or regular peace indexes to guide the development aspirations of the country.

The County Governments should also publish regular peace indexes to gauge and monitor the levels of peace in each County. Such indexes will be key in guiding County Governments and her partners in designing appropriate peace programmes that will enable respective counties to realize their socio-economic and political potentials

NCIC should continue investing and producing Annual Cohesion Indexes (ACIs) for this has been found to be a key determinant of peace in the country. Without a Peace Index, the Cohesion Index, which was once published in 2013, could also serve the purpose, at least temporarily.

Peace building stakeholders should intensify peace building campaigns, including elements of electoral justices that often creep up every electoral cycle to the detriment of peace. The time for enhanced peace building, integration and cohesion is now.

Civil society should continuously provide technical and material support to the Building Bridges Initiative (BBI) through nationwide peace conversations, research and development of policy options for curing the problem of negative ethnicity and political competition.





## 1.1 Background and Problem Statement

The protracted 2017 general elections, particularly the presidential election, left the country deeply divided along ethnic and political lines. The divisions were exacerbated on January 2018 when the opposition leader, Raila Odinga took oath in controversial circumstances as the “People’s President”. Nonetheless, the President and the opposition leader closed ranks and shook hands on March 9, 2018 at Harambee House, to herald a new beginning for Kenya. In their nine-point joint statement, the two leaders noted that Kenya was witnessing a continuous deterioration of relationships between ethnic communities and political formations that were too often characterized by aggressive antagonism and competition<sup>1</sup>. The “Hand Shake” gave birth to clarion call “Building Bridges” where; the two leaders identified nine-point agenda as the main issues holding the country back from the road to prosperity, stability and peace. These are:

- 1) ethnic antagonism & competition
- 2) lack of national ethos
- 3) inclusivity
- 4) devolution

- 5) divisive elections
- 6) safety & security
- 7) corruption
- 8) shared prosperity and
- 9) Responsibilities & rights<sup>2</sup>.

Taken together and for the purposes of this study, the nine “Building Bridges” points can form the basis for determining the state of peace and political stability in the country. Moreover, the National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict Management’s (NSC/PBCM) 2018 – 2022 Strategic Plan identifies resource-based conflicts, competition/contestations associated with devolved governance system, divisive & polarizing political processes, youth unemployment and cybercrime as the main development challenges facing Kenya<sup>3</sup>. These issues could collectively and cumulatively form the building blocks for the National Peace Index. Furthermore, the Annual Global Peace Index has increasingly become an acceptable way of determining the level of peacefulness across the

<sup>2</sup> Ibid

<sup>3</sup> National Steering Committee on peace building and conflict management (NSC), 2018, *Strategic Plan: 2018 – 2022*, NSC, unpublished report)

<sup>1</sup> Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga, 2018, *Building Bridges to a new Kenyan Nation*, Government of Kenya.

163 sampled countries each year. This is despite the complication of measuring peace at a global level against different contexts, civilization and description of peace.

In Kenya, there has been several attempts to measure the level of peace in the country, the Annual Crime Statistics, the on and off conflict mapping and analyses by Civil Society and a number of state agencies such as National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) through its National Cohesion Index (NCI), NSC through her National Conflict Early Warning and Early Response System (NCEWERS), the National Crime Research Centre (NCRC), the elections based Uwiano Platform for Peace and occasionally the Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) surveys by National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons (KNFP) alongside her partners such as Small Arms Survey and Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC).

In most cases, such reports, especially the analyses and mappings, simply describe the key conflict issues, coming short of stating the level of risk or peace in the country or the Counties investigated. For instance, NCEWERS hosted by the NSC “collects information within the public domain with the sole intention of complementing government institutions mandated with maintaining peace and security.”<sup>4</sup> In its June 2017 quarterly brief, the NCEWER Report concluded that the electoral processes (mainly party primaries) were “generally peaceful though tensions and incidences of violence were reported in at least 10 Counties”<sup>5</sup>.

On the other hand, foreign embassies such as United States (US) amongst others have been publishing regular peace and security status

of the country as one way of informing their citizens of safety issues in the country. Such updates often inform the issuance of travel advisories by the said foreign embassies. For instance, on 27th April 2017, The US Embassy in Nairobi published a dispatch titled Kenya 2017 Crime and Safety Report: Overall Crime and Safety Situation in which Nairobi was established as being a Critical Threat Location for Crime Directed at or affecting Official US Government Interests<sup>6</sup>. The dispatch went on to state the threats of terrorism, political, economic, religious threats and ethnic violence as high.

In the Counties, NSC published 47 County Peace and Conflict Profiles in 2013<sup>7</sup>. These profiles attempted to highlight the key conflict issues, opportunities for peace and the conflict risk factor of each of the 47 Counties.

Utmost, these attempts have tried to analyze, map, and project conflicts and compare crime statistics. No real attempt has been made to determine perception on the level or the status of peace in the country in any given time interval. This is why this study is important in trying to test these uncharted waters and potentially contribute to the development of a framework for National Peace Index.

## 1.2 Justification/Purpose of the Study

This section builds a case for this study as well as the sampled three Counties. Literature reviewed shows that Kenya, as a country, lacks

<sup>6</sup> <https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=21731>

<sup>7</sup> Information for the 47 County Peace and Conflict Profiles was collected by a team from NSC through desk-top research and fieldwork. This team comprised Kyalo Musoi, Peter Mwamachi, Ahmed Biko, Ruto Pkalya, Thomas Odera, Nelly Waiya, Veronica Jekemio, Rukia Abdulrahman, Ronald Wasilwa and Lucy Oiro. The team was supported by field researchers and conflict analysts: Babu Ayindo, Doreen Ruto, Muktar Liban, John Olang’Sana, Shaba Varajab, Johnstone Kibor, Mugethi Gitau and Martin Munene. Lazarus Kubasu compiled the reports on behalf of NSC.

<sup>4</sup> See introduction to *Uwiano Platform for Peace, The 2017 Political Party Primaries: Analysis of Implications for Peaceful General Elections in Kenya* (Monthly Report, April/May 2017)

<sup>5</sup> *Uwiano Platform for Peace, The 2017 Political Party Primaries: Analysis of Implications for Peaceful General Elections in Kenya* (Monthly Report, April/May 2017)

a regular or Annual Status of Peace (or Peace Index) Report. This has made it difficult for the Government, Civil Society, communities and other stakeholders to determine the right trajectory in terms of “peacefulness” or not for the country. Moreover, the country has not developed or adopted nationally accepted and uniform indicators for measuring the status or level of peace in the country. This perhaps leaves the Global Annual Peace Index, the nine-point agenda of the Building Bridges Initiative (BBI) and NSC 2018 – 2022 Strategic Plan as the starting point for designing a National Peace Index, hence the significance and contribution of this study.

Due to resource and time constraints, the study was conducted in three Counties, Nairobi, Kisumu and Mombasa. The three counties largely represent the face of the country in terms of ethnicities and population. Nairobi County, for instance, is the capital city of the country. It is the Kenya’s melting pot as every ethnic group, race, class or religion is represented. The first Governor of Nairobi City County once observed that Nairobi is not only a cosmopolitan city, but also the melting pot of all tribes in the country<sup>8</sup>. On the other hand, Mombasa County represents the face of the coastal region of Kenya. It is the gateway to the rest of Kenya as well as neighboring land locked countries. Kisumu, another cosmopolitan city, represents the western part of the country. On their own, Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu, the capitals of the said Counties, are the only cities in the country.

The study sought to determine the status of peace and economic impacts of conflict as at June 2018. This means, the events of the year 2017 may be the yardstick for many of the respondents in the sampled Counties. The year, 2017, witnessed

a general election that for the first time in the country’s history saw the presidential election being annulled by the highest court in the land and a repeat presidential election boycotted by a section of the country. It was also marked with pockets of violence across the country<sup>9</sup>. During these episodes of electoral violence, Nairobi, Kisumu and to a large extent Mombasa were among the most affected Counties in the country<sup>10</sup>.

Moreover, even before the 2017 general elections, Nairobi, Kisumu and Mombasa were some of the cities that witnessed riots and demonstrations calling for electoral reforms before the polls could be held. The demonstrations, held in May and June 2017, turned violent in Nairobi and Kisumu as demonstrators demanded the exit of Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) staff for alleged plan to rig the elections in favor of the ruling party. Nairobi and Kisumu cities also bore the brunt of 2017 presidential election post poll protests. As riots and protests consumed Kisumu and Nairobi, many parts of the country, including the NASA strongholds of western and coastal Kenya remained calm albeit jittery.

Therefore, this study believes that given resource and time constraints, the findings from the three Counties can give a fairly accurate picture of the state of peace in the country.

### 1.3 Objectives of the Study

The main objective of the study was to establish the state of peace and socio-economic impact of conflict in Kenya.

#### Specific Objectives:

- To establish the current status of peace in Kenya

- To determine the socio-economic impacts of conflict in Kenya as at June 2018
- To propose peace indicators for the purposes of determining the perceptions of peace in the country; and
- To make recommendations to the National, County Governments and civil society to support peace initiatives including publishing Annual Status of Peace (Peace Index)

comprehensive methodological consideration for the establishment of the Annual (and or monthly/quarterly) Peace Index in the country. This pioneer “index”, limited as it is, is thus the first step towards actualizing the national peace index.

### 1.4 Limitation of the Study

Because of funding and time constraints, field data collection was limited to Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu Counties. As such, the generalizability of the findings of the study may not be assured, accounting for a methodological weakness. As observed by Canon and Haji in their study of devolution in Kenya, with Mandera as a case study, widening the area of study to include all of Kenya’s 47 Counties would have improved the generalizability of the study<sup>11</sup>. Also, and given the sampling strategy, findings are not necessarily representative for all people engaged with, and exposed to, the different elements of the “peacefulness” in the three Counties, let alone for the 47 Counties of Kenya<sup>12</sup>.

While the study recognises that it may not have captured all views, it is believed that the main parameters of peacefulness in the country have been identified. Nonetheless, the study is also meant to elicit debate on the need for a

<sup>8</sup> Otieno, Julius, 2016, “Nairobi is a cosmopolitan melting pot of all tribes, residents should reject divisive leaders – Kidero”, *The Star*, November 29, 2016 issue. Accessed on June 4, 2018 at [https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2016/11/29/nairobi-is-a-cosmopolitan-melting-pot-of-all-tribes-residents-should\\_c1463489](https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2016/11/29/nairobi-is-a-cosmopolitan-melting-pot-of-all-tribes-residents-should_c1463489)

<sup>9</sup> Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, 2017, *A Human Rights Monitoring Report on the 2017 Repeat Presidential Elections*, KNCHR, Nairobi

<sup>10</sup> Jamii Thabithi, 2017, *Report of A Rapid Assessment of Peace and Security Responses to Disorders during 2017 Elections*, Coffey International, Nairobi.

<sup>11</sup> Cannon, J. Brendon & Ali, H. Jacob, 2018, “Devolution in Kenya Four Years on: A Review of Implementation and Effects in Mandera County”, *African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Spring 2018), pp. 1-28

<sup>12</sup> Pkalya, Dominic, 2017, *The evolving landscape of the infrastructure for peace in Kenya*, Coffey International (unpublished report)





### 2.1 Status of Peace: Measuring/Defining Peace

Peace is notoriously difficult to define<sup>13</sup>. It is also difficult to describe or determine. Nonetheless, a minimum criterion for defining peace is the absence of war – that is, organized political violence between at least two actors<sup>14</sup>. Indeed, the easiest way to define or measure peace is to look at the absence of violence in a given country or society. However, absence of violence does not necessarily mean there is peace. Absence of violence has been defined by Johan Galtung as the “Negative Peace”<sup>15</sup>. On the other hand, the desired positive peace connotes absence of both structural and physical violence, which is also fluid. This is why perceptions of peace, corroborated with “conflict” data, continues to be the most realistic way of defining and measuring peace in any society or country.

<sup>13</sup> Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017, *Global Peace Index 2017*, IEP.

<sup>14</sup> Kurtenbach, Sabine; GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies - Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien (Ed.), 2017, *No One Size Fits All - A Global Approach to Peace*. Hamburg, 2017 (GIGA Focus Global 5).

<sup>15</sup> Galtung, Johan, 1969, “Violence, Peace and Peace Research”, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 6 (3), 167-191.

The Global Peace Index (GPI) uses 23 indicators spread across three domains to determine and measure peacefulness across 163 countries in the world. The three domains are; (i) ongoing domestic and international conflict, (ii) societal safety and security and (iii) militarization. Out of these domains, the best that could help measure “peacefulness” in a country like Kenya could be the societal safety and security domain, which has 10 peace indicators. These are (i) Level of perceived criminality in society, (ii) Number of refugees and internally displaced people as a percentage of the population, (iii) Political instability, (iv) Political Terror Scale, (v) Impact of terrorism, (vi) Number of homicides per 100,000 people, (vii) Level of violent crime, (viii) Likelihood of violent demonstrations, (ix) Number of jailed population per 100,000 people and (x) Number of internal security officers and police per 100,000 people<sup>16</sup>

By any standards and given the various peace and conflict contexts in the world, these societal safety and security indicators can be used to define and measure peace in any country. However, and for practicability, these indicators could be further domesticated to a national situation like Kenya. For example, the

<sup>16</sup> Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017, *Global Peace Index 2017*, IEP.

number of jailed population per 100,000 people may not be a smart peace indicator for Kenya given the alleged inefficiencies in the criminal justice system. Key findings of a recent Audit of Kenya’s Criminal Justice System confirmed that it is largely skewed against the poor<sup>17</sup>. A study by the Judiciary in 2014 on the impact of delays in court cases established that majority of the pending cases are at the magistrate courts where nearly half (49.5%) of criminal cases took up to a year and four months to be concluded<sup>18</sup>.

Political terror scale and impact of terrorism can be collapsed into one major peace indicator on level of terrorism risk. This could also be corroborated with data from GTI/Database that is published by the same IEP that publishes Annual Global Peace Index. Level of violent crime and level of perceived criminality in society could also be confusing to respondents and researchers. These two indicators, for a situation like Kenya, could be merged to remove ambiguities. On the other hand, indicators from the other domains such as “Ease of access to SALW” of the militarization domain could also be useful in assessing level of peace in Kenya. However, research has established that most of the crimes committed in Kenya don’t require a gun<sup>19</sup>. However, crimes such as armed robbery and terrorism are known to have a low frequency but high impact<sup>20</sup>. If you add others like cattle rustling and banditry, the frequency goes up with even more devastating impact. This means that accessibility of illicit and misuse of state firearms can be a good peace indicator in Kenya.

<sup>17</sup> National Council on the Administration of Justice, 2016, *Criminal Justice System in Kenya: An Audit 2016*, NCAJ in collaboration with Legal Resources Foundation Trust and Resources Oriented Development Initiatives.

<sup>18</sup> Ochieng, Abiud, 2018, “Joint efforts fail to speed up wheels of justice in Kenya”, *Daily Nation*, March 21, 2018 Issue.

<sup>19</sup> Mbarak, Twalib, 2018, “Arming private guards can help to tackle insecurity if done well”, *Daily Nation*, Monday May 21, 2018)

<sup>20</sup> Ibid

On the other hand, pick-pocketing, mugging and general theft are very frequent in urban areas<sup>21</sup>, hence the choice of the three leading cities as case studies for this assessment.

This means that a perception of the level of peacefulness in Kenya could be measured by the following 7 peace indicators adopted from the GPI:

- Level of criminality in the neighborhoods;
- Level of homicides attributed to robbery and other high intensity crimes;
- Level of cattle rustling/banditry;
- Ease of access to SALW;
- Number of refugees and IDPs
- Likelihood of violent demonstrations and protests
- Presence of criminal groups and gangs

These indicators can be measured in a 5-point agenda i.e. i) level of criminality (theft, burglary, pick pocketing, carjacking, robbery, cattle rustling and or banditry), ii) number of refugees/IDPs, iii) likelihood of violent demonstrations and or protests, iv) ease of access to small arms and light weapons and v) presence of criminal groups and or gangs. On its own and for future surveys, number of homicides attributed to any of the criminality could also be used as an indicator to determine the status of peace in a country like Kenya or a given county. As such, the status or index of peace in a country could be characterized, based on the average weight of the indicators above as either very low (violence), low, moderate (negative peace), high and very high (positive peace).

### 2.2 Annual Global Peace Index

From the foregoing, the launch of the GPI in 2007 by IEP has increasingly become a better way of determining the status and level of peacefulness of the 163 countries. Although there are conceptual and methodological concerns regarding generalized and globalized peace indicators,

<sup>21</sup> Ibid



the annual indexes have been so far the most comprehensive and reliable way of “measuring” perception of peace in the different countries in the world. It also offers a comparative analysis of the state of peace among the target countries, especially with their neighbors and peers. Such indexes can also act as baselines for holding state and non-state authorities accountable on their contribution to peace or violence.

In addition to the GPI, there are other indices, statistics and or databases that can be used to determine the status of peace in different countries in the world. One such index is the GTI that is also published by the same IEP. Others include Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)<sup>22</sup>, Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Multilateral Peace Operations Database<sup>23</sup> and the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED)<sup>24</sup>. There could be other global, continental and regional indexes and databases but the aforementioned ones are the most widely referred to. In terms of databases, ACLED has been found to be more comprehensive, reliable and verifiable and widely used and quoted<sup>25</sup>. ACLED also has a strategic focus on Africa, unlike the other databases<sup>26</sup>.

At the regional level, Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has been running a CEWARN that tracks conflict issues in the region. However, and prior to its expansion to cover other areas in Kenya, it was only focusing on two cross-border regions; Karamoja cluster (border areas of Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda) and Somali cluster (border areas of Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia). As part of the domestication of the CEWARN's

data, the government of Kenya established the NCEWERS at the NSC/PBCM. This system has lots of potential, which have not been fully utilized for purposes of coming up with a truly national conflict data base.

At the national level, the close the country has come to coming up with a national peace index was the 2013 Cohesion Index that was published by NCIC. The abridged version of the report that is publicly accessible at NCIC's website drums up support for the index by arguing that peace is necessary but not sufficient for social cohesion, the most significant factor being the existence of sustainable institutions – a constitution and working governance frameworks – that strive for normalcy when peace is disrupted<sup>27</sup>. Perhaps this understanding of social cohesion borrows from the World Banks' definition that describes Social Cohesion as the “*nature and quality of relationships across people and groups in society, including the state*.”

Other attempts on measuring “peace” in Kenya includes Constitution and Reform Education Consortium (CRECO) Baseline Report on Conflict-Mapping and Profiles of 47 Counties in Kenya that analyzed the 47 Counties on level of risks in the realm of political/security, legal, economic/social and environment<sup>28</sup>. The baseline found out that 24 Counties (more than half the country) were of “High Conflict Risks”, 19 Counties being “Moderate Conflict Risks” and only 4 i.e. Embu, Machakos, Vihiga and Siaya as “Low Conflict Risks”<sup>29</sup>. It's unfortunate that CRECO did not continue with this project that would have immensely contributed to measuring peace or rather the status of conflict and peace in the country.

<sup>27</sup> Kenya Institute for public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA), 2014, *The Status of Social Cohesion in Kenya*, 2013, NCIC (Abridged Version).

<sup>28</sup> CRECO, 2012, *Building a Culture of Peace in Kenya: Baseline Report on Conflict-Mapping and Profiles of 47 Counties in Kenya*, CRECO, Nairobi.

<sup>29</sup> CRECO, 2012

In 2013, the NSC, under the auspices of UWIANO Platform for Peace, published 47 County Peace and Conflict Profiles. The profiles briefly described key conflict issues, risks and peace opportunities in each of the 47 Counties. Unfortunately, it became a one-off publication.

In 2015 and with support from Saferworld, NSC published quarterly situational briefs that analyzed the Status of Peace and Conflict in Kenya and in the region. The quarterly briefs relied on NCEWERS data as well as other regional secondary data and analysis, (South Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda and Kenya)<sup>30</sup>. Again, NSC and mainly due to resource constraints, was unable to sustain these quarterly briefs.

**Table 1: Kenya's peace indexes from 2013 – 2017. Source: IEP**

Year	Score	World Rankings	Sub-Saharan Africa Rankings	Changes In Score	Status
2013	2.466	136	34	0.133	LOW
2014	2.452	132	32	0.028	MEDIUM
2015	2.342	133	35	-0.086	MEDIUM
2016	2.379	131	35	0.007	MEDIUM
2017	2.336	125	30	-0.042	MEDIUM

Interestingly, Kenya has been fairly stable and peaceful, if these indices are anything to go by. The “divisive and polarizing” 2013 elections largely contribute to the “low” levels of peace in the country. That's also the year (score for year 2012, which was the run up to the 2013 elections) that Kenya ranked a lowly 136<sup>th</sup> country in the world out of 163 in terms of peacefulness. From 2014 to 2016 the country was stable, averaging 2.391 peace score/index. It was in 2017 (2016

Based on the foregoing, the GPI remains the most recent and regular way of measuring peace in Kenya, this study should help domesticate by including elements of social cohesion index in order to come up with a methodology of measuring peace index in the country annually or as desired. This is an area that this study seeks to contribute to.

## 2.3 Peace Trends

The following table summarizes the annual peace indices for Kenya as published by the Annual Global Peace Index in the last five years. 2013 is taken as a baseline year since Kenya underwent an electoral process that was devoid of large scale visible political violence but nevertheless left the country politically polarized along two major coalitions of ethnic communities.

situation) that Kenya scored an average of 2.336 peacefulness score and was ranked 125<sup>th</sup> among the 163 countries in the world. It was the 30<sup>th</sup> most peaceful country in Africa, the highest score that the country achieved over this five-year period.

## 2.4 Economic Impact of Conflict

Research indicate that the very existence of a conflict makes measurement of economic activity difficult and that conflict can interact

<sup>30</sup> Unfortunately these quarterly reports were not published in both NSC and Saferworld's websites. They were mainly shared in peace stakeholders' forums and through emails. One of the contributors of this study, Dominic Pkalya, authored the quarterly briefs.



with the economy through multiple and complex pathways. Furthermore, outside the direct effects of violence on the economy, there are a number of indirect effects that may last long after the violence has receded<sup>31</sup>. This is because of the varied nature, scale and intensity of the conflict across the country as well as the diverse Kenyan economy. This challenge has left Gross Domestic Product (GDP) indices over the years to be one of the most cited and reliable determinant of the impact of conflicts on Kenya's economy. In summary, loss of livelihoods and food insecurity, inefficient resource use and environmental degradation and general economic decline<sup>32</sup> are the main effects of conflicts in the Kenyan economy. For instance, the Post-Election Violence (PEV) of 2007/08 led to reduction of real GDP from 7.1 % in 2007 to 2.6% in 2009.<sup>33</sup> This means that the real GDP contracted by a whopping 4.5% in 2009. It is important also to note that since PEV, Kenya has not attained or surpassed the 2007 real GDP growth rate of 7.1%, meaning that the impact will continue to be felt long after the conflict ended irrespective of the political resilience in the country. Additionally, the 2007/08 PEV in Kenya contributed to the decline of the agriculture sector by 4.7%, tourism declined by 34.7% with manufacturing declining by 6.8%<sup>34</sup>. Research has also estimated that

<sup>31</sup> Mueller, Hannes and Julia Tobias, 2016, *The cost of violence: Estimating the economic impact of conflict*, IGC Growth brief

<sup>32</sup> Onono, P. Ayieko, 2016, "Economic Effects of Inter-community Conflicts In Kenya: Evidence of the Importance of Peace in the Realization of Sustainable Development", *International Journal of Cooperation & Development*. 3(2): 118-129

<sup>33</sup> Kiti, Reginah M.K. Kitiabi, 2012, *The Impact of Election (2007/2008) Violence on Kenya's Economy: Lessons Learned?*, *Elections Dispatch* No. 06, African Research Resource Forum (ARRF), Nairobi.

<sup>34</sup> Kiriimi, K. Josephine and Njuguna N. Christina, 2014,

Kenya may have lost more than US\$ 3.7 million as a result of PEV<sup>35</sup>.

## 2.5 Research Gap

This literature review identified two main research gaps in as far as the study on the perceptions of peace in Kenya is concerned. First, there are no regular domestic peace index reports in the country. This robs the country the ability to determine its own trajectory of peace building. The regular global annual peace indexes are global in nature and lack the details of a national peace index that is instrumental in determining the status of peace in Kenya. The indicators used are also global in nature thus missing local nuances that often determine perceptions of peace in the country.

The second research gap is the absence of universal, nationally acceptable peace indicators. Each study and/or survey uses its own set of indicators, making it difficult to triangulate findings and make valid conclusions. Most of the indexes, surveys and/or databases place more emphasis on conflict/crime rate and less on peacefulness. Although the level of crime can influence perceptions of peace, it is important to come up with peace indicators as well to demonstrate level and capacity of peace in the country. It then follows that there is a critical need for developing nationally acceptable set of peace indicators in Kenya.

*"Impact Election Violence on Socio-Economic Situation in Africa: A Case of Kenya", Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, Vol 5 No 5, Doi:10.5901/mjss.2014.v5n5p*

<sup>35</sup> Voice of America, 2009, 'Economic Impact of Election Violence on Display in Western Kenyan City', *VOA News report*, October 27, 2009. Available at [www.voanews.com/content/a-13-2008-03-04-voa29-66808832/374161.html](http://www.voanews.com/content/a-13-2008-03-04-voa29-66808832/374161.html). Also see Chalmers, Malcolm. 2007, 'Spending to Save? The Cost-effectiveness of Conflict Prevention' in *Defence and Peace Economics* 18: 1: 1-23.

## CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY



This section highlights the study design, sampling techniques, methods of data collection, data analysis and presentation.

### 3.1 Study location

The primary data was collected in Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu Counties. These Counties are cosmopolitan in nature and home to the three cities in the country. The Counties experienced the worst of 2017 election protests, demonstrations and or violence.

### 3.2 Sample and Sampling Techniques

The study employed both probability and non-probability sampling techniques. It used stratified sampling to ensure that key strata's of the society such as administrative units, ethnicities, classes and governments representations were reached to get a fairly representative and accurate representation of the county's population and cumulatively perceptions on peace and economic impact of conflicts.

In terms of non-probability sampling, the study employed both purposeful and snowballing techniques. The KI interviews and FGDs were purposeful for it targeted respondents who were familiar with peace building in the country. Such respondents, who also recommended other equally knowledgeable respondents, were instrumental in determining the acceptable indicators of peace in their respective counties as well as the whole country. They were also useful in recommending how the counties and the country as a whole could undertake its own annual peace index to determine the status or level of peace in the country and the Counties.

The results of the probability and non-probability sampling helped in triangulating responses for purposes of in-depth interrogation and analysis of the data. The two sampling methods complimented one another.



### 3.3 Sample Area

Table 2: Sampled areas

County	Target HH	Constituency	Study Areas	HH Interviews	KIIs	FGD
Mombasa	210	Kisauni	Magogoni Mishomoroni	60	2	2
		Nyali	Kongowea	55	2	
		Likoni	Likoni	50	2	
		Mvita	Tononoka	45	2	
Nairobi	260	Westlands	Kangemi	60	2	1
		Kibra	Kibra	65	3	1
		Embakasi East	Kayole	55	2	
		Kamukunji	Eastleigh	45	1	
		Makadara	Makongeni	35	3	
Kisumu	215	Kisumu Central	Kondele	65	3	1
			Nyalenda	45	3	1
		Muhoroni	Muhoroni	55	2	
		Nyakach	Sondu	50	2	
Totals				685	30	6

### 3.4 Data Collection

The study used both qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection. This was applied in both primary and secondary data collections. The study adopted the following methods of data collection:-

#### 3.4.1 Secondary Data

A comprehensive desk review was undertaken to interrogate available data and information in the realm of peace indexes and or perceptions of the status of peace. The review relied on journals, research reports and newspaper articles and published books. Majorly, data was sourced from the following: GPI, GTI (both annually published by Australia based IEP, ACLED, Police Crime Statistics and NCEWERS among others.

#### 3.4.2 Primary Data

The primary data was collected during the field work in the three focus Counties. This was done by administering semi structured questionnaires to members of the public as well

as conducting KIIs and FGDs. A total of 685 household interviews, 30 KIIs and 6 FGDs were conducted. The primary data was instrumental in corroborating the secondary data. It was also helpful in generating case studies and recommendations for steps towards a national peace index.

### 3.5 Data Analysis

The collected data was analyzed using both qualitative and quantitative methods. Qualitative data was interpreted to give meaning to various responses, emerging common themes and was presented in prose form, case studies and/or quotes. On the other hand, quantitative data was coded and analyzed through SPSS and presented in graphs, tables and other statistical charts.

The two methods were then triangulated to present a more nuanced and comprehensive analysis of the status of peace in the country including the economic impacts of conflicts in the country and the counties.

## CHAPTER 4 STUDY FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS



This section presents a summary of study findings and discussions. The findings are presented and discussed in two levels; National and County levels. The National level is a general overview of the status of peace and economic impact of conflicts using findings from the three sampled Counties.

The county level is a presentation of county specific peace and security dynamics. Methodologically, the county specific findings are relatively more accurate in perceptions of the status of peace in each county than at National level. In both levels, the study begins with looking at the status of peace and ends with analyzing the economic impact of conflict.

### A: STATUS OF PEACE IN THE COUNTRY

#### 4.1 Overview of the Status of Peace and Economic Impact of Conflicts in Kenya

This section is a general overview of the status of peace in Kenya using data from the three sampled Counties. It presents perceptions and discussions on 7 peace indicators to measure the level of peacefulness in the country.

#### 4.1.1 The Status of Peace in Kenya (the Control Variable)

Perceptions on the status of peace in the country were collected using a control variable together with 7 indicators. The control variable was used to get a general perception of the level of peace in the country, with the other variables (indicators) basically unpacking this general perception. As part of improving this tool, future engagements would seek to fine-tune how the 7 variables can be used to compute the level of peace without necessarily relying on the control variable.

Notwithstanding this methodological constraint and using the control variable as an entry point, this study observed that Kenya was generally peaceful. This is according to the perceptions of 78.3% of respondents sampled across Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu Counties. Furthermore, almost half of the respondents (48.9%) believe that the country was moderately peaceful while 24.5% of the respondents felt that level of peace in the country was "high". Additionally, 4.9% of respondents were satisfied the country was "very peaceful". It is important to note that in spite of the protracted 2017 presidential elections that was characterized by protests and violence, both by the state actors and community members,



many Kenyans believed that the country was peaceful. Perhaps this kind of peace is what Galtung terms as Negative Peace. The situation is best explained by the fact that the elections are over and the two leading protagonists, President Uhuru Kenyatta and the then NASA Presidential Candidate, Raila Odinga closed ranks courtesy of the famous March 9, 2018 “handshake” that has since birthed the BBI<sup>36</sup>. The BBI seeks to address structural issues that polarize Kenyans especially during the electioneering period.

It could be argued that the “handshake” was a major political stabilizing factor that contributed to the high perceptions of peace in the country as at July 2018 when this study was undertaken. Furthermore, eight days after the “handshake”, a leading Kenyan Daily opined that the country experienced immense tranquility only witnessed after the signing of the National Accord in early 2008<sup>37</sup>.

that Kisumu County was the biggest beneficiary of the “handshake” in terms of perceptions of peace. In Kisumu County, 54.9% of the respondents perceive their County as moderately peaceful. Only 0.9% of the respondents think Kisumu County was very unsafe. It could have been interesting to have undertaken a similar peace perception survey after the annulled August 2017 presidential elections and compare it with the current perception of level of peace in the County. This is why this study opines that the “handshake” was a golden peace building opportunity for Kenya as a whole.

National and County Governments, should seize it to sustain the current peace. Since peace needs to be nurtured and sustained, the peace building stakeholders should intensify peace building campaigns, including elements of electoral injustices that often creep up every electoral cycle to the detriment of peace.

**Level of Crime/Criminality in the Country**

Perceptions on the level of criminality are another mirror of determining the level of peace in the country. Criminality, understood by this study to include incidents of robbery with violence, house break-ins, cattle rustling, banditry and other crimes, seems to have a direct effect on the overall perception of the level of peace in the country, if the findings of this study are anything to go by as shown in Figure 2 below.

“Majority of respondents, 78.3% are not worried about conflict or violence. Believe Kenya is peaceful”

These findings are very promising and thus the peace building stakeholders, including the




Figure 1: Level of peace in the Country

There may be concerns that the “handshake” may have not been embraced across the political divide, especially in Rift Valley, that is the home of the Deputy President whom many believe was not happy with the “handshake” for he was not fully consulted. Others think that the “handshake” will constrain the Deputy President’s 2022 presidential election ambitions if NASA leader contests or endorses a different candidate. However, these remains fears that have not been independently verified. The fact

that the “handshake” in itself is a good thing for the country also clouds such minority fears, which are also shared by a section of NASA leadership that were not part of the “handshake”.

On the other hand, the study established that only 4.6% of the respondents perceive Kenya as very unsafe while 17.0% felt lowly secure. This translates to a minority, 21.6% of Kenyans who felt the country was not peaceful as yet. A closer scrutiny of the County specific findings reveals




Figure 2: Level of criminality

The study observed that when robbery with violence, house break-ins, cattle rustling, banditry and other crimes are mentioned, majority of Kenyans shudder in fear. This was

the observation from 59.4% of respondents who felt that the level of criminality in the country was very high 20.1% and high, 39.3% respectively. There were however those who felt the situation

<sup>36</sup> Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga, 2018, *Building Bridges to a New Kenyan Nation*, Office of the President, Government of Kenya, Nairobi

<sup>37</sup> Wanga, Justus, 2018, “The golden handshake that calmed political storm in Kenya”, *Daily Nation*, March 16, 2018 issue, Nation Media Group, Nairobi.

was not as bad, accounting for 28.9% while 10.4% felt criminal incidences in the country were simply low. These findings seem to corroborate the Annual Police Crime Statistics that have ranked Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu Counties as the most crime prone. The NPS Annual Crime Report 2016 (the latest published by the police as at the time of this study) not only reported Nairobi and Mombasa as some of the highest crime prone Counties but also registering more than average crime indexes<sup>38</sup>.

*"About 60% of 'of people living in Mombasa, Nairobi and Kisumu counties live in fear of crime".*

**Presence of organized criminal groups**  
Studies have shown that there is a nexus between organized criminal groups and conflict

and state fragility. A study commissioned by US Agency for International Development (USAID) in 2015, established that organized crime is both facilitated by, and contributor to state fragility<sup>39</sup>. The study observed that 55.4% of respondents in this study believed that there were criminal groups living amongst them. The criminal groups were also believed to be the reason for high crime rates and also threat to peace and security. Indeed, an insignificant 5.3% of the respondents believe that the presence of these criminal groups was not a major peace and security concern.

*"More than half of respondents, 55.4% believe that the country is under the threat of organized criminal groups who majorly contribute to high crime rates, insecurity and violence"*




Figure 3 : Level of presence of organized criminal groups

The study observed that majority of respondents were not keen on mentioning names of the criminal gangs despite the assertion that they were prevalent. Many reasons could be adduced to explain the reservations although the fear of reprisals was confirmed by various KIIs. In

Mombasa County, 71.4% of the respondents said that they didn't know the existence of criminal groups or gangs in the County. It was the same case for Kisumu County, 92.1% and Nairobi, 65.1%. The finding appears to contradict the Gazette Notice published on December 30, 2016 by the then Interior Cabinet Secretary, Major General Joseph Nkaissery, which outlawed 89 criminal gangs in different parts of the country. A review of the 89 outlawed groups indicate that almost 80% of them were found or were believed

to have established bases in the three sampled Counties.

Regardless, the study found out that "Wakali Kwanza" in Mombasa, "42 Brothers" in Kisumu and "Gaza" in Nairobi were the most known, notorious and feared organized criminal groups in the three Counties. Figure 3 summarizes the respondents' perceptions of the presence of organized criminal groups in the sampled counties.

Table 3 : Organized criminal groups/gangs in Mombasa, Kisumu and Nairobi Counties

County	Organized Gang/ Group	Frequency	Percent
Mombasa	I don't know any	155	71.4
	Gaza	2	.9
	Mustard Boys	1	.5
	Sitaki Kujua	1	.5
	40 Brothers	2	.9
	Wakali Wao	7	3.2
	Wakali kwanza	28	12.9
	Mateja	3	1.4
	Wajukuu wa Bibi	9	4.1
	Piyopiyo	5	2.3
	Watalia	2	.9
	Tabasco	2	.9
	Total	217	100.0
Kisumu	I don't know any	198	92.1
	Sitaki Kujua	1	.5
	42 Brothers	12	5.6
	China Squad	4	1.9
	Total	215	100.0

<sup>38</sup>National Police Service, 2016, Annual Crime Report 2016, National Police Service, Nairobi.  
<sup>39</sup>Management System International (MSI), 2015, Organized Crime, Conflict and Fragility: Assessing Relationships through a Review of USAID Programs, USAID, Washington DC.



County	Organized Gang/ Group	Frequency	Percent
Nairobi	I don't know any	183	65.1
	Gaza	30	10.7
	Mungiki	3	1.1
	Mustard Boys	4	1.4
	Sitaki Kujua	5	1.8
	Kamjeshi	2	.7
	Hapana Tambua	11	3.9
	40 Brothers	8	2.8
	Kapedo	18	6.4
	Wakali Wao	2	.7
	Super Power	5	1.8
	Langalanga Brothers	4	1.4
	Sha Boys	2	.7
	Showground Mob	1	.4
	Usiku sacco	1	.4
	Jam Street	2	.7
	<b>Total</b>	<b>281</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: Analysis of findings from the questionnaires, KIIs and FGDs.

*“Wakali Kwanza, 42 Brothers, and Gaza are the most known, notorious and feared organized criminal gangs in Mombasa, Kisumu and Nairobi respectively”.*

### Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in the Country

Availability of illicit SALW is closely related to criminality in the society as well as the presence of organized criminal groups/gangs. Although police reports indicate that majority of crimes in Kenya are not committed with the aid of firearms<sup>40</sup>, the presence of illicit SALW is a security concern in itself.

A report on the perception of availability of SALW published in 2012 by KNFP and Geneva Based Small Arms Survey estimates that there could be

between 530,000 and 680,000 illicit firearms in civilian hands nationally<sup>41</sup>. It is disheartening to note that such level of the proliferation of illicit SALW is a major security threat for there could be more arms in civilian hands than in the state's armories across the country.

This study corroborates the KNFP and Small Arms Survey Report with 58.7% of respondents appearing to confirm the proliferation of illicit firearms. Out of this, 29.5% of the respondents thought that the proliferation was high with another 7.9% opining that the problem was dire. Only 13.2% of the respondents in the three sampled Counties thought the problem was not a major concern.

<sup>41</sup> Wepundi, Manasseh et al, 2012, *Availability of Small Arms and Perceptions of Security in Kenya: An Assessment, KNFP & Small Arms Survey.*

<sup>40</sup> Mbarak, Twalib, 2018

Figure 4 summarizes the respondents' perceptions of the levels of proliferation of illicit arms in the country.




Figure 4: Level of illicit firearms proliferation in the country

Furthermore, some respondents were concerned that some rogue police officers could be acting in cahoots with criminals by leasing their guns and or ammunitions at a fee. In such circumstances, such rogue officers were likely to look the other way when crime involving firearms were reported for fear action on such reports could expose them.

*“About 29.5% of people in Mombasa, Nairobi and Kisumu counties are concerned about the proliferation of illicit firearms in the Country while about 7.9% believe the problem was dire”.*

### Likelihood of protests/demonstrations

The study also sought to determine the likelihood of protests and/or demonstrations in the country. The protests or demos, whether peaceful or violent is an indicator that some sections of the society are not happy about something hence not peaceful. Even peaceful protests indicate that there is negative peace driven by certain structural issues that perturb the population.

While the three sampled Counties are largely prone to protests and demonstrations courtesy of their huge populations and home to too many trade unions, associations and institutions of higher learning, 34.9% of respondents believed there was little chance of occurring. However, 37.8% of respondents felt that protests and demonstrations were bound to occur in the country with 27.2% opining only a modest chance exists. Moreover, the “moderates” KIIs added that protests and/or demonstrations were not good since they disrupt daily chores, occasion's loss of lives and property and disturbs public peace and order. Figure 5 illustrates the respondents' perceptions of the likelihood of protests and or demonstrations in the sampled Counties.




Figure 5: Likelihood of demonstrations and protests

Furthermore, protests and/or violent demonstrations are increasingly becoming a feature of electioneering events in the country. As was witnessed in 2017, the protests, which were also violent, commenced during the party primaries especially in the strongholds of the major political coalitions, Jubilee Party and NASA, where securing a party ticket was as good as being elected to an elective post<sup>42</sup>. This is why this indicator is critical in determining the status of peace in the county.

*“65% of respondents believe that demonstrations and protests in the country pose a great challenge to peace, security and public order”.*

### Political Intolerance

The study observed that although not all demonstrations or protests are political in organization and nature, a good number, especially the ones that turn violent, are political<sup>43</sup>. Perceptions of the level of political tolerance or intolerance can therefore be a good indicator of the peace, security and stability in the country. The 2007/08 PEV as well as the previous episodes of electoral induced violence were confirmations that political intolerance can be recipes for large scale political instability, fragility and violence. Studies such as Akindele, S.T. Olaopa, O.R & Salaam, N.F. 2009, Claire Elder, Susan Stigant, and Jonas Claes, 2014, and Wambua, Muema, 2017 amongst others have all blamed high levels of political intolerance and ethnicization of politics for electoral related violence in young democracies such as Kenya.

<sup>43</sup> Coffey International, 2017.

<sup>42</sup> Coffey International, 2017.

Respondents in this study were asked on the perceived level of political intolerance in Kenya. Figure 6 indicates their responses.




Figure 6: Perceived Level of political intolerance in the country

The study found that Kenyans were divided on issues of political intolerance. In fact, 51.2% of respondents were of the opinion that political intolerance was either still very high, 21.5%, or high, 29.7%. On the other hand, 23.8% of the respondents felt the political intolerance was “moderate”.

The study observed that political intolerance continues to be a major source and driver of political polarization and division in Kenya that often manifest itself ethnically or as a representation of collation of ethnic groups. Such a coalition perceives the other coalition as automatic “enemy” and this continues to be a concern for Kenyans. High level political intolerance also contributes to polarization and profiling that cumulatively leads to violence and hence low levels of “peace” in the country. Moreover, the March 9, 2018 “handshake” between President Uhuru Kenyatta and NASA Presidential Candidate and Opposition Leader Raila Odinga was a major stabilizing factor. However, the respondents were concerned that

this good gesture could be undermined by the diehard supporters of the two leaders depending on how they perceive the “handshake” in regards to the future political ambitions of the leaders of the various coalitions in the country. Sustainable and long-lasting peace building should pay attention to the level of political intolerance in the country and invest resources in reducing this intolerance.

*“More than 50% of respondents believed that high level political intolerance contributes to polarization and profiling that cumulatively leads to violence and hence low levels of “peace” in the country”.*

### Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

High levels of insecurity, criminality, presence of organized criminal groups/gangs, easy availability and access to illicit firearms, demonstrations and/or protests and political intolerance in a society could lead to internal

displacements as was witnessed in Kenya during the 2007/08 PEV. During the PEV, more than 500,000 Kenyans were displaced. The level of IDPs in the country was therefore considered

as an indicator for peacefulness where the lower the level of IDPs means peace within the country.




Figure 7: Perceived Level of the presence of IDPs in the three sampled Counties

The study established that majority of Kenyans, 63.8% are of the opinion that the level of IDPs was not a major concern to the country. Indeed, 38.3% of the respondents said that the presence of IDPs was low with 25.5% returning a verdict of very low. However, the situation could be different if the study focused in other Counties although it's incumbent to note that electoral violence of 2017 was mainly experienced in Counties such as Kisumu and Nairobi. This means that the 2017 elections did not lead to marked internal displacements. In Mombasa, a KI noted that, prior to the 2017 general elections and in fear of eruption of violence, some people, especially with "up country" heritage practiced what has since been termed as "self-displacement". This is a practice where people move from an area for fear of violence and return back when things are back to normal. So many people, across the country, could have "self-displaced" in anticipation of violence hence low levels of the presence of IDPs in the sampled counties.

"Majority of respondents, 63.8% were of the opinion that the issue of IDPs was not a major concern in the country".

### Equality of opportunities including employment

The Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) Report, also popularly known as the Waki Report (named after the Chair of the Commission) found out that inequalities and economic marginalization, often viewed in ethno-geographic terms, were very much at play in the PEV in places like the slum areas of Nairobi<sup>44</sup>. The report also noted that the widespread belief that the presidency brings economic advantages to the President's ethnic group make communities exert violence

<sup>44</sup> Government of Kenya, 2008, Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) final Report, Government Printer, Nairobi.

to attain and keep power<sup>45</sup>. In as much as the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 clipped the powers of the presidency and dispersed some of the powers to the 47 County Governments, the events of 2013 and 2017 presidential elections infer that the Presidency is still one of the highly sought political office in the country and that's why communities or coalitions of ethnic groups were doing all they could, including employing violence, to grab or retain the Presidency depending on their position at the time of the presidential election. As if this is not enough, the gubernatorial positions created by the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 has created another level of "mini" Presidents in the 47 Counties, where communities, clans, village or groups believe that the position comes with widespread

advantages in terms of advancing their political and economic interests. This is why there was violence in various parts of the country as communities jostled over these positions of leadership.

The common denominator of these jostling is the perceived level of inequality in terms of opportunities and jobs offered by both the National and County Governments. This competition can be a source of cohesion or polarization and violence depending on how the perceptions manifest themselves and how they are handled. This means that the perception of inequality in society is an indicator of structural violence that denotes absence of positive peace in society.

Figure 8 summarizes the respondent's perceptions of the level of equality of opportunities including employment in the sampled Counties.




Figure 8: Level of equality of opportunities including employment in the sampled counties

The study observed that majority of Kenyans were not happy with the way opportunities, including employment, were distributed in the country. Indeed, 59.3% of the respondents were concerned that the level of equality of opportunities were either "low", 34.1% or "very

low", 25.2%. A KI in Mombasa County summed it all, observing what he called "systematic marginalization" of the coastal people through denying them what God has endowed them with.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid



“We have the biggest port in the region, home to the tourism sector in the country and access to the sea but yet we are still very poor. This is why we have been in opposition since and at the slightest provocation, we can engage in violence if that will address some of these grievances we have been fighting for”, noted the respondent.

“About 60% of respondents believe inequality in the distribution of resources including employment was rife in the country and a key threat to peace and security”.

### Cumulative Level of Peace/Threats Levels

As observed in the introductory section of the findings, a control variable was used to determine a general perception of levels of peace without making references to the individual indicators. The study took note of the fact that it is common for respondents to generally state that the country or County was peaceful but when, for instance, asked about the level of criminality, the same respondent indicate otherwise. This could infer lots of negative peace as summarized Figure 4 below.

Level/Indicator	Level of Criminality	Presence of Criminal Gangs	Presence of SALW	Likelihood of Demonstrations	Level of Political Intolerance	Presence of IDPs	Level of Equal opportunities (upside own)	Average rating (%)
Very High	20.1	16.4	7.9	14.4	21.5	2.8	25.2	15.5
High	39.3	39.0	29.5	23.4	29.7	11.1	34.1	29.4
Moderate	28.9	20.3	21.3	27.2	23.8	22.3	24.1	24.0
Low	10.4	18.9	28.2	23.1	14.7	38.3	9.4	20.4
Very Low	1.4	5.3	13.2	11.8	10.2	25.5	7.2	10.7
<b>Total</b>								<b>100</b>

Table 4 : Summary of the variables for perception of peacefulness

In order to make meaning out of these cumulative average scores, very high denotes very high risks hence low levels of peace. On the other hand, very low threats means very high levels of peace. It then follows that based on the cumulative scores/indicators, 31.1% of the respondents believe that the country is peaceful, given the low and very low risk levels. On the other hand, almost half of the respondents, 44.9%, feel that the country is not peaceful given the high

conflict risks levels. Almost a quarter, 24% of the respondents, returned a verdict of moderate peace levels (moderate risks levels).

“31.1% of Kenyans believe that the country is peaceful, 44.9% are of contrary opinion while 24% believe that the country is on moderate risk levels”

These cumulative findings are very similar to the control variable findings in a number of ways. One, in the control variable (perception of level of peace in the country), 29.4% of the respondents said that the country was peaceful. The cumulative findings of the 7 variables used put the level of peace at 31.1%, a difference of 1.7%, which can be accounted by statistical margin of error.

On the other hand, 21.6% of the respondents under the control variable opined that the country was not peaceful. The cumulative average score of the 7 indicators puts this perception at 44.9%. This observation could be attributed to aspect of negative peace as explained by Johan Galtung (1996).

### B. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CONFLICT

Further, the study sought to determine the economic impact of conflicts especially as it affects citizen’s livelihood. Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu, the economic “giants” of the country, were used as the reference point. The study also sought to determine which types of

conflicts had the severest economic impact in the country.

#### 4.1 Effects of Conflicts on Livelihoods

The effect of conflicts on livelihoods is a major policy discourse currently in Kenya. The NSC/PBCM Strategic Plan for the period 2018 – 2022 highlights peace as the enabler of the “Big Four” agenda and the realization of Vision 2030. The “Big Four” is the economic blueprint of President Uhuru Kenyatta’s second and last term in office designed to define his legacy. The Big Four guides the development agenda of the country in the period 2018 – 2022 and prioritizes affordable and decent housing, affordable healthcare, food and nutritional security, and employment creation through manufacturing<sup>46</sup>. On the other hand, Vision 2030, unveiled in 2007, is the long-term national planning strategy that aims to transform Kenya into an industrializing middle-income country by the year 2030<sup>47</sup>.

The effect of conflicts on livelihoods was confirmed by 89.8% of the respondents. Only a paltry 6.5% of the respondents held a contrary view.




Figure 9 : summarizes the respondents’ perception on the effects of conflicts on livelihoods.

<sup>46</sup> Kenya Institute for Public Policy, Research and Analysis (KIPRA), 2018, “Realizing the “Big Four” Agenda through Energy as an Enabler”, Policy Monitor, Issue 9 No 3.

<sup>47</sup> Government of Kenya, 2007, Kenya Vision 2030 (the Popular Version), Government Printer, Nairobi.

These findings seem to imply that Kenyans know and agree that conflicts negatively affect their livelihoods yet they still engage in intermittent bouts of violence that escalates during electoral periods or major political events like referendum and delineation of boundaries. This finding could be used to create awareness and mobilize Kenyans towards a peaceful, cohesive and prosperous nation.

*"About 90% of respondents confirm the negative effects of conflicts on their livelihoods".*

#### 4.1.1 Conflicts with the highest impact on livelihoods

The study sought to establish which of the conflicts had the highest impact on people's livelihoods. Figure 10 below is a summary of the findings.




Figure 10: Perceptions of conflicts that have the highest impact on livelihoods

Two key inferences can be deduced from the respondent's perceptions of the conflicts that have the highest impacts on their livelihoods. One, these perceptions may have been informed and influenced by the protracted 2017 elections, particularly the presidential election that was annulled and repeated amidst boycotts and violence in opposition strongholds that apparently make up most of the three sampled Counties, particularly Kisumu and Nairobi. This is why 74.6% of the respondents opined that political conflicts are the greatest threats to their livelihoods and well-being. The elections were lengthy, characterized with demonstrations, protests and bouts of violence that disrupted people's lives and livelihoods as some business premises had to be closed. Investors were also on a "wait and see" kind of policy regarding investments in the country because of the uncertainties' brought about by the elections,

having learned the hard way during the 2007/08 PEV. This, among other reasons, could explain why political conflicts ranked the highest in all the three sampled counties.

Two, this particular finding goes against the public grain that has ranked terrorism as the top peace, security and political agenda not only in Kenya but in the Horn of Africa region as a whole. This narrative has led governments and development partners to prioritize counter-terrorism investments over other conflicts in the region, Kenya included. What this particular finding is saying is that yes, terrorism is a major problem but this should not reduce investments in the other forms of conflict management in the country. The fact that Mombasa County, one of the Counties affected by terrorism was part of the study and still prioritized political conflicts in terms of its effects on local people's livelihoods

speaks a lot. The study established that 53.9% of the respondents in Mombasa cited political conflicts as the major threat to their livelihoods with 22.1% citing terrorism. Although political events and processes are periodic, it seems that many Kenyans are concerned with political conflicts that seem to have long term effect on the citizens' livelihoods.

*"Majority of respondents, 74.6% are more concerned about political conflicts than any other form of conflicts"*

#### 4.2 County Based Findings and Discussions

This section presents County specific findings. It offers a more specific and comprehensive analysis of the status of peace in each of the sampled Counties based on the seven indicators of peace isolated during the literature review.

##### 4.2.1 Mombasa County

This report summarizes the findings of the field work undertaken in Mombasa County. Primary data was collected through KIIs, FGDs and administration of general questionnaires to members of the public. Interviews were conducted in Nyali, Kisauni, Likoni and Mvita urban centers. The goal was to engage in conversations that would bring out a clear picture of the state of peace, peace indicators, levels of criminality, levels of homicide, levels of refugees/IDPs, likelihood of violent demonstrations, ease of access to SALW, presence of criminal groups and/or gangs, political instability and equality of opportunities to access sources of livelihood in the county. KI were drawn from various agencies including Kenya Community Support Centre (KECOSCE), Women empowerment groups, Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government (NGAOs), NPS, CSOs such as Likoni Community Development Program (LICODEP), Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI), Coast Advisory Trust, and a youth group – Dream Achievers, were interviewed so as to get their perceptions on peace and security in the County.

##### 4.2.1.1 State of Peace in the County

The study was informed that, during the electioneering period, Mombasa County was highly tensed. The tension was as a result of mistrust and suspicion among the various communities. It was noted that the tension had since subsided as a result of the "handshake". The economy of the County has also stabilized and there is a general sense of hopefulness among the residents. Though the County was perceived as generally peaceful, the core grievances like unemployment and resource distribution remained unaddressed. Further, the current political debate over the 2022 elections was bound to polarize the County at a very early stage.

Other concerns that came out strongly among the interviewed people included matters such as mutating juvenile and criminal gangs, drug abuse, the high rate of idle youths on the streets, high levels of illiteracy and radicalization. These issues pose a threat to the peace and security of the County. Some respondents felt that job opportunities by the County Government were skewed towards friends or those perceived to be "politically correct". The study noted that drug and substance abuse was wide spread in the County, with Likoni, Kisauni and Nyali areas said to be the havens for drug businesses. It was mentioned that the drug dens were so popular with the young men that they spend most of their time at those places. In Kisauni, some police officers were accused of protecting the drug dealers other than the community. One of the KI observed thus:

*"In Kisauni, the police have been accused of soliciting for bribes from the drug dealers (4,000 Kshs per week), abetting the trade in the process<sup>48</sup>".*

Landing sites used for fishing were alleged to be key drug entrant points for drugs into the county.

<sup>48</sup> Key informant comment on the issue of drug trafficking in Kisauni. Interview held in 2018.






Figure 11: Level of peace in the County

In terms of perceptions of peace, 77.8% of the respondents in Mombasa were of the opinion that the County was relatively peaceful. Out of these, 35.4% of the respondents noted that the levels of peace in the County were very high, 6.3% or high 29.1%. A majority of 42.4% of the respondents said the County was moderately peaceful.

*“Majority of residents of Mombasa County, 77.8%, believe that the County is peaceful but juvenile delinquency, criminal gangs, drug abuse, illiteracy, radicalization, biasness in filling available job opportunities and crime were serious security concerns”.*

#### 4.2.1.2 Levels of criminality

Crime in Mombasa is wide spread. It is nevertheless more prevalent in Likoni and Kisauni where majority of respondents' felt was home to various organized gangs. The gang's

criminal activities in Likoni were noted to extend to Mvita while the ones in Kisauni extended to Nyali. In Kisauni, most of the gang members were said to be either touts or motorbike riders and are mostly known for attacking and robbing their customers. The study was informed that the gangs were well armed with a wide variety of weapons. One strategy the gangs use to attack their victims was introduction of chili powder into the eyes of their targets before robbing them. There are incidences of pick pocketing as well, mainly in Mvita and Likoni's ferry crossing point.




Figure 12 : Level of crime

As evident in Figure 12, 59.9% of the respondents were concerned that the levels of crime in Mombasa County were very high, 21.2%, and high, 38.7%. Only 12.5% of the respondents thought levels of crime were either low, 11.1%, or very low, 1.4%. This means that level of criminality is a major concern in Mombasa County.

*“About 60% of residents of Mombasa County live in fear of crime, 12.5% do not”.*

#### 4.2.1.3 Presence of Refugees/ IDPs

Refugees and IDPs are minimal in Mombasa County. In fact, about 83% of respondents felt the numbers were low. There are however few IDPs in areas such as Kazadani who are yet to be settled. In areas like Jomvu (Owino Uhuru slum)

and Mishomoroni, there are a few IDPs who claim settlement by the National Government. A few cases were mentioned of unregistered refugees in places like Nyali, who are said to be of Rwandese, Somali and Tanzanian decent.

*“The issue of refugees and IDP's is not a serious concern to Mombasa county residents”.*






Figure 13 : Level of refugees/ IDPs

#### 4.2.1.4 Likelihood of Demonstrations and or Protests

During the electioneering period, there were demonstrations in Mombasa with young men and women rumored to have been paid by politicians to disrupt competitors' political rallies. Reports of the opposition party's supporters taking to the streets to demonstrate against and push for

IEBC reforms even after the opposition party leader had pulled out of the repeat elections were common, so was the scuffles between the police and civilians.<sup>49</sup> After the elections and the "handshake", such demonstrations and protests fizzled out giving room to immense tranquility only witnessed after the signing of the National Accord in 2008'.<sup>50</sup>




Figure 14 : Likelihood of demonstrations/ protests

Figure 14 demonstrate that majority of residents of Mombasa, 62.7%, dismissed the likelihood of demonstrations and or protests in the County. Out of this, 36.9% and 25.8% of the respondents thought the likelihood of protests, especially political demonstrations and protests was low and or very low respectively. This is good news for the County No. 001 since political protests and or demonstrations are disruptive to socio-economic development especially the tourism sector that is very sensitive to insecurity.

*"Majority of residents of Mombasa, 62.7%, believe that the County is safe from any demonstrations and or protests".*

#### 4.2.1.5 Proliferation of illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)

The proliferation of illicit small arms in Mombasa is low. Consequently, majority of criminal activities in the County are executed by use of crude weapons such as machetes, spokes or knives. Indeed, 40.6% and 17.1% of respondents felt the access to SALW in the County was low or very low respectively. Nonetheless, 15.7% of respondents felt the proliferation of illicit small arms in Mombasa was a serious concern with majority citing criminal gangs operating between Mvita and Likoni as armed.




Figure 15 : Level of illicit firearms proliferation

A KI observed that:

*"There are over one hundred fishing points on the shores of Mombasa. These points and the vehicles that carry the fish are not inspected thus giving room for SALW, drugs and refugees to get into Mombasa".*

As such and although the respondents downplayed proliferation of illicit arms in the County, this research established that the many fishing points in the County could be exploited by gun merchants, including terrorist groups, to sneak-in illicit SALW or use the fishing points as escape routes once they commit crimes using guns.

<sup>51</sup> Key informant comments on the issue of SALW proliferation in the coastal region. Interview held in Mombasa in 2018.

On the other hand, it can be deduced that crude weapons and chiefly knives, swords and

<sup>49</sup> <https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Nasa-Anti-IEBC-Protests-/1056-4141732-ikopff/index.html> Retrieved on 18<sup>th</sup> September 2018, 10:21am

<sup>50</sup> <https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Uhuru-Raila-handshake-calmed-political-storm/1064-4344940-x5abbuz/index.html> Retrieved on 18<sup>th</sup> September 2018, 10:51am

machetes (panga) are the preferred tools of trade for the many juvenile criminal groups reported to be harassing the port city residents.

*“15.7% of respondents felt the proliferation of illicit small arms in Mombasa was a serious concern with majority citing criminal gangs operating between Mvita and Likoni as armed”.*

4.2.1.6 Presence of Criminal Groups and/or Gangs

Criminal groups and/or gangs in Mombasa County are a serious security issue. According to

various FGD’s, the gangs exist majorly in Likoni and Kisauni where the latter was mentioned as the training grounds. It was also mentioned that the gangs consist of young boys and girls who start off as drug peddlers and addicts before graduating to criminal gangs. The gangs mostly operate in and from Likoni and Kisauni sub-counties. Due to the proximity of Likoni and Kisauni, these gangs operate as well in Nyali, Mvita and Changamwe sub-counties.

Criminal Gangs			
Likoni		Kisauni	
i.	Wajukuu wa bibi (13-18 yr olds)	i.	Wakali wao
ii.	Young thugs	ii.	Wakali kwanza
iii.	Whitehouse	iii.	Gaza
iv.	Makavela	iv.	Wakware babies – Women
v.	Chaka to chaka	v.	Wachafu
vi.	Blue ladies – Women	vi.	Kagen
vii.	Chafu za docs - Women	vii.	Wabajuni
		viii.	Bakarani
		ix.	Wajukuu wa mtume
		x.	Mavuzi Girls – Women
		xi.	Wazambarati

Table 6 : Criminal gangs/groups in Mombasa County, a case of Likoni and Kisauni sub-counties

In Kisauni, “Wakali Wao” and “Wakali Kwanza” are said to be the major gangs from which these other gangs originate. Kisauni is said to be the ‘training ground’ for the emerging gangs. The presence of the gangs is closely associated with high levels of illiteracy especially in Kisauni caused by the lack of schools in the region. The study was informed that getting to school would mean a child walking for long even sometimes more than 4 kilometers, or part with one hundred shillings for a motorbike which parents cannot afford due to high levels of poverty. In fact, the whole of Kisauni has only 4 primary

schools. Some people have taken advantage of this situation and started small ‘schools’ whose teachers are high school dropouts and therefore poor quality of education. The study also learnt that it was in these backroom schools where radicalization and drug abuse start and thus the children find themselves engaging in criminal activities and deep in drug and substance abuse.




Figure 16 : Level of presence of criminal gangs or groups

In total, 62.2% of the respondents felt the presence of criminal gangs in Mombasa County was high, 38.7% and very high, 23.5%. Moreover, the presence of organized criminal gangs is a major peace and security agenda in Mombasa County.

*“It is from the “backroom” schools in Kisauni where radicalization and drug abuse start before the youth graduate to criminal gangs which 62.2% of respondents believe are wide spread in the County”.*

very major role in calming down the opposition supporters leading to reduced tension among the communities. In spite of this observation, a significant 36.9% of the respondents felt that political intolerance in the County required urgent attention with 19.4% opining that it was very high. 42.4% of respondents felt political intolerance was either low or very low.

4.2.1.7 Political Intolerance

The study observed that Mombasa County was politically stable, though campaigns for the 2022 elections seemed to have started and was feared could cause a bit of unrest in the County. The “handshake” was mentioned to have played a




Figure 17 : Level of political intolerance

*“There were near equal division with 36.9% of the residents of Mombasa feeling that political intolerance in the County required urgent attention while, 42.4% felt political intolerance was either low or very low”.*

The study observed that the feeling of marginalization and skewed distribution of resources could drive conflict or radicalization that in many cases lead to violent extremism hence the need to be addressed.

#### 4.2.1.8 Equality of opportunities

According to respondents, key informants and the focus group discussants, opportunities for livelihood exist in Mombasa County, but are not evenly distributed. A majority, 62.7% felt that, the County jobs were offered to political allies and the politically correct and never to deserving candidates leading to the conclusion that the level of equality of opportunities was either low or very low. One KI observed thus:

*“Politicians give jobs to their own, Muslims to their fellow Muslims and the rest who cannot get favors are left in the cold.” – KII Kisauni*




Figure 18 : Level of equality of opportunities including employment


#### 4.2.1.9 Economic Impact of Conflicts in the County

The study established that political conflicts had the highest impact on sources of livelihoods. These range from lack of opportunities for employment to destruction of businesses and markets. With the presence of conflicts in the County, businesses are forced to close early or not open at all because the traders are being careful not to have their stock destroyed by angry mob on the streets. It was also mentioned that the price of goods and services skyrocket and people are forced to dig deeper into their pockets so as to fulfill their daily needs. According to Figure 19 below, 53.9% of respondents felt that bad politics was one of the leading reasons for

increased poverty in the County while 22.1% blamed high poverty levels on terrorist attacks. These terrorist attacks cause the same effects in the communities as political unrest because people live in constant fear of attacks and are reluctant to engage in daily economic activities for their own safety.



**Type of Conflict with the highest Impact on Sources of Livelihoods**



**Figure 19 : Type of conflict with the highest impact on sources of livelihoods**

*“Bad politics as well as terrorism have the highest impact on sources of livelihoods for the residents of Mombasa County”.*

#### 4.2.2 Kisumu County

This section provides a summary of findings from administration of general questionnaires, FGDs and KIIs undertaken in Nyalenda in Kisumu east, Kondele and Milimani in Kisumu central, Chemilil in Muhoroni and Sondu in Nyakach Constituencies. The respondents provided useful information on the state of peace in the County, peace indicators, levels of criminality, levels of homicides, levels of refugees/IDPs, likelihood of violent demonstrations and or protests, ease of access to SALW, presence of criminal groups and/or gangs, political instability, equality of opportunities to access sources of livelihood and socio-economic impacts of conflicts.

##### 4.2.2.1 Perceptions of Peace in the County

Kisumu County is mostly ethnically

homogenous. It is mostly calm with flares of politically motivated violence especially during periods leading up to and after elections. Party primaries are a do or die contest since, the County excites a strong following of the party associated with Raila Odinga, who traces his origin and political support base to Nyanza region hence clinching the dominant party ticket is as good as clinching the coveted elective seat during the general elections. On the other hand, the large numbers of unemployed youth, especially in the city, are often used by politicians to instill fear in their rivals. The County has also experienced increased tensions and, or violent conflicts along the Nyakach/Nandi border and Muhoroni due to cattle rustling and boundary-related disputes. After the “handshake” between President Uhuru and opposition leader Raila Odinga, the County has witnessed a cessation of violence between the two communities normally perceived to have divergent political interests.


##### 4.2.2.2 State of peace in the county

The study observed that devolution had played a big role in enhancing political, inter-ethnic and inter-klan tensions and animosities with majority of respondents complaining of being discriminated in job opportunities at the County level. At the national level, the feeling was the same with majority arguing that they had been technically ‘denied’ national political leadership. Nonetheless, 34.9% of respondents felt that there was peace in the County with a majority, 54.9% opining that the state of peace was just moderate. This cumulatively account for 89.8% of the response rate implying that generally Kisumu County was peaceful and this can be due to its ethnic homogeneity nature and the “handshake”.

Moreover, a paltry 9.3% and 0.9% of the respondents felt that the level of peace was low and very low respectively. This can be attributed to be the residents of Nyakach and Muhoroni

constituencies which border Nandi County, who have been experiencing continued boundary disputes and cattle rustling. According to the International Journal of Humanities and Social Studies (ISSN 2321 - 9203), cattle rustling and demarcation factors have been a thorn in the flesh amongst communities living alongside Nyando, Muhoroni and Tinderet. The report argues that the Nandis to some extent carry out attacks with a purpose of acquiring animals for bride price and as part of their initiation rites, while Luos carry out retaliatory attacks to repossess the cattle taken by the Nandis. This influences inter-ethnic conflicts in Nyando, Muhoroni, and Tinderet sub-counties<sup>52</sup>. This seems to concur with this study whereby a proportion of 9.3% and 0.9% felt unsafe.

*“Majority, 89.8% believe Kisumu County is peaceful save for boundary and cattle rustling issues in Nyakach and Muhoroni constituencies”.*



**Figure 20 : level of peace**

<sup>52</sup> See more on the International Journal Of Humanities & Social Studies vol 6 issue 3 (ISSN 2321 - 9203) page 11, accessed on 18/9/2018 available at <https://theijhss.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/18.-HS1803-002.pdf>

#### 4.2.2.3 Level of criminality

The level of criminality in Kisumu County was found to be generally moderate. This was opined by 39.5% of respondents who added that the situation was not good during the electioneering period. There were however those who felt criminality were still high, 22.8% and very high, 19.5% associating the vice with high levels of youth unemployment, poverty and high cost of living. Participants in FGDs observed that mainly poverty drive youth to crime as a means

of survival or supplement to their meager income. This seems to concur with a study carried out by Olang'o, Kennedy O. (2017) on Youth Involvement in Crimes in Kisumu East, which found out that majority of the youth involved in criminal activities were unemployed or lacked appropriate skills for employment<sup>53</sup>.

*"Almost half of the residents of Kisumu County, 42.3% live in fear of crime. Only 18.1% do not".*




Figure 21 : Levels of crime

#### 4.3.2.4 Presence of refugees/IDPs

The study established that there was very low presence of IDPs and no refugees in Kisumu County. This was opined by 44.7% and 26.0% of the respondents who cited low and very low respectively when asked about levels of refugees/ IDPs as a result of conflicts. It was found that most of the IDPs during the 2007/2008 PEV have since been absorbed by their families

or the community as confirmed by a discussant in a FGD session.

*"All our people came back either dead or alive; we do not have IDPs here" - Discussant in FGD Nyalenda*

Most of the IDPs had also been compensated by the Government as reported in one of the daily newspapers 'the star' on 19<sup>th</sup> Dec, 2017<sup>54</sup>.

<sup>53</sup> Olang'o Kennedy O (2017). Thesis on civil society organization programmes on criminal activities in Kisumu County pdf. Pg 51 "...majority of youth are involved in criminal activities due to lack of employment and appropriate skills with a mean of 1.6 and std deviation of 0.8. This is supported by majority of respondents 147(53.7%) and 106.1(38.6) strongly agree."

<sup>54</sup> The star Newspaper, reporter Faith Matete "...Kisumu IDPs thank Uhuru as each gets Sh50,000 compensation." Accessed on 19/9/2018 available at [https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2017/12/19/video-kisumu-idps-thank-uhuru-as-each-gets-sh50000-compensation\\_c1687562](https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2017/12/19/video-kisumu-idps-thank-uhuru-as-each-gets-sh50000-compensation_c1687562).

*"Generally there are no refugees or IDP's in Kisumu County. This is largely due to strong community ties which lead to absorption once one is displaced"*




Figure 22 : Level of IDPs or Refugees

There are however other respondents who felt that there were IDPs in the County with 6.0% and 7.0% mentioning very high and high respectively. These may be considered to be those individuals who were left out during the compensation plans, or those displaced during cattle rustling and boundary conflicts alongside Nyakatch and Muhoroni.

Kibos, Miwani, Muhoroni, and areas bordering Nandi community which have been affected by boundary disputes, resulting in conflict between the Luo and Nandi communities. The Luo and Nandi communities dispute the exact boundaries of the Rift Valley and Nyanza areas around the Muhoroni area. The Luo claim their boundary stretches up to the escarpment while the Nandi insist it was only up to the railway line.

#### 4.2.2.5 Likelihood of violent demonstrations and or protests

The study observed that the likelihood of violent demonstrations and protests in Kisumu was very high. This assertion was opined by 32.6% with 23.3% feeling it was high as well. One KI mentioned that:- "It only takes the right trigger to set Kisumu on fire". Indeed, violent demonstrations are common in areas such as

*"Majority of residents of Kisumu County, 55.9% believe that there is a high likelihood of violent demonstrations and or protest in the county".*






Figure 23 : Likelihood of demonstrations or protests

Each community claims that the disputed land belonged to their ancestors. Tension and intermittent clashes have adversely affected the growth of centers such as Kibigori, Chepsueta, and Chemase and slowed farming activities. For example, the Potopoto farm in Kibigori area, one of the most contentious areas, has previously deployed armed youths to guard the land.

“We appreciate the fact that our development agenda is pegged on peace and as leaders we must ensure this for good coexistence regardless of our party affiliations - KI in Muhoroni

#### 4.2.2.6 Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)

Proliferation of Small arms and light weapons is not a serious issue in Kisumu County. This was the observation of a majority 87.4% of respondents. Indeed, 39.5% mentioned that

illicit Small arms ownership was low while 25.1% opined it was very low. 22.8% said it was moderate adding that most of the crimes were executed using crude weapons such as machetes, knives, bows and arrows. On the other hand, 9.8% and 2.8% of the respondents felt that the proliferation of illicit SALW was high and very high respectively. This can be attributed to the presence of criminal gangs and incidents of criminal activities. However, respondents were lost on their availability as confirmed by a Kondele resident during a discussion who mentioned that:-

“We only hear victims have been left with guns shots but we can't tell who shot them” - FGD Discussant in Kondele




Figure 24 : Level of illicit firearms proliferation

The study observed that the increasing cattle rustling incidents in the border with Nandi and Kericho Counties may have led to the militarization of border areas. This scenario obtained in other areas of the country such as Elgeyo Marakwet and Laikipia Counties that had to acquire illicit guns to cope up with increasing armed cattle rustling incidents.

“Majority of Kisumu County residents, 87.4% believe the proliferation of illicit Small arms and light weapons is not a serious security concern”.

#### 4.2.2.7 Presence of criminal groups and or gangs

Kisumu is alleged to host a number of criminal gangs. However, some gang members who were previously responsible for violence in their communities, and who were alleged to have been hired by politicians to cause violence and instability around elections publicly denounced

violence and become peace advocates. This is according to a Baseline Survey by CRECO 2012<sup>55</sup>. This study appear to support CRECO's findings since cumulatively 80.9 % of the respondents cited the level of criminal gangs as either medium, low or very low. This was mentioned by 33%, 39.1% and 8.8% of the respondents respectively.

There are nonetheless, large numbers of idle and unemployed youth in the County which make it easy for the youth to gang or subscribe to criminal gangs. The study observed that criminal gangs were the likely instruments for conflicts and other issues that cause violent confrontations such as cattle rustling at the Nyakach/Nandi border and boundary disputes in Muhoroni. Most notable criminal gangs are: Baghdad boys, Nyalenda hood boys, American marine and, Chinese commandos.

<sup>55</sup> CRECO 2012. The large number of idle and unemployed youth in gangs makes it easy for politicians to try to obtain leverage through violent means by funding and deploying these gangs. This situation may have been ameliorated by the fact that most youth who had previously been involved in violence are now engaged in activities that promote peace.




Figure 25 : Level of presence of criminal gangs/ groups

However, a proportion of respondents, 19.1% felt that criminal groups and/or gangs were rampant citing high 12.6% and very high 6.5% respectively. These findings can be attributed to the 42.3% of respondents who felt criminality levels (theft, burglary, pick pocketing, carjacking, robbery, cattle rustling and banditry) in the county were a serious concern.

*"80.9 % of the respondents opined that the level of criminal gangs in the County was medium, 33%, low, 39.1%, and very low 8.8%".*




Figure 26 : Levels of political intolerance

#### 4.2.2.8 Political intolerance

Kisumu has traditionally been politically a very active area. The amalgamation of very politically diverse districts into County presented a great challenge since, the County, especially the city, is prone to politically-motivated violence. The traditional tensions have sometimes taken a native clan verses immigrant clan (jo-dak) dimension with political intolerance normally witnessed within and without the ODM party nominations.

This study sought to determine the levels of political intolerance in the County whereby 54.4% of the respondents stated high (22.3%) and very high (32.1) levels of intolerance. Interviewees viewed the 2017 PEV as a culmination of anger towards the perception of being politically marginalized as their preferred presidential candidate, Raila Odinga, was allegedly denied the presidency. The violence that followed involved local communities evicting those they considered non-locals who had been in Kisumu on account of business or employment opportunities. Properties, especially business premises and homes, were looted and burnt, mainly by youth, though women and elderly men were also involved in perpetrating these crimes.

The effects of the "handshake" came into play during the study in which 25.1% of the respondents felt that political intolerance was moderate, 14.0% low and 6.5% very low as shown in Figure 26.

*"About 80% of respondents believe that political intolerance is a cause for concern in Kisumu County".*

#### 4.2.2.9 Equality of opportunities

Like the other parts of the Country, Kisumu County experiences the menace of lack of inclusivity and inequality in distribution of resources. The study observed that majority of residents were not happy with the way distribution of resources and employment was being done at both the County and the national government levels.




Figure 27 : Levels of equality of opportunities including employment



Indeed, 34.4% and 28.4% cited low and very low levels of equality of opportunities which accounts for a cumulative of 62.8% of the total responses. This is quite high. Discussants associated the high levels of inequality in the distribution of resources with politics whereby opportunities are shared as rewards for political allegiance in which politicians repay their loyal supporters instead of considering expertise. It is also alleged that, ethnicity (being a member of the same clan with top leadership) and nepotism affected employment opportunities in the County.

*“Almost 62.8% of respondents in Kisumu County feel marginalized as far as National and County resource distribution and opportunities are concerned and blame rampant political allegiance, ethnicity and nepotism.”*

#### 4.2.2.10 Economic impact of conflicts

The study observed that there were boundary conflicts along the border of Kisumu and Nandi Counties and cattle rustling in Nyakatch. In

general, and as the case is with the other Counties sampled, these conflicts have slowed down investment and development leading to revenue loss. A discussant narrated how they experienced difficulties in interacting with other neighboring communities due to the border conflicts.

*“We are unable to buy milk and vegetables from our neighbors from Nandi County, we definitely have lost business” - Businesswoman at Muhoroni*

Moreover, elections in Kenya are characterized by chaos and demonstrations leading to businesses performing poorly due to high risk of theft of goods and destruction of property when opposing groups clash. The conflicts nonetheless affect sources of livelihood differently with political conflicts cited as having the highest impact, 75.3%, followed by stock theft with 31%, boundary conflicts 6.0%, terrorism 2.3% and land clashes 1.9%.

Table 8: Conflict with the highest impact on the main source of livelihood

Type of Conflict	Frequency	Percent
Political	162	75.3
Stock Theft	31	14.4
Terrorism	5	2.3
Land Clashes	4	1.9
Boundary Conflicts	13	6.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>215</b>	<b>100.0</b>

*“In Kisumu County, political conflicts have the highest impact on livelihood, 75.3%, followed by stock theft, 31%, boundary conflicts 6.0%, terrorism 2.3% and land clashes 1.9%”.*

#### 4.3.3 Nairobi County

The Nairobi City County, like the rest of Kenya continues to face peace and security

challenges that hinder economic development and which disproportionately affects areas that are already poor and marginalized. This report provides a summary of findings from administration of general questionnaires, KII's and FGDs undertaken in the sub-counties of Kibra, Kamkunji and Westlands. It is an effort to determine the status of peace in the County using seven peace indicators; levels of criminality,

levels of refugees/IDPs, likelihood of violent demonstrations and or protests, ease of access to illicit SALW, presence of criminal groups and/or gangs, political instability and equality of opportunities. The report also provides an analysis of the economic impact of conflicts in Nairobi County.

#### 4.3.3.1 Perceptions of Peace in the County

The people of Nairobi believe the County is not peaceful but calm. This assertion is what Johan Galtung (1996) defined to as a “negative peace” - an absence of violence. The study observed that in all the FGDs and KIIs, the respondents felt that the County was not peaceful but calm. It was repeatedly mentioned that the “handshake”

of 9<sup>th</sup> March 2018 brought both peace and conflict and that the prevailing “calmness” was just superficial ceasefire/truce since people still harbored grudges. The study noted that the “hand shake” may have addressed political issues but rapid population growth, unemployment, corruption, poor governance and nepotism remained unresolved. The assertion for “negative peace” got more backing in Kangemi where, respondents claimed some people were buying only from certain shops owned by their community members. The study observed that only 19.2% of respondents believed there was peace in Nairobi County. This was as opposed to 31.3% who believed the state of peace was either low or very low. Indeed, a majority, 49.5% found the state of peace as moderate.




Figure 28 : State of peace in Nairobi County

The study noted that people were bitter about many issues including demolitions, cost of living, political uncertainties' (after the hand shake) and corruption among others. Further, there were feelings that some tribes were being targeted after the handshake. As one participant explained:

*“There is peace but much anxiety. ‘The current situation is like a volcano waiting to erupt’<sup>56</sup>.”*

<sup>56</sup> A remark by a FGD participant while reacting to a question on the status of peace in Nairobi. Meeting held in 2018.

*“Nairobi is simply calm but not peaceful. Almost 50% of respondents believe the state of peace was moderate with 31.3% opining the level of peacefulness was simply low”.*

### 4.3.3.2 Levels of criminality

The crime level in Nairobi County is high. This was the observation of majority of respondents, 72.3%, who felt the levels of crime were high, 52.7% and very high, 19.6%. The increment in crime can be attributed to a number of factors including the recent demolition/destruction of property in Kibra, Westlands and other areas. The findings also appear to concur with the National Police Service Report on crime for January-March 2018 quarter<sup>57</sup>, where “the Police recorded an increase of 1,448 crime cases

between January and March 2018, translating to a 7% rise from the 19,815 incidents reported to the police in the previous year”.

The study was informed that crime was rampant in Kayole and Eastleigh where it is believed to be home to Gaza, a criminal outfit. In Kayole, residents mentioned places like Njiru (chokaa), “corner” and various bus stops as hotspots for crime. In Eastleigh, KI expressed fears that crime was likely to increase due to alleged criminalization and extrajudicial killing of youth that seemed to be creating anger among the youth hence high chances of revenge. It was further alleged that the youth were being arrested on flimsy excuses such as mode of dressing, ‘comfort bases’ and hairstyles among others. On the other hand, only 10% of respondents believed crime levels were low, 6% and very low, 4%.




Figure 29 : Level of crime

In Kangemi, the area along Waiyaki way, around Kianda School was isolated as notorious for muggings and mobile phone thefts. The area referred to as “Sodom” was also identified as notorious for burglary. The increased crime levels in Kangemi were partly attributed to the demolitions in Westlands market which rendered many youth jobless and partly due to increased urban-slum population.

*“The crime level in Nairobi County is high. This was the observation of majority of respondents, 72.3%, who felt the levels of crime were high, 52.7% and very high, 19.6%”.*

### 4.3.3.3 Presence of refugees/ IDPs

The study found that there were refugees and IDPs in Nairobi County although the population was low, 36.3% or moderate, 36.3%. The populations are highly dispersed, mobile and reluctant to seek assistance due to fear that they

could be deported or sent to refugee camps. The study found that most of the refugees come from Somalia, Ethiopia and South Sudan among other nations. Though the exact size of the refugee population in Nairobi’s is not known, the Refugee Consortium of Kenya (RCK) approximate the figures to range from 45,000 to 100,000.<sup>58</sup>




Figure 30 : Level of Refugees/IDP's

The number of IDPs is also perceived to be low with majority of the IDPs either retiring to their rural areas or directly absorbed by their families. Residents of Eastleigh felt that the level of refugees especially from Somalia and Ethiopia had increased leading to displacement of indigenous people who are not able to cope with the increased population pressure.

*“There are refugees and IDP's in Nairobi County. This was the perception of 19.2% of respondents who felt the levels were high, 17.4% and very high, 1.8%. A sizeable 36.3% felt the levels were moderate”.*

### 4.3.3.4 Likelihood of violent demonstrations and or protests

The probability of violent demonstrations in Nairobi County is high, 35.6% although an almost equal number of respondents, 30.2% felt it was moderate. The study observed that it was due to the “handshake” that people felt violent demonstrations were not likely to occur. On the other hand, there were feelings that should the “handshake” collapse as political pessimists would want people to believe, then politically instigated demonstrations were bound to

<sup>57</sup> <https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Police-reveal-status-of-crime-in-Kenya/1056-4537974-fo5ebv/index.html>

<sup>58</sup> Sara Pantuliano (2010), *Hidden and Exposed: Urban Refugees in Nairobi, Kenya*



resume. The study was informed that most Nairobi residents strongly believed that the only way to air their grievances and/or communicate to their leaders was through demonstrations.




Figure 31 : Likelihood of demonstrations or protests

The study noted that there were those from both the political camps that were not happy with the truce but they were afraid to say as much. Such a group would like the “handshake” to collapse for their own selfish political interests. What needs to be expedited is the institutionalization of the “handshake” through the BBI in order to insulate it from any political or ethnic sabotage otherwise it will remain a truce build on quick sand.

*“Despite the “hand shake”, 45.9% of residents of Nairobi County believed that chances of demonstrations and or protests were high, 35.6% or very high 10.3%”.*

#### 4.3.3.5 Proliferation of illicit Firearms

The study finds the level of illicit firearms in Nairobi as high, 56.6%. Additionally, a

considerable number of respondents, 15.3% felt illicit arms proliferation in the County were very high. This finding appears to suggest a direct correlation between illicit proliferation of firearms and crime. This is because the level of criminality was also found to be high. The high proliferation of illicit firearms was confirmed by a study by KNFP. In this study, approximately 530,000 and 680,000 firearms are believed to be unlicensed and within civilian hands. Moreover, there were claims both in Kangemi and Eastleigh that some rogue police officers were increasingly hiring their guns to criminals. Eastleigh being the launching pad for North Eastern and Isiolo, there is possibility of easy access to and proliferation of firearms concealed in trucks transporting livestock to Nairobi. The study was informed that in addition to availability of firearms, ammunitions going by the street name “Kambengu” were selling in open markets at merely Kshs. 6 in Mathare.




Figure 32: Level of Illicit Firearm Proliferation

*“Majority of Nairobi residents, 71.9% believe the levels of illicit small arms proliferation in the County was high, 56.6% or very high, 15.3%”.*

#### 4.3.3.6 Presence of Criminal Gangs/ Groups

In all the sample areas in Nairobi, criminal gangs were found to be prevalent under various names like *Kapedo* (motor bikes) which operates between Kianda School and below the bridge. The *Gaza*, which runs part of 42 brothers was said to have split into *yakuza* and *smarter boys* who operates mainly in Kayole and Dandora. *Yakuza* boys mainly operate in Dandora dumpsite and charge an extortion fee of between Kshs. 50 to Kshs. 200 depending on the volume of garbage.<sup>59</sup> A survey done by Standard Media Group revealed that the gang works in cahoots

with security personnel, Matatu crews and commercial sex workers. The matatu crew and the sex workers role is to identify and report to the gang, men and women with large amounts of money or expensive phones. Showground Boys, Mustard Boys, Jam Street, Sitaki Kujua, Hapana Tambua, Shah Boys (Shamahir), and Kamjesh in Eastleigh all fragmented from the original gang “super power”. The gangs, especially those around Matatu SACCOs, charge extortion fee of Khs. 100,000 to allow a new Matatu to join the routes they control. The study was informed that some of the criminal gangs and groups were privately managed by politicians largely because slum economic conditions conscript many youth to idleness hence vulnerable to recruitment into various criminal groups. The study observed that majority of people in Nairobi believed that the presence of criminal gangs was high, 59.1% or very high 19.6%. Cumulatively, 78.7% of

<sup>56</sup> <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001271529/nightmare-bloody-reign-of-gaza>

respondents believe criminal gangs in Nairobi were prevalent.

“Almost 80% of residents of Nairobi believe the city is marred with criminal gangs with most of them associated with slums and politicians”




Figure 33 : Level of presence of criminal gangs/ groups

4.3.3.7 Equality of opportunities including Employment

Figure 34 below illustrates the respondents’ perceptions on the level of equality of opportunities in Nairobi County. The study found out that 34.5% of the respondents felt that the equality level was low, 19.6% moderate while 18.5% felt it was very low. 14.9% and 12.5% felt the levels of equality were high and very high respectively. In all FGDs, there was general view that although opportunities actually exist both at National and County levels, there were acute levels of discrimination. It was opined that ethnicity, clannism and nepotism were rife in terms of employment and tendering opportunities hence leading to poor performance and or non-delivery of services. The study also

observed that age and marital status were the basic determinants of employment in Nairobi County. From the FGD’s, the study learnt that most employers were not ready to employ married women because they think marital obligations may hinder delivery of service.




Figure 34 : Level of equality of opportunities including employment

“53% of residents of Nairobi County decri discrimination in county jobs and tenders in terms of tribe, sex or political affiliation”.

4.3.3.8 Economic Impact of Conflict

Nairobi County is the country’s economic capital contributing about 60% of Kenya’s GDP<sup>60</sup>. This means that any political, social or economic event that affects Nairobi will cumulatively disrupt its economic potential, in the process affecting the economy of the whole country and East Africa by extension.

The study noted that high crime level has affected the economies of the Nairobi in several ways. In Kibera as in other slums, most businesses, especially M-Pesa shops and small scale traders have to close early for fear of robbers thus affecting the desire for 24-hour economy. Unpredictable demonstrations or protest has

also negatively affected the Nairobi economy since businesses are either looted, destroyed or vandalized during such occasions thereby scaring off would be new investors. In retrospect, in Eastleigh, where 24 hour economy thrives, the crime level was found to be relatively low except in areas around Mlango kubwa where mugging, burglary and or daylight theft and robberies are the order of the day.

The study observed that political conflicts had the highest impact on the economy. In fact, 92.5% of respondents felt that conflicts associated with politics had the greatest negative effect on the economy. The huge percentage could be attributed to political instability experienced in the country during 2017-2018 general elections whereby many people closed their businesses; property vandalized and looted rendering many homeless, and many others losing their jobs as a result of political protests.

<sup>60</sup> <http://www.kenya-information-guide.com/nairobi-business.html>






Figure 35 : Conflicts with the highest impact on sources of livelihoods

Other conflicts such as terrorism, land clashes, tribalism, stock theft and boundary conflicts contributed a smaller percent.

*"In Nairobi County, an overwhelming majority of 92.5% identified political conflicts as having the highest impact on their sources of livelihoods".*

#### 4.4 Additional Peace Indicators

The respondents were asked to rank additional peace indicators that could be used to measure levels of peace in the County. The following is a summary of their responses.

Table 12 : Additional peace indicators

Peace Indicators	Frequency	Percent
No response	82	11.5
Intermarriage	9	1.3
Level of crime	21	2.9
Youth empowerment	30	4.2
Availability of jobs	128	18.0
Respect of rule of law	14	2.0
Political tolerance	69	9.7
Equality in distribution of resources	35	4.9
Corruption	32	4.5
Cohesion and reconciliation	100	14.0
Extrajudicial killings	8	1.1
Historical injustices	3	.4
Poverty	7	1.0
Tribalism	29	4.1
Security	60	8.4
Respect for Human Rights	21	2.9
Free and fair elections	7	1.0
Proliferation	6	.8
Presence of refugees/IDPS	4	.6
Level of education	10	1.4
Demonstrations/protests	8	1.1
Trade	27	3.8
Religious intolerance	3	.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>713</b>	<b>100.0</b>

It is interesting to note that availability of jobs/ youth employment, levels of cohesion/ reconciliation, general security/crime levels and political tolerance were ranked as the most appropriate indicators of peace in Kenya. Considering that the three sampled counties are cities where thousands of young men and women migrate to each year in search of jobs,

then it is not far-fetched for availability of jobs/ youth employment being the top most suggested indicator for peace.

Other additional indicators mentioned included equality in distribution of resources, corruption levels, levels of tribalism/negative ethnicity, levels of trade across community borders (especially in

areas where there are boundary contestations), respect for human rights especially linked to extra-judicial killings and respect for the rule of law. These could be factored in future research processes in determining the state of peace in Kenya.

It was also interesting to note that corruption was also mentioned as crucial indicator in determining the state of peace in Kenya. This could be attributed to the numerous corruption or alleged misappropriation of funds by individuals tasked with offering services or addressing some of the key factors contributing to conflicts in Kenya. The crackdown on those individuals has brought forth issues of tribalism as individuals accuse some of the institutions of targeting their 'own' people. According to Delattre (2018), corruption significantly weakens institutions that safeguard the rule of law, leads to drastic economic disparity and

promotes organized crime and the financing of terrorism. Generally, corruption undermines the security and the political, economic and social development of a country. In that regard, it can be an obstacle to peace and security especially in countries where institutions tasked with fighting the vice are weak<sup>61</sup>.

It is therefore important to include corruption levels as one of the indicators of determining status of peace in Kenya.

<sup>60</sup> Corruption and Security Statement by Mr. François Delattre, Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations Security Council - 10 September 2018. Accessed on 5th April, 2019. Available at: <https://onu.delegfrance.org/Corruption-is-a-threat-to-peace-and-development>.

## CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS



This chapter concludes the study as well as prescribes key policy and practice recommendations to be considered by key peace building stakeholders, including the National Government, County Governments and civil society. The conclusions and recommendations are not in any way comprehensive or conclusive given the methodological inadequacies occasioned by limited sampling of the counties to represent the whole country. Nevertheless, general conclusions and recommendations that resonate with the whole country are made.

### 5.1 Conclusion

The study has established that Kenya is relatively peaceful, at 51.1% peace mark– thanks to a number of factors and mainly the now famous “handshake” of March 9, 2018 between President Uhuru Kenyatta and NASA leader, Raila Odinga. The “handshake”, which has since been embraced across the country, has been a major peace and stabilizing factor. Although there might be different political interpretations of the “handshake”, the common denominator is that it has stabilized the country.

To operationalize the “handshake”, the two leaders established the BBI, led by a committee of 14 prominent Kenyans, to spearhead the

national healing and reforms process in the country. Part of the committee’s agenda is to identify and suggest solutions to the issues that keep on dividing and polarizing Kenyans during electoral processes. However, and since the “handshake”, little has been done to move this agenda forward. Pundits are warning that the timing, goodwill and momentum for the BBI is running out. Macharia Gaitho, a well-known columnist with the *Daily Nation* Newspaper, observed that, “We were filled with hope and optimism that, finally, Kenyans would stop burying their heads in the sand, seize the opportunity to exorcise the demons of the past and at last, begin laying the building blocks for a peaceful, stable, united nation where all individuals and communities can claim equal co-ownership. Sadly, it is beginning to look like a dream differed, yet another of those fraudulent political bridges to nowhere that we have been condemned to for so long”<sup>62</sup>.

This study has established that despite the BBI being a major peace and political stabilizing factor; it is still a shaky political truce that may collapse if, in the worst case scenario, one of the

<sup>62</sup> Gaitho, Macharia, 2018, “‘UhuRao’, waken slumbering Building Bridges, graft war”, *Daily Nation*, July 24, 2018 Issue, Nation Media Group, Nairobi.



architects of the “handshake” pulls out. There are those from both the political camps (President Uhuru Kenyatta and NASA leader Raila Odinga) that were not happy with the truce but they are afraid to say as much. Such a group would like the “handshake” to collapse for their own selfish political interests. What needs to be expedited is the institutionalization of the “handshake” through the BBI in order to insulate it from any political or ethnic sabotage otherwise it will remain a truce build on quick sand.

The study has also established that despite of the various challenges, including premature 2022 elections campaigns and the “slumbering” BBI coupled with perceived cracks and or divisions within the major political formations in the country, the country is still in the right direction in terms of peace building. What is perhaps needed is to soldier on with the BBI, community based reconciliation efforts and the intensified war on corruption, something this study found to be a major peace factor, at least according to the sampled respondents in the three Counties.

The study concludes that for the gains brought about by the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, BBI, Big Four Development Blueprint amongst others to be preserved, the country need to continuously guard against political intolerance, perceived inequality in resource allocation including jobs, corruption and political conflicts, which the study found to be major conflict points with the highest impact on the communities’ livelihoods. The current prevailing peace as at the time of this study will only be threatened by inability of the country to guard against these societal interests.

Finally, this study recommends that a regular peace index based on or mostly on the indicators used in this study, will offer the country a useful framework for monitoring and evaluating the progress made by the country in terms of peace building and conflict management. It can be a very useful accountability tool to hold into account those entrusted with positions of authority and power in as far as peace, security and community safety is concerned. Institutions such as NSC should consider adopting this

framework and be the country’s reference point when it comes to peace building matters, including the national peace index.

## 5.2 Recommendations

This study makes the following policy recommendations for the peace building stakeholders.

### 5.2.1 To the Governments (National and County)

1. The National Government agencies such as NSC, NCRC and/or NCIC should purpose to publish annual or regular peace indexes to guide the development aspirations of the country.
2. The County Governments should also publish regular County specific peace indexes to gauge and monitor the levels of peace in the County. Such indexes will be instrumental in guiding County Governments and her partners in designing appropriate peace programmes that will enable the respective counties realize their socio-economic and political potentials.
3. Both the National and County governments should consider adopting the seven peace indicators used in this study or customize its peace indicators for the purposes of conducting annual or regular peace indexes.
4. The Government, through the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, should fast-track the enactment of the National Peace Council Bill. This, and for posterity purposes, will make the National Peace Council the home of the Annual Peace Index.
5. The BBI should be fast-tracked. There is overwhelming goodwill for this initiative that can be used to drive the

peace agenda nationally. Institutions such as NCIC and NSC should find a way of working closely with this initiative for sustainability.

6. Both levels of government should ensure that there is adequate public participation and transparency especially on resource distribution. This should be reflected in the National Budgeting as well as CIDP processes. Inclusive governance can be a cure to many conflict issues in the country.
7. Police should improve analyses of its annual crime reports. In addition to the statistics (quantitative data), a bit of qualitative analysis of the Police Crime Reports will offer more insights on why certain types of crime escalate in certain parts of the country during certain months. Such analyses will inform programming and response options to crime and conflict in the country.
8. NCIC should purpose to produce regular ethnic audits at the two levels of governments with objective of enhancing inclusion in the public service. They should also continue producing Annual Cohesion Indexes for this has been found to be a key determinant of peace in the country. Without a peace index, the cohesion index, which was once published in 2013, could also serve the purpose, at least temporarily.
9. The national government should make corruption a peace and security issue; a national priority. This study has established that corruption is a key driver of conflict and should be viewed as such and not just as an economic crime.

### 5.2.2 To Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and Communities

1. Provide technical support to the two levels of government in developing, rolling out and publishing regular peace indexes.
2. Lobby and promote accountable and inclusive governance in the two levels of the government to improve inclusion, equality in access to opportunities and jobs.
3. Provide technical and material support to the BBI through nationwide peace conversations, research and development of policy options for curing the problem of negative ethnicity and political intolerance.
4. Investigate and highlight cases of corruptions within the two levels of government as one way of addressing the problem of corruption in the country, which has been identified as a key driver of conflicts.
5. Support and demand for meaningful public participation during government’s planning and budget processes.
6. Provide technical support to peace building structures such as peace committees and community policing committees.

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The status of Peace and Economic Impact of Conflicts in Kenya: A case of Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu Counties, is the inaugural status of peace report in Kenya. The report, partly informed by the protracted 2017 presidential elections, also sought to determine the economic impacts of conflicts on the national economy. This report marks the first steps towards the journey to the publication of comprehensive Annual State of Peace Reports in the country. Findings are aimed at informing policy formulation and providing insights on how to address peace and security issues in the country.

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